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THE BURGER COURT AND THE
NEW FEDERALISM:
PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLES
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTORS
IN THE POLITICAL DRAMAS OF THE 1980'st
M. DAVID GELFAND *
During the 1970's, the Burger Court rendered a series of crucial deci-
sions which appear to redefine the relationship among local governments, in-
dividuals. state governments and the federal government. Some of these cases
required rulings on claims that certain local government policy choices had
violated the constitutional rights of individuals,' while others required a de-
termination whether the federal or the local policy choice should prevail. 2
They involved such diverse subjects as the zoning practices of a Chicago sub-
urb, alleged to infringe upon equal protection rights, 3 and the conditions at-
tached to receipt of federal health care funds, alleged to violate the tenth
amendment. 4 In some cases, local government policy decisions were upheld; 5
in others, they were invalidated.° Though city attorneys, real estate develop-
t Copyright © 1980 by M. David Gelland.
* Associate Professor, Tulane Law Sahool.J.D., 1976, Columbia University
Law School; M. Phil., 1974, Oxford University; B.A., 1971, Columbia University. The
amhor gratefully acknowledges the utterly invaluable assistance provided by Lisa Shel-
ton at every stage of the development of this ankle, from early research through final
editing. Research assistance on various portions of the article was also provided by Sue
Peppard, Bill Cassell, Russell Stegeman, Michael Magner, and Stacy White.
' See, e.g.. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland. 43I U.S. 494 (1977): Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
▪ See, e.g., City of Rome v. United Suites, 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980); North
Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978); Bre.,.. v. EPA, 431 U.S. 99 (1077): National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
3 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1077).
• North Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
• See, e.g., Ambacli v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S, 252 (1977); National
League of Cities v. Userv, 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment. 100
S. Ct. 826 (1980); U.S. Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977): Hynes v. Mayor &
Council of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
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ers, environmentalists and others whose plans revolve around municipal af-
fairs must seek guidance from this entire range of opinions, commentators
have generally focused upon a single term of the Burger Court or have sur-
veyed only decisions in particular fields. By contrast, this article explores an
array of Burger Court decisions in a variety of fields that impact directly
upon local governments as political entities. It attempts, first., to articulate the
themes underlying the Court's developing federalism and, second, to suggest.
the conceptual and practical shortcomings of these themes.'
'l'he first section views federalism, as expounded by the Burger Court.,
front a local government perspective. A general pattern of broad judicial def-
erence to local government programmatic choices, as against constitutional
rights asserted by individual litigants, emerges. This federalism-based defer-
ence to local "self-rule-
 is, however, subsumed within a larger pattern of
Burger Court deference to Congress. Though the Court has made a brief and
dramatic attempt. to impose some limits on congressional interference with
local governments in their capacity as providers of services,' this doctrinal
innovation appears likely to protect little more than local (and state) govern-
ment_ structural arrangements. The result is that appropriately crafted con-
gressional enactments, whether to advance individual rights or to promote
general welfare, can nearly always overbear the Court-espoused federalism
rest.raints on national policymaking.
Since a congressional spending program (with conditions reflecting na-
tional goals attached to the receipt of federal aid) is the most effective means
of overriding "state sovereignty -
 and local government authority, the article
next turns to an analysis of the current local financial pressures created by the
taxpayers' revolt and urban fiscal crises of the 1970's. These pressures, it. is
suggested, severely impair the ability of local government officials to bargain
with federal administrators for assistance and, as a corollary, force the former
to accept_ increased federal control over their affairs. Hence, the restraints
upon federal government overreaching in this relationship will be the result
more of financial than of judicial developments. Indeed, some of the Court's
recent ()pinions may actually weaken the overall bargaining position of local
government actors.
Finally, the article examines the area of aesthetic and environmental reg-
ulation as a case-in-point. to illuminate and test the conclusions reached. It
then projects likely political and legal scenarios for local governments during
the new decade.
I. SETTING THE STAGE— POLITICAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL. PRINCIPLES
A. Local Governmen! Roles
"It is for men to choose whether they will govern themselves or
be governed."
—Henry Ward Beecher (1887)"
While much of the analysis applies to state-federal relations as well, this
article examines the Burger Court's constitutional development primarily through a
local government lens.
" See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1975).
H. BEECHER, PROVERRS FROM PLYMOUTH PULPIT (1887).
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"Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for
human wants."
—Edmund Burke (1790) 1 °
The social science literature about American local government identifies
two principal governmental roles: (a) local governments are (or can he) organs
of democratic self-rule, and (b) local governments provide basic public services
to their constituents." Since controlling the provision and mix of local ser-
vices is an important reason for seeking and maintaining political self-rule,
these two local government roles are often interrelated. Yet, they are concep-
tually distinct perspectives, and they must. be
 distinguished in order to provide
an adequate elaboration and critique of the Burger Court decisions affecting
local government.
The self-rule perspective is a manifestation of the deeply felt notion, ar-
ticulated as part of democratic theory, that government is most effective when
it is closest to the people. It was the principle behind the creation of the
federal system and the Massachusetts town meeting 12 during the early history
of our country, the home rule reforms of the 1875-1912 period," and the
urban "community control" movement in the 1960 . 5. 14 As these historical
" E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 88 0 79 0.
See, e.g.. C. ADRIAN, GOVERNING OUR FIFTY' STATES AND THEIR COMMUNITIES
92-95 (1963); E. BANTFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 18-24 (1963); D. YATES, THE
UNGOVERNABLE CITY; THE POLITICS OF URBAN PROBLEMS AND POLICY MAKING xii-xiii,
4-10 ( I 979).
" See J.F. ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN MEETING: A TexActous
sTrru-rwN (1967).
' These were the "formative years," but many states (especially in New Eng-
land and the South) did not adopt home rule provisions until after World War 11. See
Vancilandinghain, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, III WILLIAM & MARY L. REV.
269, 270, 277 (1908). As a political symbol "home rule" was a rallying cry for munici-
pal reformers, who often did not agree upon the extent of local autonomy to be.
achieved, or the methods of achieving it.. Thus, it was difficult to translate their
abstract political demands into precise constitutional and statutory provisions. See Rich-
land, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York: II, 55 COLUM. L. Rev. 598, 623 (1955);
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role fin: the Courts, 48
MINN. I... REV. 1143, 645 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sandalowl; Sperling, Municipal
Income Taxation and Home Rule, I URB. LAW. 281, 283-84 (1969). Two general princi-
ples can, however, be distilled from the subsequently adopted home rule provisions—
the affirmative grant of local powers to municipalities and the restriction of state legis-
lative interference with municipal affairs. See Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-
/965 Retrospect and Prospect, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 335, 336 (1966): Sandalow, supra, at
667; D. MANDELKER D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL. GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 179-86 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MANDELNER &' NErscia
11 See H. fim,LNIAN. Nerc.:(Inounoon CONTROL OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS (1970); M.
KOTLER. Nrictutouttoon GOVERNMENT 36 (1969); D. YATES, NemnBounoon DEMOC-
RACY 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as YA -res]; Nordlinger & Flartly, Urban Decentraliza-
tion: An Evaluation of Four Models, 20 l'uttue POLICY 359 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Nordlinger & Hardy]. The 19118 conflicts between parents seeking "community con-
trol" over New York City's public schools and the teachers union which opposed it
drew substantial public attention. See M. BERUBE S.: M. GITFELL. CONFRONTATION AT
OCEAN HILL-BuowNsvit.i.e.: NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL STRIKES OF 1008 (1969); N.
LEVINE R. Colt EN, OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVIIA.E: SCHOOLS IN CRISIS (1909). For sub-
sequent developments, see Rebell, New York's School Decentralization Law: Two and a Half
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examples suggest, self-rule actually is composed of two subelements—citizen
participation and community self-determination. The first focuses on proce-
dures, such as town meetings and referenda, which make it possible for local
citizens to participate in government decisions. -Ihe second involves the power
of a local majority to make collective choices about the character, composition,
and quality of its community, free of interferences from Other levels of gov-
ernment.' .' Although there are important differences, both citizen participa-
tion and community self-determination place substantial emphasis upon input
into decisionmaking and control over the local political process. They both
raise the question, Who decides?"'"
On the other hand. many citizens and commentators have adopted
Burke's notion that. government's main purpose or role is to provide ser-
vices.' 7 Under this view, local government is merely an administrative unit.
within a larger system of state and federal public authorities, and .functional
efficiency—output—is the primary value. The principal policy question then
becomes which level of government will most efficiently provide various pub-
lic services.'" The main concern is not who controls decisions about service
delivery, but rather the levels, costs, and types of services delivered.
B. Legal Typecasting
In the United Stales, because of the institutionalization of the federal
system in the national Constitution and of home rule in state constitutions (or
statutes), these general political concepts are considered, if at all, only in the
Years Later, 2 ,[.L. &
	 1, 20, 30 (1073); Comment, Conflict Resolution in a Politically
Decentralized Local Government Syslem, I I COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 629 (1975).
1 ' For a discussion of the importance of slate sovereignty as a means of pro-
tecting individual participation as well as improving governmental processes, see Ka-
den, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 CoLum. L. Rev. 847,
853-57 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kaden].
1 " Urban political scientists have long been concerned with the question of"
who has power. The community power debate often involved acrimonious exchange
between the "power elite" school, with Floyd Hunter as progenitor, and the "pluralist"
school, led by Robert Dahl. See R. DAHL WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN
AN AMERICAN CITY (1061); F. HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE (I053). Modern
policy studies revolve around touch more detailed questions about the process of
decision-making and the exercise of power through the policy-making process. See
YA'rFs, supra note 14, at 10-11; see also Clark, Who Governs, Where, When and with What
Effects? in CosistusaTv STRucruRe AND DECISION-MAKING: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES (T.
Clark ed. 1968).
17 This was fur example, the perspective of those who advocated administra-
tive decentralization as an alternative to community control. See, e.g., Connery, , Govern-
ing the City, in GOVERNING THE CITY 6 (R. Connery & D. Caralcy eds. 1969); Kaufman,
Bureaucrats and Organized Civil Servants, in id. at 45, 53; Macchiarola, Decentralization —
the Right Answer to the Wrong Questions?, N.Y. AFFAIRS 111,  1 14 (Spring 1974). See also
Nordlinger & Hardy, supra note 14, at 359, 381-83.
See Gelfand, Decentralization —London and New York, at 1-6, 15-18 (Trinity
Term 1974) (M. Phil, thesis, Oxford Univ.) [hereinafter cited as Gelland, Decen-
tralization]. See generally R. DAHL & E. TUFre, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973); AREA AND
POWER, A THEORY 4).E LOCAL. GOVERNMENT (A. Maass ed. 1950).
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context of narrower legal issues. Put in simplest. form, when a particular local
government "action"'" is judicially challenged, the court must ask itself:
(1) does this government have the authority to perform this action?;
(2) does some other (special district, state, federal) government have
conflicting authority and, if so, which should prevail?; and
(3) is this action beyond the scope of any government's authority?
The first question, which involves tracing grants of authority through
constitutions, statutes, and ordinances, is not considered in this article. The
second question requires the resolution of conflicts among federal, state, and
local prerogatives. The Burger Court's handling of federal-local (and federal-
state) conflicts, with its emphasis on the service-provider role of local (and
state) government, is developed in Section III. State-local conflicts are consid-
ered in this article only insofar as they are affected by the resolution of other
types of conflicts. 20 The third question involves a determination whether the
challenged exercise of local government self-rule is delimited by individual
rights. The Burger Court's approach to this question is elaborated in the next
section.
11. RAISING THE CURTAIN-
THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED
The Burger Court has shown its greatest deference to local self-rule in
cases where it has rejected claims against local governments premised directly
upon the Constitution. This deferential pattern is reflected not only in the
Court's treatment of numerous substantive constitutional rights, but also in its
handling of matters that might. generally be considered procedural. In all
these cases, the Court has ruled, in effect, that local self-determination over-
rides both individual choice and federal court decisionmaking at the behest of
individuals, reserving only a limited exception for "fundamental" individual
rights. While not always clearly articulated, the justification for these rulings
appears to rest upon traditional majoritarian democratic theory, favoring au .-
thoritative decisionmaking by local political bodies over decisions by non-
elected federal judges. Yet, other decisions of the Court do not show the re-
spect for citizen participation which majoritarian democratic theory seems to
dictate.
" It should he noted that inaction (a "nondecision") by government may
often be just as significant as an affirmative act, and therefore may be subject to judi-
cial challenge as well. For example, the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), were attacking a refusal to
rezone. See generally P. BACHRACH & M. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 3-16 (1970) (arguing that "nondecisions" form a critical part of the political
process); NI. CRENsoN, THE UN-POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION: A STUDY OF NON-
DECISIONMAKING IN THE CITIES (1971).
2 " For example, by requiring an express delegation from the State in order to
protect a locality against antitrust liability, the ruling in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power and Light, 435 U.S. 38Y (1978), may well undercut the pattern of broad-based
home rule grants now employed in most states.
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A. Individual Choice vs. Community
Self-Determination: Character Development
1. Land Use and Exclusion
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpora-
tion, 2 ' potential developers of a federally subsidized low and moderate income
housing project and a black prospective tenant 22 sued a Chicago suburb,
which had a population of 64,000 persons, only 27 of whom were black. 23
These plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling the Village Board to rezone
a 15-acre tract from single to multi-family residential, contending that the
Board's refusal to rezone was racially motivated in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24 The Supreme Court ruled
that plaintiffs' showing of the racially discriminatory effects of the Village
Board's zoning decision was insufficient to establish an equal protection viola-
tion. 25 Instead, the majority required proof of a governmental intent or
purpose to discriminate on racial grounds, 26 to be demonstrated primarily on
21 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
22
 Id. at 261-64.
22
 Id. at 254-55.
24 Id. at 254. The equal protection clause provides: "[N]or shall any State ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST, amend. XIV, § 1.
Id, at 254-65. The Court relied upon the equal protection test employed in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 29 (1976). Plaintiffs there were unsuccessful black can-
didates for the District of Columbia police force, who claimed that the unvalidated
pencil-and-paper aptitude test required by the District violated the equal protection
clause because blacks failed it at four times the rate of whites. The Davis Court held
that the District of Columbia had a legitimate interest in increasing the literacy of its
police force and that plaintiffs' showing of a disproportionate impact was insufficient
to prove an equal protection violation. Id. at 245-46. The Davis Court strained to dis-
tinguish prior Supreme Court cases which it admitted contained "some indications to
the contrary" and overruled a substantial number of lower court cases that had applied
the disparate impact standard to equal protection claims in a variety of areas. Id. at
242, 244 n.12, 245. See generally Bienstock„Section 1983 Problems and Concerns, in S.
RosEN, G. STRICKLER H. TEITELBAUM, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 83, 95-96
(1979). More recently, the Court, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980),
employed the governmental intent. test. to uphold a local government's at-large election
system against an attack based on the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The
Court relied heavily on Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights for the proposition
that "'a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose.'" 100 S. Ct. at 1501. For a full discussion of City of Mobile, see
notes 127-38 infra and accompanying text.
2"
 429 U.S. at 265. Intuitively, wealth discrimination might seem more to the
point in a case like Arlington Heights, However, a showing of wealth discrimination
alone would have been insufficient in light of prior Burger Court rulings that wealth is
not a suspect classification invoking strict judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971),
and that housing is not a fundamental interest such that an infringement would re-
quire strict. judicial scrutiny. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). The
minimum rationality needed to justify local government wealth discrimination with re-
spect to public housing could be net by showing that such discrimination served the
community's fiscal interest, such as preserving property values and maintaining a
higher tax base. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976)
May 1980]
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the basis of the procedural history of the zoning enactment or decision. 27
The Court then concluded that plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden
under these newly articulated standards." It noted that the challenged re-
fusal to rezone was consistent with the Village's usual policy on placement of
multi-family housing, 29 and that the record reflected no procedural flaws or
racially oriented statements by the Village Board or Plan Commission. 30
(upholding mandatory local referendum for zoning amendments); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1134 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE1. See also R. FISHMAN,
HOUSING FOR ALL 131 (1978).
" 429 U.S. at 257-68. The Arlington Heights majority first noted that "impact
alone is not determinative" but only a starting point for inquiry. Id. at 266. It then
listed the f011owing factors to be considered in deciding if racially discriminatory intent
is present: (I) whether a "series of official actions [had been] taken for invidious pur-
poses:" (2) what "the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision"
was: (3) whether there were departures from procedures "usually considered impor-
tant by the decisionmaker;" and (4) what the administrative or legislative history of the
challenged enactment revealed via "contemporary statements by members of the de-
cisiotunaking body. minutes of its meetings, or reports." Id. at 267-68. Its focus upon
the details of the governmental decisionmaking process, rather than upon the out-
comes in terms of housing availability, indicates that the Arlington Heights Court viewed
housing and the zoning process from the self-rule rather than the service-provider
perspective. For a helpful critique of the Court's approach, see Lamb & Lustig, The
Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Activist-Restraint Debate, 40 U. PITT. L. Rtw.
169, 200-06 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Lamb & Lustig].
" The following footnote from the majority's opinion is particularly illuminat-
ing:
Respondents complain that the District Court unduly limited their efforts
to prove that the Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes, since it
forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at the time
they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the cir-
cumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivation would
otherwise have been proper.... Respondents were allowed, both during
the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board members fully about
materials and information available to them at the time of decision. In light
of respondents' repeated insistence that it was effect and not motivation
which would make out a constitutional violation, the District Court's action
was not improper.
429 U.S. at 270 n.20. The Court was asking the litigants to anticipate its change from
the discriminatory impact standard, even though Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), sec note 25 supra, was not rendered until more than a year after the trial in
Arlington Heights.
2" 429 U.S. at 269. The Court observed that "t.he Village is undeniably com-
mitted to single family homes as its dominant residential land use." Id.
"" Id. at 270. The dissenters thought the case should have been remanded to
the court of appeals to review the evidence in light of Davis. 429 U.S. at 271-72 (Mar-
shall, joined by Brennan. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 272-74
(White, j., dissenting) (contending that both the statutory and constitutional issues
should be remanded, with the statutory issue to be considered first). The Court's re-
mand, 429 U.S. at 271. covered only the statutory issue—whether there had been a
violation of Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1976). See
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978) (arguing the remand in Arlington Heights "would have been unneces-
sary" unless intent was not, an element of Title VIII claim, since trial court had already
determined no discriminatory intent present); Comment, A Last Stand on Arlington
Heights: Title VIII and the Requirement qf Discriminatory Intent, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150
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The Arlington Heights ruling effectively prevents federal judicial interven-
tion in or supervision over local government zoning schemes, even in the most
extreme exclusionary cases. Indeed, the weight of the burden imposed upon
those who seek to attack such schemes and decisions under the fourteenth
amendment is so great that lower federal courts can he expected to "give
deference to local self-determination even when [local government] decisions
have racially discriminatory impact.""'
When other zoning decisions rendered earlier in Chief Justice Burger's
tenure are reviewed, it becomes clear that Arlington Heights is merely a recent
illustration of a strong trend toward deference to local government self-
determination."' In Village of Belle. Terre v. Boraas," several student tenants,
who were unrelated by blood or marriage, and their landlord challenged an
ordinance that zoned the entire village for single-family residences, 'with "fam-
ily" being defined to include no more than two unrelated persons living and
cooking together in a single household. 34
 Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, unhesitatingly rejected their claims that the ordinance violated their
rights of privacy, travel, association, and equal protection. 35
 In a very clear
statement. of deference to community self-determination, he declared that
local governments have the power to "lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet. seclusion and clean air make the area
a sanctuary for people," and to establish a "quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted." 3 i' Belle Terre can thus be seen as
having laid the foundation for Arlington Heights, by recognizing the authority
of local governments to control the composition of their residential com-
munities through zoning regulations. 37
(1978) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Continent]. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (distinguishing the lower burden borne by plaintiffs in Title VII actions from
that in equal protection actions).
"' McDougal. Contemporary Authoritative Conceptions of Federalism and Exclusion-
art Land Use Planning: A Critique, 21 B.C. L. REV. 301, 316 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
McDougal]. See also Mandelker. Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspec-
tive on Arlington Heights, 55 Ttlx. L. Rev. 1217 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mandelker].
State courts also generally defer to local government programmatic choices in the zon-
ing field. See Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. URB. L.
335, 344-46 (197 I); McDougal, supra, at 342; Sandalow, supra note 13.
3.2 See Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning in the Federal Courts,
17 B.C. Inn. & Com. L. Ruv. 347, 347-49 (1976).
"" 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Although Belle Terre was decided after Burger was ap-
pointed Chief' Justice, its principal judicial protagonists were all leading lights of the
Warren Court —Justice Douglas for the majority and Justices Brennan, id. at 10, and
Marshall, id. at 12, in dissent. Justice Douglas' opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Stewart, Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist.
34
 Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 7. Indeed, he dismissed their claims almost summarily: "[The ordi-
nance in question] involves no *fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution,
such as voting, ... the right of association, ... the right of access to the courts, ... or
any rights of privacy...." Id. (citations omitted).
"" Id. at 9.
" Zoning was originally upheld as a means of regulating the uses of land for
the common good. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1920).
Nfay 1980]
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The Court's later ruling in Warth a. Sekiln," purportedly resting on pro-
cedural grounds, did even more than Belle Terre to insulate local zoning
schemes from federal judicial scrutiny. In Warth, a broad•range of plaintiff's,
including several individuals who claimed to have been illegally excluded front
residence there, sought to challenge the exclusionary purpose and effect c.)f"
the zoning ordinance and practices of Penfield, New York (a suburb of"
Rochester)."" The Court crafted a new "substantial probability" lest that
linked standing to the effectiveness of ultimate relief a federal court might.
give, and it denied standing to all plaintiff's on the ground that their com-
plaint failed to demonstrate that they personally would benefit should a court
grant the requested relief." Justice Powell' added that the political process
was the appropriate arena fur resolving zoning disputes:
Belle Terre, while relying heavily upon Eyelid, went substantially further in upholding a
local government regulation upon the users of land. See Comment, The Power to Regu-
late People: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 55 DENVER L.. J. 311,  324, 327 (1978) [here-
inaher cited as Power to Regulate[. Arlington Heights, in turn, rejected plaintiffs' claims
that local government zoning decisions planned as regulations of land use were actually
covert exclusions of certain land users—low and middle income residents. 429 U.S. at
2611.
" 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
" Id. at 493 - 94.5re Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978) [hereinafter
cit ed as Sager]. Professor Sager's excellent commentary' and critique describes the
Worth plaintiffs as having the "symmetry and mutually supportive qualities of a troop
deployment." Id. at 1376 - 77 n.9. A not-for-profit citizens' housing action group was in
"the vanguard'' (alleging that Penfield's zoning ordinance excluded low and moderate
income persons); Rochester property owners (alleging they had to pay higher taxes to
support Rochester services because lower cost housing with tax abatements remained
in their city rather than in Penfield) and low and moderate income Rochester residents
who were members of minority groups (alleging they had been excluded from Pen-
field) served as the "infantry columns:" and two builders' associations (alleging they
had been prevented from constructing low- and moderate-income housing in Penfield)
were on ''the flanks."
" 422 U.S. at 504-08. Justice Powell, writing for a five-justice majority, stated
the Court's new test for standing as follows:
[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must al-
lege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices
harm him and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way front the
court's intervention.
hl. at 508.
The individual plaintiffs claiming exclusion failed to meet this test, because mute
of them had a current property interest in Penfield, and two apparently had too little
income and one had too much income ur qualify for the one subsidized project that
had been proposed. Id. at 306 & n.16. Justice Brennan's dissent sharply disagreed with
the majority's reading of these income figures. hl. at 527 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court further ruled that none of the many other plaintiffs were properly in
federal court. The Rochester taxpayer's had no standing, because their injury was "con-
jectural,- the "line of causation between Penfield's actions and such injury [was] not
apparent from the complaint," they asserted no "personal right ... to be free of action
by a neighboring municipality," and they could not assert the third party rights of
persons allegedly excluded. Id. at 509-10. Similarly, the citizens' housing action group
had no standing as a Rochester taxpayer or as a citizens' group to raise the constitu-
tional rights of third parties. hl. at 51'2-14. Nor could the builders' associations assert it
claim for injunctive relief' based on the constitutional rights of their members (or pre-
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We also note that zoning laws and their provisions, long considered
essential for urban planning. are peculiarly within the province of
state and local legislative authorities. They are, of course, subject to
judicial review in a proper case. But citizens dissatisfied with provi-
sions of such laws should not overlook the availability of the normal
political process.'
Warth's standing requirement creates an almost insurmountable barrier to
systemic attacks upon exclusionary zoning schemes.'" It permits standing
only for plaintiff's who attack an unfavorable zoning or rezoning decision with
respect to a particular project, such as the attack made in Arlington Heights. 44
sumably those of their potential purchasers) unless a specific proposed project had
been precluded by defendants' actions. hi. at 516. Though one of the members of one
of the builders' associations had previously been denied a zoning variance for a
specific. moderate-income project in Penfield. the Court ruled that any dispute over
this project had been moot by the time the complaint was filed, Id. at 517.
4L
 justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist. These same five justices were in the majority in
both Belle Terre and Arlington Heights. They also composed the five-man majority in
San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), and Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), see notes 47-72 infra and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan dissented in an qpinion joined by Justices White and Marshall.
422'U.S. at 519. He argued that the low-income minority plaintiffs and the two build-
ers' associations had standing. He concluded, "These parties, if their allegations are
proved, certainly have the requisite personal stake in the outcome of this controversy,
and the Court's conclusion otherwise is only a conclusion that this controversy may not
he litigated in a federal court. -
 Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
42 Id, at 508 n.18. Justice Douglas, in dissent, also recognized that questions of
community self-determination, which he likened to those in Belle Terre, were involved:
A clean, safe and well-heated home is not enough for some people. Sonic
want to live where the neighbors are congenial and have social and political
outlooks similar to their own. This problem of sharing areas of the com-
munity is akin to that when one wants to control the kind of person who
shares his own abode.
422 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Yet, his next sentence showed he was pre-
pared to define the "community" more broadly than the majority had. As he viewed
the facts, "Metro-Act. of Rochester, Inc, the citizens' action groupl and the Housing
Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc. ... represent. the communal feeling of the
actual residents .... Their protest against the creation of this segregated community ,
expresses the desire of their members to 'live in a desegregated community." Id. For
this reason, he felt they should be given standing, as were the plaintiffs itt Tral ficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), see note 217 infra and accompany-
ing text, and that the other plaintiffs should he given standing "by virtue of the dignity
of their claim.'' Id. at 519. He concluded, "The zoning power is claimed to have been
used here to foist an un-American ccnntnurtity model on the people of this area. 1
would let the case go to trial and have all the facts brought out." Id. He thus rejected
die most extreme exclusionary implications of his Belle Terre opinion, see notes 33-37
supra and accompanying text.
43 Sager, supra note 39. at 1383. See also Lamb k Lustig, supra note 27, at.
207-22. But see Sandalow, Comment on Ward] v. Seldin, 27 LAND Um; I.. & ZONING
DIGEST, No. IX, at 7 (1975).
44 But cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which
Justice Powell was prepared to be much inure generous with respect. to standing in a
suit challenging the admission requirements of a state educational institution. His at-
tempt to distinguish his Wrath opinion is particularly instructive. See id. at 280 n.4.
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As already noted, however, the Arlington Heights "discriminatory intent" stan-
dard imposes a nearly unbearable burden of proof upon plaintiff's attempting
to overturn local government self-determination decisions in federal courts. In
short, Warth, Belle Terre, and Arlington Heights have largely ended federal court
review of local government" decisions concerning the character of land use
in local communities."
2. Local Finance and Education
The Court has extended similar deference to local government financing
arrangements. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez," residents
of school districts with below average property values and per capita incomes
challenged the school financing scheme in Texas as a deprivation of equal
protection." Like most school systems at that time, Texas schools were fi-
nanced primarily by local real estate taxes, with the result that, districts with
higher property values were able to spend substantially more on education
than poorer districts, even when the latter imposed a higher tax rate. 4" Al-
though state aid, which was distributed partially on the basis of relative taxing
ability, tended to reduce the difference, there was still a wide variation among
districts in dollars spent per student."
The Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, ruled that this school financing
scheme should not be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny by federal courts
because it did not discriminate against "any definable category of 'poor'
people" and did not result in "absolute deprivation of education." 51
 Indeed,
45
 The Burger Court has also retreated from reviewing zoning decisions made
directly by local citizens. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976). See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Both cases are discussed at
greater length in notes 84-101 infra and accompanying text.
4a
 The Court has, however, been willing to enforce congressional statutes im-
posing additional duties upon local governments or expanding the scope of judicial
review of local land use decisions. See notes 200-61 infra and accompanying text.
47 411 U.S. I (1973).
" Id. at 46,
" See id. at 11-16, Thus, even though the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict, "situated in the core-city ... in a residential neighborhood that has little commer-
cial or industrial property," id.. at. 12, made a greater effort by imposing a tax rate of
1.05 per cent., this produced only $26 per student per year above its contribution to
the Foundation Program. In contrast, the Alamo Heights Independent School District,
an affluent residential community, imposed a lower tax rate, only .85 per cent, yet
produced $333 per student per year because of its much higher property values. Id.
al 12-13.
Fora discussion of developments in other states, see MANDELKER & NETSCH, supra
note 113, at 784-9I, 816-28. and sources cited therein.
5"
 Edgewood Independent School District spent $356 per student per year,
while Alamo Heights spent $594 per student per year. 411 U.S. at 12-13.
•1 Id, at 25. The Court described the plaintiffs as a "large. diverse, and
amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that hap-
pen to have less wealth than other districts," id. at 28, and it found no factual basis
for a conclusion that the "poorest people—defined by reference to any level of abso-
lute impecunity—are concentrated in the poorest districts," id. at 23. Professor Coons
offers the following refutation of the court's conclusion:
Wealth is the capacity to purchase a specific good: here that good is educa-
tion.... One buys public education only with public money; he is
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since the Texas scheme was "affirmative and reformatory'," the majority felt it.
"should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the
State's efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the Constitu-
tion.":" 2
 More specifically, justice Powell's Opinion emphasized that judicial
intervention was inappropriate given the Court's lack of expertise, knowledge,
or familiarity with such sensitive and technical matters as state and local tax-
ation and educational policy a 3
 He then found a rational relationship be-
tween Texas' locally based financing system and a legitimate slate interest in
preserving local control over education. Strongly endorsing community self-
determination, justice Powell noted that the Texas scheme
permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and con-
trol of each district's schools at the local level. In an era that has
witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of
government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has
survived. .
[Even the poorest districts] will retain under the present system a
large measure of authority as to how available funds will be allocated
... [and] the power to make numerous other decisions with respect
to the operation of the schools. The people of Texas may be justified
in believing that other systems of school financing; which place more
of the financial responsibility in the hands of the State, will result in
a comparable lessening of' desired local autonomy. That is, they may
believe that along with increased control of the purse strings at the
state level will go increased control over local policies.'
education -poor in the public market if his school district is poor. In the
case of public education, personal wealth and district wealth are identical.
because the only wealth a family has available for the purchase of public
education is that of the school district.... So far as proof of the constintL
tionat violation is concerned, it is proper literally to identify district poverty
with personal poverty.
Coons, Recent Trend:, in Science Fiction: Serrano Among the People of Number, 6 j .L. & En.
23, 38 (1977) (emphasis in original). PrOfessor Tribe argues that neither a definable
class nor absolute deprivation were required by prior wealth discrimination cases. See
TRIBE, supra nine 26, an 1124.
The lack of absolute deprivation served as a basis for the Court's rejection of the
claim that the Texas scheme denied plaintiffs a fundamental interest—education.
While the Court acknowledged that education was a key service provided by state and
local governments, it concluded that funding which provided ''each child with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process" was sufficient. 411
U.S. at 37. The dissents, by contrast, made the service-provider role of state and local
governments the central focus of their attack. See notes 262-321 infra and accompany-
ing text.
justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief' Justice Burger and justices Stewart,
Blackmun. and Rehnquist. justice White dissented in an opinion joined by justices
Douglas and Brennan. 411 U.S. at 63. justice Marshall dissented in an opinion joined
by Justice Douglas. Id. at 70.
" 2 411 U.S. at 39.
'' Id. at 40-43.
54 ld. at 49, 51-53. The Court added that a contrary decision might open the
judicial floodgates, resulting in the drowning of self-determination:
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The Court then added a "cautionary postscript" that the "unprecedented up-
heaval in public education" which a contrary result would produce might. not
result in a benefit. for "the poor, racial minorities, or the children in overbur-
dened core-city school districts" represented by plaintiffs." For all of these
reasons, Justice Powell concluded that "the ultimate solutions must come from
the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them." 5"
Justice White's dissenting opinion accepted community self-
_
determination, in the form of "maximizing local initiative and choice" in edu-
cation, as a legitimate state purpose. Nevertheless, he found the facts simply
did not support the majority's conclusion that the Texas scheme furthered
this goal. i 7 Justice Marshall's dissent took a very different. tack. Rather than
seeing it as a self-rule case, he, like the plaintiffs, focused on school districts as
service-providers." This approach led him to the conclusion that Texas' lo-
cally-based financing scheme prevented the poorest districts from delivering a
constitutionally' adequate level of educational service.'" After attacking the
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional
method of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissi-
ble means of providing other necessary services customarily financed
largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection,
public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We
perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property
taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions.
Id. at 54. This comment may also signal the Court's concern that a contrary ruling
would have required it to examine the mathematical details of financing schemes in
nearly every state, just as the Warren Court had been bogged down with reapportion-
ment cases for so many years. See notes 112-15 & 197-98 infra and accompanying text.
For a collection of cases and commentaries vividly portraying the frustrations of those
state courts, especially New Jersey, which entered this school financing thicket, see
MANDELKER & NEFSCH. supra note 13, at 784 - 828,
" 411 U.S. at 56. In a later opinion, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
Justice Powell developed this same skepticism about the effectiveness of federal court
rulings into a doctrinal ground for denying plaintiff's standing in their broad-based
attack upon a town's zoning scheme. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
5 " 411 U.S. at 59.
57 Id. at 63, 68 (White, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall'S emphasis on the results
of the local political process, rather than on any value inherent in the process itself was
evident in his very first sentence:
The Court today decides, in effect, that a State may constitutionally vary
the quality of education which it offers its children in accordance with the
amount of taxable wealth located in the school districts within which they
reside.
Id. at 70-71. In the next paragraph, he added:
In my judgment, the right of every American to an equal start in life, so
far as the provision of a state service as important as education is con-
cerned, is far too vital to permit state discrimination on grounds as tenuous
as those presented by this record. Nor can I accept the notion that it is
sufficient to remit these appellees to the vagaries of the political process
which, contrary to the majority's suggestion, has proved singularly unsuited
to the task of providing a remedy for this discrimination.
Id. at 71.
5" Id. at 132-33.
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majority's rejection of the strict scrutiny test,"" he criticized its analysis of and
deference to fiscal self-rule. Like Justice White, he noted that the state already
controlled many details of this local service."' Moreover, he insisted that the
claim for fiscal self-determination be linked to the fiscal preconditions for ef-
fective citizen participation:
If Texas had a system truly dedicated to local fiscal control, one
would expect the quality of the educational opportunity provided in
every district to vary with the decision of the voters in that district as
to the level of sacrifice they wish to make for public education. In
fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the opposite result. Local
school districts cannot choose to have the best education in the State
by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of educational
opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined
by the amount of taxable property located in the district —a factor
over which local voters can exercise no control."'
Thus, justice Marshall found the majority's deference to local self-rule highly
inappropriate; he would, instead, have required the Texas school system to
fulfill its service-provider role more equitably.
The lines of conflict between deference to self-rule and insistence on the
obligations of service-providers were drawn even more starkly in a later case
that, at least nominally, dealt with procedural issues. In Milliken v. Bradley,"
Chief justice Burger was joined by the other four members of the Rodriguez
majority in ruling that a federal district court had exceeded its authority by
granting an injunction that consolidated and restructured school district lines
in a three-county metropolitan area outside Detroit, where Detroit alone had
been found guilty of racial segregation in violation of the equal protection
clause."' . Despite a finding by the courts below that "any less comprehensive
a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all black system
immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems,""
"" Id. at 97-98. justice Marshall argued that plaintiffs constituted a recogniza-
ble class for purposes of equal protection analysis ("the children of a district are disad-
vantaged if that district has less taxable property per pupil than the state average," id.
at 9(i) and advocated a sliding scale of judicial review rather than the strict two-tier
approach employed by the majority. Id. at 98-110.
'' Id. at 126-27. Justice Marshall gave the following summary of state in-
volvement:
In Texas, statewide laws regulate in fact the most minute details of local
public education. For example, the State prescribes required courses. All
textbooks mum be submitted for slate approval, and only approved
textbooks may be used. The State has established the qualifications neces-
sary for teaching in Texas public schools and the procedures for obtaining
certification. The State has even legislated on the length of the school day.
hi. (footnotes omitted).
62 hi. at 127-28. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1131 ("[I]nsofar as local control
is a concomitant of local rather than centralized funding, the Texas symeM afforded
local control only to the property-rich districts.").
"3 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
" 4
 Id. at 752-53. justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined Chief' Jus-
tice Burger's opinion, justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion. Id. at 753.
"' Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2(1 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973) (summarizing the
district court's findings), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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the majority declared, "to approve the remedy ordered • would impose on
the [53] outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional
violation, a wholly impermissible remedy." 6 The Court ruled that school
district lines cannot he "casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience," because these lines separate independent governmental au-
thorities responsible for the operation of autonomous school systems." Cit-
ing Rodriguez, it added, "No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools.""
Justice White, joined by the other three Rodriguez dissenters," argued
that under the majority's community self-determination approach, "the State
of Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has
successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation
remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local dis-
tricts." 7" Justice Marshall, as he had in Rodriguez, emphasized the extensive
degree of centralized state control over education. 71
Thus, the prevailing five justices saw Rodriguez and Milliken as self-
determination cases in which it was inappropriate for the federal courts to
interfere with local educational policymaking, which local educational au-
thorities used as a means of defining the character of their communities. Rod-
riguez, in addition, involved the delicacy and difficulty of restructuring state
and local revenue-raising systems. The majority justices in both cases clung to
their view of local governments as institutions for self-rule, despite suggestions
from the four dissenters that this vision did not conform to the fiscal and
88 418 U.S. at 745.
87 Id. at 741. Desegregation plans that apply throughout a large city school
district, but do not cross district lines, subsequently obtained the approval of a clear
majority of the Court. In Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979),
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined the three remaining Milliken dissenters (justices
White, Brennan and Marshall) in upholding such a plan for the entire Columbus
School District, based upon the district court's finding "that at the time of trial there
was systemwide segregation in the Columbus schools that was the result of recent and
remote intentionally segregative actions by the Columbus Board." Id. at 463-64. Even
Chief' Justice Burger, id. at. 468, and Justice Stewart, id. at 469, concurred. In the
companion case, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), the same
five-justice majority upheld a court of appeals ruling that a systemwide remedy was
required where a dual school system had existed in 1954 and the school board had
failed to fulfill its duty to disestablish that system and its effects. This time, however.
Chief Justice Burger and justice Stewart dissented, concluding that the district court's
finding that plaintiff had failed to prove the necessary connection between remote
purposeful segregative actions and current segregation effects was not clearly errone-
ous. 443 U.S. at 478-79. justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented in both Penick and
Brinkman, opposing judicial intrusions upon local control over education. Id. at 479,
489, 542.
68 418 U.S. at 741-42 (emphasis added).
6" Id. at 762 (White, j., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall,
.1.1.),
7" Id. at 763.
71 Id. at 793-98 (Marshall. J.. dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and
White, jj.). Sec note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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administrative realities of the cases before them. The dissenters, by contrast,
saw education as a state service being delivered poorly and inequitably. 72
3. Abuse of the Self-Determination Principle
The Burger Court's conception of self-determination as requiring local
government policymaking and financial arrangements to be free of federal
court intervention found an extreme application in Rizzo v. Goode." There,
in an opinion authored by justice Rehnquist, the Court ruled that a federal
district court had exceeded its equitable powers when it required the
Philadelphia Police Department to create a "comprehensive program for deal-
ing adequately with civilian complaints," even though the district court had
found a "pattern of frequent police violations" of constitutional rights and a
departmental policy that discouraged citizen complaints. 74
 The Supreme
Court majority held that the named plaintiffs in this class action lacked stand-
ing to sue. Although they had been subjected to police mistreatment in the
past, the majority concluded that the named plaintiffs lacked the requisite
personal stake in the outcome, because they might not be subjected to such
treatment in the future. 75
72
 Professor Tribe uses somewhat different terminology to describe the Milli-
ken opinions:
The 5-4 split in Milliken reflects a fundamental disagreement among the
justices concerning the purpose of school desegregation.... For the major-
ity, which defined right and remedy On the basis of the jurisdictional im-
pact of the wrong, state action which contributed directly or vicariously to
the de jure segregation of Detroit schools imposed on the state only the
obligation to effect desegregation within the Detroit district. However, for
the dissenting Justices, who defined right and remedy in terms of out-
comes, the existence of discriminatory state action, direct or vicarious. im-
posed on the state an affirmative obligation to exercise all of its authority,
. including its authority to redraw school district boundaries if' necessary, in
a manner which facilitated desegregation in fact.
TRIBE, supra note 26. at 1038-39 11.5.
73
 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
" Council of Orgs. on Philadelphia Police Accountability & Responsibility v.
Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318-31 (ED. Pa. 1973), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in
part sub 110711. GOOde v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
The trial court had ruled that the more drastic, interventionist remedy sought by one
group of plaintiff's—placing the police department in receivership—was not necessary.
Instead, it required defendants to formulate a detailed program for handling citizen
complaints in accordance with its guidelines, which included revision of police manuals
and rules of procedure. See '357 F. Supp. at 1320-21. "The proposed program,
negotiated between petitioners and respondents for the purpose of complying with the
order, was incorporated six months later into a final judgment." 423 U.S. at 365.
75
 423 U.S. at 372-73. justice Rehnquist opined that plaintiffs' claimed injury
"rests not upon what the named petitioners [city officials] might do to them in the
future but upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to
them in the I uture because of [those] unknown [policemen's] perception of de-
partmental disciplinary procedures." Id. at 372. Characterizing this claim as "even
more attenuated than those allegations of future injury found insufficient in O'Shea to
warrant invocation of federal jurisdiction," id., the Court concluded that the named
plaintiffs did not present a "case or controversy." Id. at 373. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488 (1974), was a class action attack on the allegedly discriminatory bond-setting,
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Despite its conclusion that no case or controversy existed, the Rizzo Court
went on to rule that federal judicial interference with internal police depart-
ment_ procedures was, in any event, inappropriate." It concluded that there
were too few incidents of police brutality to justify the new complaint proce-
dures and that the failure of high-level local officials to supervise patrolmen
could not justify broad judicial relief affecting the entire police department.
The majority further opined that this intervention in delicate local govern-
ment policy matters violated principles of federalism . 77
 Justice Rehnquist
even went so far as to analogize Rizzo to inapt. Burger Court. decisions restrict-
ing federal court interference with prior state judicial proceedings."
sentencing, and jury - ke assessment practices of a county judge and magistrate. The
Court ruled the threatened injury was "too remote" to present a justiciable con-
troversy, because the O'Shea plaintiffs could only be subjected to the allegedly uncon-
stitutional practices if they violated a valid law and were then validly arrested. Id. at.
498. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Rizzo distinguished O'Shea on the ground that the
Rizzo plaintiffs were "'persons' injured by past unconstitutional conduct (an allegation
not made in the O'Shea complaint) and fear injury at the hands of the police regardless
of whether they have violated a valid law." 423 U.S. at 383.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Stewart, and Powell. Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall.
" 423 U.S. at 373-80.
" Id. at. 375-76, 380. Apparently, police supervisory officials were sued be-
cause: (1) municipalities could not, at that time, be sued directly under 42 U.S.C:.
1983, see notes 181-91 infra and accompanying text, and (2) a broadly worded injunc-
tion against individual policemen would involve too great an intermeddling by the
federal court with daily police affairs. See 423 U.S. at 381. 386-87 (Blackmun, J.. dis-
senting); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV, L. REv. 56, 239-40 n.11 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as 1975 Term]. For a post-Rizzo order prohibiting more specific police
misconduct where supervisory officials were directly involved, see P.A.B., Inc. v. Stack,
440 F. Supp. 937 (Si)., Fla. 1977) (the author served as co-counsel for plaintiffs). An
excellent. discussion of the difficulties of formulating "the elaborate affirmative decree"
involving the operation of a state or a local government agency appears in Friendly,
The Courts and Social Policy; Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 21, 40-41
(1978). See also Chayncs, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1296-1302 (197(i).
" 423 U.S. at 378-80. The first such abstention case was Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), in which the Court announced that equity, comity, and federalism
prevent federal injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings. in the absence
of had faith prosecution or other extraordinary circumstances. /d. at 53. The Younger
abstention principle has been extended by the Burger Court to include state-initiated
civil proceedings, Huffman v. Pursue, 1,1(1., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.), and
state criminal actions commenced before "proceedings of substance on the merits"
have taken place in a prior federal injunctive suit, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975) (White, J.). See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (Younger
absention appropriate where pending state custody proceedings raised similar issues);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (White. J.) (abstention from interference
with state-initiated proceeding to recover welfare payments and accompanying gar-
nishment action); juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[Wle
think the salient fact is that federal court interference with the State contempt process
is 'an offense to the State interest,'" whether contempt be labeled civil, quasi-criminal,
or criminal). See generally Comment, Closing the Courthouse Door: 'The Expanding Rationale
of Younger Abstention, 19 B.C. L. REV. 699 (1978).
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In Rizzo the Court strayed far from the Belle Terre and Rodriguez concep-
tion of self-determination as a means fin. local communities to determine their
character without outside interference. 7" Rizzo does, nevertheless, have many
of the same practical effects as some of the community self-determination
cases. Like Worth, it requires a judicial focus on individual cases of unconstitu-
tional conduct—rezoning particular parcels or discrete instances of police
brutality." Like Milliken, it shows antipathy for broad structural federal in-
junctions."' Like Arlington Heights, it creates a substantive test that requires
plaintiffs to delve into the discriminatory motives of public officials, rather
than permitting them to rely upon the effects of official conduct, to prove
constitutional violations." Yet, unlike these opinions, Rizzo is not linked to
the democratic concerns which are the driving spirit behind community self-
determination. Instead, the emphasis in Rizzo is upon federal court respect for
the integrity of local government institutional structures as an end in itself."
As the next section shows, this institutional emphasis reflects an inadequate
conception of the self-rule role of local government.
B. Citizen Participation vs. Community
Self-Determination: The Actors Should Respond
Arguments for deference to community self-determination are most ef-
fective when linked to the other aspect of self-rule—citizen participation. In
other words, the claim for local political independence from outside control is
strongest. when the local government can demonstrate that. its actions, in fact,
reflect the will of its citizens, who have participated in formulating the policies
The Court has, however, noted that the Younger principles of equity. comity, and
federalism "have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding." Steffel v.
7 1-hompson, 415 U.S. 452. 462 (1974). See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)
(Burger. C.J.): Alice v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974); Lake Carriers Ass'n v.
MacMullan. 406 U.S, 498, 509 (1972). Indeed, the analogy to Younger abstention scents
particularly inappropriate in the Rizzo context. When a federal court abstains under
Younger and its progeny, it is merely requiring the federal plaintiff 10 attempt to vindi-
cate his or her federal rights as a defendant in an ongoing criminal, quasi-criminal or
state-initiated civil proceeding. thereby allowing valid prior state court action to con-
tinue and avoiding duplication of judicial effort. The Rizzo plaintiffs, on the other
hand, were complaining that the existing processes—citizen complaint procedures—
for vindicating their individual rights against their local government were fundamen-
tally unfair. Rizzo actually encouraged judicial duplication by inrcing them to file and
reprove their federal constitutional case in state court. See "num:. supra note 26, at 156:
1975 Term, supra note 77, at 244-46.
7 " See notes 33-37 & 47-62 supra and accompanying text.
'" See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 63-72 supra and accompanying text. At least in Milliken the dis-
trict court had found that there was no racial discrimination by suburban school dis-
tricts, while in Rizzo there was a showing of inadequate supervision by the defendant
officials subjected to the trial court's injunction.
See notes 21-31 supra and accompanying text.
"	 Rehnquist, The Adversary Society: keynote Address of the Third Annual Baron
de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. Nfinmi L. Ri•v. 1 (1978) (arguing that judicial inter-
ference with labor unions, churches. zinc! families is disruptive of important, internal
institutional relationships).
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behind those actions. Local citizen participation may develop in a variety of
ways, ranging from voting for representatives to direct involvement in
policymaking as a local official. The Burger Court has shown a strong prefer-
ence for decisionmaking by direct local citizen participation in referenda, but
it apparently sees little role for the federal courts in assuring that other, less
direct, avenues of participation remain open to all members of the commun-
ity.
1. Referenda
Not surprisingly, the Burger Court has found no constitutional violation
when the outcomes of local referenda override the policy determinations of
elected local representatives, even where these referenda outcomes have se-
vere exclusionary effects. The first such case considered by the Burger Court
was James v. Valtierra," announced in 1971. There, a five-justice majority"`'
rejected an equal protection attack on a California constitutional provision
requiring all "low-rent housing project[s1" developed by a state or local gov-
ernment agency to be "approved by a majority of those voting at a community
election." 86 The Court emphasized that the provision in question did not
involve an explicit racial classification," and it rejected plaintiffs-appellees' ar-
gument_ that strict judicial scrutiny should be applied because of the additional
political burden the referendum requirement imposed on the poor." Citing
California's long history of employing local referenda on a variety of sub-
jects,"" the Court. concluded that, mandatory public housing referenda merely
reflected the state's "devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or
prejudice.''In a statement clearly linking self-determination, citizen par-
ticipation, and local fiscal decisionmaking, the Court concluded:
This procedure ensures that all people of a community will have a
voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local
government funds for increased public services and to lower tax rev-
84
 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
8
 hi. Justice Black's opinon for the Court was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion was
joined by justices Brennan and Blackmun. hi. at 143. Justice Douglas did not partici-
pate.
86
 402 U.S. at 139; CAL. CoNsT. art. XXXIV, § I.
87
 402 U.S. at 141, 143. This allowed the Court to distinguish Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which invalidated a city charter provision requiring
''that any ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion or na-
tional origin could not take effect without approval by a majority of those voting in a
city election." See 402 U.S. at 140.
" Id. at 141. This ruling in James that only an explicit. racial classification, and
not discriminatory impact, would trigger strict judicial scrutiny was a harbinger of later
Burger Court opinions—Rodriguez, Davis,' and Arlington Heights. See notes 21-31 &
47-62 supra and accompanying text.
" 402 U.S. at 142. The Court neglected to mote that the other mandatory
referenda—inyolying the issuance of general obligation bonds and municipal
annexation—did not single out low-income persons to bear their burden. Moreover,
other forms of public housing were not subject to prior approval by referenda. See 402
U.S. at 143, 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"" 402 U.S. at 141.
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enues. It gives them a voice in decisions that will affect the future
development of their own community."'
Five years later, the Burger Court relied upon James to justify a referen-
dum procedure with even more severe exclusionary implications. In City qf
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., ." 2
 the Court" upheld a city charter pro-
vision that required all proposed zoning changes accepted by the city council
to be approved by 55 percent of those voting in a local referendum." The
challenged provision had been added to the Eastlake City Charter by voter
initiative after the City Planning Commission and the elected Eastlake City
Council had approved a zoning change to permit plaintiff Forest City Enter-
prises, a real estate developer, to construct a multi-family, high-rise apartment.
building."'" The United States Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
Ohio Supreme Court that this referendum requirement was an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power which deprived plaintiff of clue process of law."
Chief Justice Burger's opinion initially described the important role of
direct local citizen participation:
A referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of
power. Under our constitutional assumptions. all power derives from
the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which
they create.... In establishing legislative bodies, the people can re-
serve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might.
otherwise be assigned 10 the legislature."'
He continued by noting that the referendum, like the Massachusetts town
meeting, is a means for direct political participation, allowing the people the
final decision, amounting to a veto power, over enactments of representative
bodies." "8
 Since zoning and rezoning decisions were characterized as "legisla-
"1 Id. at 143.
"' 426 U.S. 668 (I 076). Eastlake. Ohio is a suburb of Cleveland.
"3
 The voting breakdown in Eastlake was somewhat different from the cases
discussed above. See note 41 supra, This time, Justices Marshall and White joined
Chief Justice Burger's (pinion (along with Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist),
but Justice Powell dissented. Id. at 6611. justice Stevens also dissented, in an opinion
joined by justice Brennan. Id. •
"4
 See EASTLAKE CITY CHARTER all. VIII, §	 quoted in 426 U.S. at 670-71
426 U.S. at 670.
"" See Forest. City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,
108, 324 N.E.2d 740, 747 (1075). The Ohio court ruled that due process "requires that.
a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of municipal power, by
assuring that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise of that power are
articulated by some responsible organ of municipal government." Id. at 196, 324
N.E.2d at 746.
"7 426 U.S. at 672 (citation omitted).
98 Id. at 673. Chief,
 justice Burger then added that referenda were "designed
to 'give citizens a voice on questions of public policy.' " Id., quoting James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 141 (1071). This and later quotations from James were somewhat inapt,
since the referendum considered in James involved low-cost public housing which may
have imposed a financial drain on local taxpayers, while the mandatory referendum
procedure reviewed in City qf Eastlake applied to all zoning changes whether for public
or private development.
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live," the Court ruled that they could be performed by means of ref-
erenda." Chief justice Burger then distinguished prior cases that had in-
validated property-owner consent. provisions "" on the ground that the
Eastlake referendum procedure allowed "all the people of a community,"
rather than just those living in the affected neighborhood, to participate in a
zoning-change decision.
Though both opinions can be criticized for defining the relevant com-
munity or the appropriate subjects for referenda too narrowly, James and City
of.
 Eastlake are, in some sense, quintessential self-rule decisions because they
link judicial deference toward community self-determination directly to citizen
participation. Yet, the Court has not always insisted on such a close connec-
tion. For example, in Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the
Local Level, I nc., 1 " 2
 it upheld a dual majority requirement for charter revision
referenda. It thus allowed a strained version of self-determination—
maintaining local government structural integrity
— to outweigh citizen par-
ticipation. Moreover, the Court had previously held that the protection of
certain citizens' financial interests could justify insulating some local decisions
from direct democracy, either by requiring a supermajority vote in tax and
bond referenda 103
 or by restricting the referendum franchise to "primarily
interested . ' individual and corporate landowners, whose votes were weighted
according to acreage owned. 1 04 Despite its commitment to referenda, there-
fore, the Burger Court has been prepared to defer broadly to state and local
governments in their choice of referendum subjects and, to some extent, even
in their definition of the referendum electorate.
Id. at 672. This characterization drew strong fire from Justice Stevens, who
insisted that the Court, in ruling on the (Inc process claim, was not bound by the Ohio
Supreme Court's conclusion on this issue. 426 U.S. at 680, 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also 426 U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting): Lamh k Lustig, supra note 27, at 188-
89. Professor Sager argues that rezoning is a special kind of legislative decision—one
which requires "decision by a deliberative governmental body." Sager, supra note 39, at
1421-22.
""' See 426 U.S. at 677-78.
11" Id. at 678, quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971). Not only is
the referendum requirement in James generally distinguishable from that in Eastlake,
see note 98 supra, but this particular passage. see text at note 91 supra, is especially
inapt, since it speaks of participation in decisions that may lead to "large expenditures
of local government funds - -an issue that certainly was not before the Eastlake citi-
zens when they voted.
112 430 U.S. 259 (1977). All justices, except Chief Justice Burger (who con-
curred in the judgment). joined Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court.. See generally
Martin, The Requirement qf Concurrent Majorities in a Charter Referendum: The Supreme
Court's Retreat from Voting Equity, 16 DU QU ESN E L. Rev. 167 (1977-78).
Hi s Gordon v, Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (Burger, C.J.).
"" Associated Enterprises. Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410
U.S. 744 (1973). This per curiam opinion followed the reasoning of its companion
case, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719
(1973). which is discussed at notes 120-26 infra and accompanying text. Justice Doug-
las, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in both Associated Enterprises
and Salyer on the ground that these voting schemes gave disproportionate control over
important government functions to discrete, wealthy elements of the local community.
410 U.S. at 735, 745.
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2. Public Employment
A similar pattern of Court deference has developed with respect to the
restrictions on public employment imposed by state and local governments,
even though public employment provides a means of directly influencing pub-
lic policy across a broad range of issues. Thus, in Ambach v. Norwick, 105 the
Court found a basis in democratic theory for denying resident aliens access to
public employment. In Ambach, two resident aliens, who were eligible for U.S.
citizenship but had chosen not to apply, challenged a New York State statute
making citizenship by birth or naturalization a prerequisite to certification as a
primary or secondary public school teacher.'" Acknowledging that the
Court's alienage cases "have not formed an unwavering line," "7
 Justice
Powell's opinion for the Court held that this alien-exclusion law did not vio-
late the equal protection clause under the "rational basis standard."'" The
Court justified use of this deferential standard by ruling that teaching in pub-
lic schools, like serving on a police force,'" involved a "governmental func-
10 ' 44l U.S. 68 (1979).
' 0" Both the statute and its implementing regulations made an exception for
persons who had declared an intention to become citizens but were unable to effec-
tuate it for "valid statutory reasons, - such as an oversubscribed quota. 441 U.S. at 70
nn.1-2. See Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HAR". L
Rev. 1516, 1536-37 (1979) (arguing these provisions provided justification for deferen-
tial judicial review, because aliens seeking leaching jobs could avoid exclusion by de-
claring intent to become citizens) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
441 U.S. at 72.
" 8 Id. at 80. justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart. White, and Rehnquist. These saute live justices composed the Rizzo
majority. See note 75 supra. Justice Blackmun dissented, 441 U.S. at 81, as he had in
Rizzo. His opinion was joined by justices Brennan and Marshall, who had joined his
Rizzo dissent, and by justice Stevens, who had not participated in Rizzo. The dissenters
contended that the facts could not be distinguished from those of In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973), which had invalidated citizenship requirements fur attorneys, who
were officers of the court. justice Powell responded:
New York's citizenship requirement is limited to a governmental function
because it applies only to teachers employed by and acting as agents of the
State. The Connecticut statute held unconstitutional in In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973), by contrast. applied to all attorneys, most of whom do not
work for the government.
441 U.S. at 76 n.6.
"'" The Ambach Court. relied heavily upon Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978), in which the Court had upheld a statute excluding aliens from the New York
State police force, because there was "some rational relationship between the interest.
sought. to be protected and the limiting classification." Id. at 296. Since the police func-
tion fulfilled ''a must fundamental obligation of government to its constituency" and
cloaked its officers with substantial discretionary powers, id. at 297, the Foley Court
ruled that the strict judicial scrutiny applied to statutes excluding aliens from all posi-
tions in the state civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), or from the
practice of law, In it Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), did not apply. Cf. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (District of Columbia had legitimate interest in increasing
literacy of police force when it imposed written tests with disproportionate impact
upon black applicants): Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (principles of federalism
limited federal court's power to grant injunction requiring municipal police forces to
establish formal. internal procedures to handle citizen complaints of police brutality).
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Lion" that was "so bound up with the operation of the State ... as to permit
the exclusion ... of all persons who have not become part of the process of
self-government." "" Justice Powell buttressed this position by noting that
citizenship "denotes an association with the polity which, in a democratic re-
public, exercises the powers of governance.... It is because of this special
significance of citizenship that governmental entities, while exercising the
functions of government, have wider latitude in limiting the participation of
non-citizens." '"
3. Election of Representatives
It is much more difficult, however, to discern a justification in demo-
cratic theory for Court deference to state and local government policies that di-
lute the value of the votes of local citizens. Yet the Burger Court has indicated
its willingness to tolerate much more substantial deviations from mathematical
precision in the one-person-one-vote standard 12 for state and local elections
than for congressional elections.''' Moreover, it has ruled that still further
For criticisms of Foley, see Harvard Note. supra note 106, at 1532-34; Note, 11 CONN.
L. REV. 75 (1978).
10 441 U.S. at 73-74. The majority further emphasized the importance of pub-
lic schools as a political and social "assimilative force," the wide discretion given
teachers in selecting materials and methods of presentation, and the significance of the
teacher "as a role model." Id. at 75-79. The last factor appears to be the controlling
one, since it is the sole characteristic distinguishing the position of public school
teacher from the policymaking position of community school hoard member, which
apparently can be held by any resident alien who has a child in the New York City
school district. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-c.4 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See 441 U.S. at
81-82 n.15; id. at 81, 86-87 (Blackmun. j., dissenting).
" 1 441 U.S. at 75 (footnote and citation omitted). The position taken by the
majority in Ambach is consistent with dicta in Foley v. Connelie. 435 U.S. 291, 296, 299
(1978), which suggested the Burger Court would apply deferential review to statutes
excluding aliens from other forms of political participation—voting, running for of-
6ce, and serving on juries. See note 109 supra and accompanying text. See also Rubio v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979) (upholding
exclusion of aliens from jury service). It is also, however, consistent with more recent
cases involving broad deference to local governments when acting as employers. For
example, in N.Y.C. Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (Stevens, J.), the
Court rejected an equal protection attack upon a local authority's ban on hiring per-
sons in a methadone maintenance program for any of its positions, and in Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (Stevens, J.), it severely limited the due process protections
previously available to stale and local employees. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976).
' 2 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and its companion cases made this
the prevailing test for legislative apportionment. The one-person-one-vote standard
was later extended to local government elections. See Hadley v. junior College District,
397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969): Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
"3 Compare White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790-93 (1973) (rejecting total devia-
tion of 2.43% from absolute population equality in congressional districting scheme)
with Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (validating 7.83% total deviation
in slate house of representatives election districts, because "minor deviations from
mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a
prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the fourteenth amendment so as to
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variations can be justified by attempts of lawmakers to follow the boundary
lines of political subdivisions in constructing election districts.'" The accep-
tance of some deviation may merely reflect the Court's desire to remove itself'
from constant fine-tuning of state and local election districts." 5 and the accep-
tance of local government boundaries for election districts may reflect a desire
to limit gerrymandering "" and to maintain consistent local community rep-
resentation in state " 7 and county " ' t legislative halls.'"
Neither prudential nor theoretical concerns, however, can justify deci-
sions validating laws that exclude large numbers of citizens from voting for
local government boards which have a substantial impact upon community
life. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,'" the Court
rejected an equal protection attack on a California scheme that excluded resi-
dents who did not own land from the election of local water district directors.
The scheme also weighted the votes of all landowners—including
corporations—according to the value of the land they owned. Distinguishing
prior one-person-one-vote cases , 121 Justice Rehnquist's opinion - for the
require justification by the State.") and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1973)
(9.9% deviation for state legislative districts need not be justified). Mahan v. HOwell,
410 U.S. 315, 321-24 (1973). traced this distinction between congressional anti state
legislative districting to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964). It should be noted,
however, that at least three current members of the Court favor applying the relaxed
Mahan, White and Gaffney approach to congressional districting as well. See White v.
Weiser, 412 U.S. at 798 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger. C.J., and Rehnquist,
.1.)
I" See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (finding a 16.4% total devia-
tion justifiable). See also Gaffney v. Cummings. 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973) (" 'oddly
shaped' town lines" may be followed even if this results in districts that are neither
compact nor attractive).
Mr. justice Powell, who did not participate in Mahan, later indicated that devia-
tions of as much as 19.39 percent could be justified by a policy of maintaining political
subdivision boundaries, even where this policy is implemented by a federal court. See
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 430-31 (1977) (Powell, j. , dissenting).
11 •' As Mr. Justice White recently put it: ''That. the Court was not deterred by
the hazards of the political thicket when it undertook to adjudicate the reapportion-
ment cases does not mean that it should becinne hogged down in a vast, intractable
apportionment slough, particularly when there is little, if anything, to be accomplished
by doing so." Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749-50 (1973).
"" See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 426, 429-30 (1977) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring, joined by Burger, C....1.); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 553-55 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting).
'' See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-24, 325 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.).
See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187 (1971) (deviations of up to 11.9% in
county election districts jusitifed by goal of preserving boundary Thies of towns which
had strong cooperative relationship with county).
''" Preserving local government boundaries has. so  far, been rejected as a jus-
tification for deviations from absolute equality in congressional election districts. See
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1969): White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,
790-91 (1973). See also note 113 supra.
"" 410 U.S. 719 (1973). The companion case, Associated Enterprises, Inc. v.
Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiant), upheld the
establishment of a similar watershed district on the basis of a referendum with a simi-
larly restricted franchise. Sec note 104 supra.
121 See note 112 supra.
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Court 122 concluded that this franchise-exclusion was constitutionally accepta-
ble because of the water district's "special limited purpose and disproportion-
ate" benefits for and burdens on landowners.' 23 As Justice Douglas' stinging
dissent 124 demonstrated, however, California water districts possessed the full
panoply of governmental powers with respect to water storage, irrigation, and
flood control—functions which vitally affected the lives, homes, and jobs of
local residents who were not landowners. 125 Given the prevalence of special
districts in metropolitan areas, 12 " Salyer's authorization of restricted-franchise
special districts seriously undermines public participation.
More recently, the Court assumed a deferential stance even in the con-
text of a more broad-based attack on racial discrimination in a local voting
scheme. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,'" black citizens of Mobile, Alabama insti-
tuted a class action against the city and its incumbent commissioners, contend-
1 ^ 2 410 U.S. 719. justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief J ustice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Id. at 720.
" 3 hi. at 725-30. He also argued that this special voting arrangement may have
been necessary to obtain the landowners' consent, so they could he assured their prop-
eny would not have to bear unreasonable assessments to finance the district's opera-
tions. This argument is flawed in two respects: (I) the landowner's real protection
against unreasonable burdens is the state judicial requirement that special assessments
he directly related to benefits obtained, and (2) if one-person-one-vote were applied to
the initial election, the landowners would, presumably, he unable to prevent the crea-
tion of a district strongly desired by the community residents.
'" 410 U.S. at 735. Justice Douglas' dissent was joined by justices Brennan and
Marshall.
1 • As ,Justice Douglas noted:
Water storage districts in California are classifed as irrigation, reclamation,
or drainage districts. Such state agencies "are considered exclusively gov-
ernmental," and their property is "held only for governmental purpose,"
not in the "proprietary sense." They are a "public entity," just as "any
other political subdivision." That is made explicit in various ways. The
Water Code of California states that "WI waters and water rights" of the
State "within the district are given, dedicated, and set apart for the uses
and purposes of the district." Directors of the district are "public officers of
the state." The District possesses the power of eminent domain. Its works
may not he taxed. It carries a governmental immunity against suit. A dis-
trict has powers that relate to irrigation, storage of water, drainage, flood
control, and generation of hydroelectric energy.
Id. at 740 (footnotes omitted). He had particularly strong objections to admitting cor-
porations to the franchise. which he found "grotesque" and "unthinkable." Id. at 741.
He added:
It would be a radical and revolutionary step to take, as it would change our
whole concept. of the franchise. California takes part of that step here by
allowing corporations to vote in these water district matters that entail per-
formance of vital governmental functions. One corporation can outvote 77
individuals in this district. Four corporations can exercise these gov-
ernmental powers as they choose, leaving every individual inhabitant with it
weak, ineffective voice. The result is a corporate political kingdom un-
dreamed of by those who wrote our Constitution.
Id. at 742 (footnote omitted).
' 3 " See generally N1ANDELKER K NEFSCH, supra note 13, at 38-44, 126.
" 7 100 S. Ct. 14) (1980).
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ing that its at-large election system diluted the vote of blacks (who constituted
thirty-five percent of the population), in violation of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act,'" the fifteenth amendment,'" and the equal protection clause. In
his opinion for a plurality of the Court, justice Stewart 13" announced that
absent a "purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government
of the freedom to vote,""' there could be neither a fifteenth amendment nor
a statutory violation. 12 He reasoned that the fifteenth amendment —does not
confer the right of suffrage upon anyone.' " 1"3 Instead, he found its com-
mand to be "negative," protecting against governmental discrimination in the
exercise of the elective franchise."' Since blacks were not prevented from
registering and voting in Mobile, Justice Stewart concluded that there was no
fifteenth amendment violation. 13 '
Drawing upon Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, the Court
further insisted that discriminatory intent had to be shown to establish an
equal protection violation in the voting context.'ati The Court then ruled that.
this standard was not satisfied even by plaintiffs' showing that Alabama had a
substantial history of official racial discrimination, that Commission members
discriminated against. blacks in municipal employment and the provision of
'" 42 U.S.C.	 1973 (1976).
1 " "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." U.S. CONS''. amend. NV, 1,
1 " Justice Stewa•t's plurality opinion was jointed by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which had upheld the ruling of the district court that the at-large electoral system
violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and the latter's order that the City of Mobile
adopt in mayor-council form of government. will) single member districts. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the result, 100 S. Ct.. at 1507, and Justice Stevens filed a sepa-
rate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1508. Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall each filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1514, 1520.
131
 Id. at 1499. Justice Stewart found support for "the principle that racially
discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth AITICIAMCIll claim,"
id. at 1497, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (racially motivated gerry-
mander of municipal boundaries violated fifteenth amendment) and Wright v. Rock-
efeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (upholding congressional reapportionment statute due to
plaintiffs' failure to prove discriminatory state purpose). He also pointed to the Burger
Court's reading of Gomillion in its Davis and Arlington Heights opinions. IOU S. Ct.. at
1497 n•10,
' 3 ' 100 S. Ct. at 1497. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals had
addressed the statutory claim, although general principles (.1 judicial administration
required them to do so. The Supreme Court first considered the statutory claim, in-
stead of remanding iI, as was clone in Arlington Heights. See note 30 supra. The Court
concluded. however, that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act merely restated the fif-
teenth amendment and thus added nothing to plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 100 S.
Ct. at 1497.
" 3 Id. at 1497, quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214. 217 (1875),
134
 100 S. CI. at 1497.
Id. at 1499.
':1 d M. at 1499-1500. See notes 21-31 supra and accompanying text. The Court.
also relied upon Burger Court reapportionment cases: White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 .
 U.S. 124 (1971); Wright v. Roi:kefeller, 376 U.S. 52
(1964). For further discussion of these cases, see notes 113 & 131 supra and accom-
panying text.
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municipal services, that the features of the at-large electoral system tended to
disadvantage blacks as a voting minority, and that no black person had ever
been elected to the Commission.''" Finally, Justice Stewart rejected the dis-
senters' argument for a constitutional right to effective representation with
the flat statement that the "Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require proportional representation as an imperative of
political organization." 138
4. Abuse of the Public Participation Principle
While James and Eastlake pay homage to direct public participation in
important decisions affecting the character of the community, cases such as
Salyer, City of Mobile, and Ambach show a surprising deference to state and
local legislation restricting the franchise, diluting votes, or limiting other
forms of participation. In particular, when the goals of public participation
and governmental integrity are in conflict, the Burger Court has often per-
mitted state and local governments to choose to compromise the former in
order to achieve some aspect of the latter. Deference to voting district
schemes premised on local government boundaries can be viewed in this
light,' 3 " as can deference to municipal employment policies.'" Though the
Court at least claimed to find some democratic underpinnings for these deci-
sions, it articulated no such basis for the anti-participation ruling in Rizzo v.
Goode. There, the Burger Court reversed a judicial order seeking to remedy
constitutional deprivations through police-citizen interaction in the form of a
citizen complaint procedure developed and accepted as workable by the police
officials who would administer Even more surprising is the Court's will-
ingness to allow the compromise of citizen participation for judicial conven-
ience'"or for the protection of corporate property interests in Salyer, 143 while
insisting that citizen participation values outweigh the property interests of the
losing landowners and potential tenants in James and Eastlake.'"
When read together, the cases discussed in these two subsections reveal a
consistent pattern of judicial deference to local government political decisions,
even where these self-determination decisions have severe exclusionary effects
or undercut public participation. Thus, Warth, Arlington Heights, James, and
1M17 100 S. Ct. at 1503-04.
13" Id. at 1509.
"" See notes 114 & 119 supra and accompanying text.
14" See nmes 105-11 supra and accompanying text.
14 ' See notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text. See also Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1976) (cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
does not apply to corporal punishment in public schools; imposition of additional ad-
ministrative safeguards as a constitutional requirement would intrude into domain of
local school authorities): Paul v. Davis, 421 U.S. 909 (1976) (holding police chief's
distribution of flyer naming plaintiff as "active shoplifter" did not deprive him of any
"liberty" or "property" rights within the meaning of the•(tue process clause of the
fourteenth antendment).
142 See note 115 supra,
1 " See notes 120-25 supra and accompanying text.
144 See notes 84-101 supra and accompanying text.
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'Eastlake signal political officials in white, wealthy suburbs that they will be free
of federal judicial interference if they exclude blacks and poor persons
through various land use practices. Milliken and Rodriguez further assure them
they can maintain homogeneity and local control of their schools. The general
economic and racial homogeneity created by these exclusionary practices can,
in turn, insulate the practices from change at the local political level. City of
Mobile permits local officials to use at-large elections to reduce the impact of
the few minority citizens who do live there, and the recent reapportionment
cases' further ensure that these local exclusionary communities will have
their own representation in the state legislature. Moreover, Town of Lockport
entrenches the boundaries and powers of exclusionary communities by allow-
ing their citizens to employ weighted voting in any attempted annexation or
proposed modification of existing charter arrangements. Should these subur-
ban communities need services that require a wider area for efficient opera-
tion (such as water supply or sewage disposal), they need not turn to the
central city nor accept a metropolitan government. They can simply agree to
the creation of special districts, with only landowners voting in the initial ref-
erendum and in any subsequent board of directors' election.""
C. Limits to Deference: When Character Development Goes Too Far
Even the broad judicial deference to local programmatic choices rep-
resented by Arlington Heights, Belle Terre, Rodriguez, Salyer, City of' Mobile, and
Ambach has its limits. The Burger Court has intervened when local govern-
ment choices purposely impinge upon what it perceives to be fundamental
interests. This is especially true where the Court can rest its decision on a
constitutional basis other than the equal protection clause, where the com-
munity self-determination interest. is particularly weak, or where the funda-
mental right. is closely related to citizen participation.
1. Community Self-Determination and The Family
Moore v. City of East Cleveland " illustrates the limits of the Burger
Court's deference to local governments in the land use field. In Moore, the
Court, invalidated a single-family zoning ordinance adopted by East, Cleveland,
Ohio. This criniinal ordinance defined "family" so narrowly that it did not
include the defendant—a grandmother living with her two grandsons, who
were first cousins."" justice Powell, writing for the Court, concluded that the
ordinance unreasonably interfered with "family autonomy" and was not.
" 5 See notes 114 & 117-19 SUPM and accompanying text.
"" Sec notes 120-25 supra and accompanying text.
147 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
" 8 "Family" was defined to include no more than one married couple. their
parents, and their dependent children, so long as no more than one of these children
had dependent children of his or her own. Id. at 496 11.2. For a discussion which puts
Moore within a line ()I' constitutional fancily law cases, see Gelfand, Authority and Au-
tononty: The State, The Individual a nd The Family, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 160 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Authority and Autonomy].
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reasonably tailored to further important governmental interests. 149 It thus
violated Mrs. Moore's rights as guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 1 •" Does Moore herald a trend away from the Court's
"hands-off" approach to local zoning and other programmatic decisions, or is
it an unusual judicial reaction reserved for "actual fits of municipal mad-
ness"?''' To state the question more narrowly: does Moore signal a judicial
rethinking of the Belle Terre rationale, or does it simply mark the outer
boundary to the broad deference represented by Belle Terre and Arlington
Heights?
It can on the one hand, he argued that the right recognized in Moore—
to reside with one's extended family free from interference by local govern-
ment zoning—could logically be extended to the right to choose living com-
panions outside the bonds of matrimony, thus undercutting the Belle Terre
analysis. 152 Indeed, the distinction between ordinances which affect related
persons, as in Moore, and those that affect only unrelated persons, as in Belle
Terre,'" begins to fade when the practical implications of the two decisions
are considered. Thus, a municipality could not prevent an extended family of
twenty persons from residing in the same apartment or house" but could
prevent three 1:') unrelated persons from living there.'"" Moreover, justice
Stevens' concurring opinion in Moore suggests a rationale—the right of "an
owner to decide who may reside on ... her property" 1 "—that would also
431 U.S. at 501). justice Powell's plurality opinion noted the historical roots
of the extended family in American life and concluded that "family autonomy" was a
fundamental interest. justice Brennan, joined by justice Marshall, concurred in 'an
opinion which stressed the impact of the challenged ordinance upon racial and ethnic
minorities. Id. at 508. justice Stevens also concurred, stressing the interest of a land-
owner in determining how to use his or her land. Id. at 521.
' 5 " "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CloNs•r. amend. MN:. § 1.
151 Sager, supra note 39, at 1421.
"2 Note the trend from Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy
right of married couples to possess and use contraceptives), to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried person to purchase contraceptives), and finally to
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy right of unwed mother to an abortion). See
also Carey v. Population Services Ina 431 U.S. 678 (1976) (right of juvenile to pur-
chase contraceptives); Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (procedural due process
rights of father seeking custody of his illegitimate child): 6 HoysTRA REv, 1087,
1097 (1978). These cases are discussed at greater length in Gelfand. Authority and Au-
tonomy, supra. note 148, at 142-43, 160-65.
' 5 ' See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
r" -' This assumes that there is sufficient habitable floor space for 20 persons.
since Moore appears to recognize the validity of neutral density requirements. See 431
U.S. at 500 11.7.
13 ' A zoning ordinance forbidding two unmarried persons In occupy the same
household nay have been beyond the:scope of Belle Terre even before Moore. See
O'Grady v. Town of North Castle, 73 Civ. 4571 (S.1).N.Y. ,Jan. 16, 1975) (relying in
part upon footnote 6 in Belle Terre to deny motion to dismiss an action challenging
ordinance that restricted town residence to families "living as a single housekeeping
unit in a domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage or other domestic bonds").
15" See Village of Belle Terre v. BOraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (Marshall, j.,
dissenting).
"7 431 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, j., concurring). Cf. Young v. American Mini
Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1970) (Stevens, j.) (ruling that this right can be severely re-
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seem to undercut the Belle Terre holding, since the landlord was a plaintiff in
the latter case.
On the other hand, Moore and Belle Terre, though producing opposite
outcomes from the perspective of the two local governments involved, can be
seen as fully consistent with the general principle of promoting "family val-
ues" through local government legislation. In this view, "Moore is really a
corollary to the Belle Terre holding: zoning to protect the family and 'family
values' is permissible, but. zoning which interferes with the family in any way
must be stricken."` 5
Employing the terminology introduced in Section I, one might argue
further that Moore does not fully contradict. the self-rule rationale of Belle
Terre. Local governments can continue to use zoning as a means of furthering
the social preferences of their citizens (community self-determination), but
they may not do so in a mariner which undercuts the most localized form of
participation. As one commentator has observed:
Proponents of federalism and localism argue that governmental deci-
sions should be made by the institutions likely to be most responsive
to the people affected and in which people can participate most
fully. The family and comparable institutions are, of course, far
closer to their members than even the smallest unit of local govern-
ment.. Thus, the underlying logic of the Court's federalism decisions
suggests that institutions like the family should be protected even
against state and local governments. Moreover, the Court has par-
ticularly stressed the role of states and municipalities in providing
certain essential services—education, law enforcement, fire protec-
tion, sanitation and public health. This suggests that the Court's con-
cern is to protect small-scale institutions so that they can provide the
important services and perform the essential functions for which
they are best suited. By analogy, then, the Court should protect
against municipal interference with institutions, like the family,
which best fulfill the vital functions of child-rearing and which serve
to shelter their members against hardship.''"
This argument, which combines aspects of the community self-determination,
citizen participation, and service-provider principles, certainly suggests a vi-
able reconciliation of Belle Terre and Moore. It. leaves the latter as a fairly
unique land use case. Closer judicial scrutiny of ordinances overtly 1 "" restricting
the users of property does, however, remain possible.'" Moreover, local
stricted if the particular use of the property, although presumptively protected by the
first amendment, may lead Iii declining values for adjoining property). See not.e 173
infra and accompanying text.
I" Power to Regulate, supra note 37, at 324-35.
' 5' Developments in the Law—Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1573-74 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Zoning]. See also Celfand, Authority and Autonomy, supra note 148.
"" Covert restrictions upon users of property, such as those considered in Ar-
lington Heights, however, will likely continue to receive the Court's sanction.
'"' See Group House of Port Washington, litc. v. Board of' Zoning and Appeals
of Town of North Hempstead, '15 N.Y.2d 260, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y,S.2c1 377
(1978),
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regulatory schemes resting on a basis other than the zoning power and
trenching upon fundamental rights may face strong judicial opposition.
9 Community Self-Determination, Citizen Participation, and the First
Amenchnent
In particular, interests protected by the first amendment have tended to
limit the deference paid by the Burger Court to local government decision-
making. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better .Environment," 2 a non-
profit, environmental protection organization challenged a Village ordinance
that required charitable organizations to obtain a permit to make door-to-door
or on-street solicitations of contributions. The ordinance forbade the issuance
of such a permit to any organization using less than 75 percent of its funds
"directly for the charitable purpose of the organization." I"' Since "charitable
purpose" was defined so as to exclude solicitation costs, salaries, and adminis-
trative expenses. public advocacy organizations (like plaintiff) were necessarily
excluded from solicitation in the Village.' The Court concluded that these
advocacy-oriented groups, unlike traditional charity organizations or commer-
cial operations, combined their financial solicitations with activities protected
by the first amendment—"information dissemination, discussion, and advo-
cacy of public issues."'"' Since the ordinance directly and 'substantially lim-
ited these forms of public participation, the Court required the Village to
show that the ordinance served•a "sufficiently strong, subordinating" and
legitimate governmental interest.'" Though prevention of fraud and prot.ec-
'loo S. Ct. 826 (1980). Justice White's opinion for the Court was joined by
the Chief justice and Justices Brennan, Stewart. :Marshall, Blackmun. Powell, and Ste-
vens. Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. hi. at 837.
"3 SCHAUMBURG VILLAGE CODE 22-20(g). quoted in 100 S. Ct. at 829. "Satisfac-
tory proof' " of compliance. with the 75 per cent requirement was to be made on the
basis of a "'certified audit of the last full year of operations'" "'other comparable
evidence.'" hi. at 829 n.4.
"4 100 S. Ct. at 835, Plaintiff, in inc.wing for summary, judgment, had submit-
ted affidavits testifying that it spent 23.3 per cent of its income on fundraising in both
1975 and 1976, as well as 21.5 per cent in 1975 and 16.5 per cent in 1976 on ad-
ministration. hi. at 830-31.
1 "' Id. at 835. (poling Village of Schaumburg - v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment. 500 F.2d 220, 225 (7th Cir. 1978). justice White connected his analysis, at least
implicitly, with the importance of citizen participation by noting
that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for par-
ticular views on economic, political or social issues. and ... that without
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.
IOU S. Ct. at 834. Fle also concluded that charitable solicitation was not a variety of
purely commercial speech, because it "dots more than inftyrin private economic deci-
sions." Id. For this reason, the Court held that plaintiff could challenge the facial valid-
ity of the ordinance on overbreadth grounds by a summary judgment motion. hi. That.
is, the "normal rule" against assertion of third party rights. as articulated so fully in
Worth, was inapplicable, as were later Burger Court opinions, such as Bates v. State
Bar of" Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1077), which had held that the overbreadth doc-
trine could not be invoked in the context of "commercial speech." See 100 S. Ct. at
835.
1 " IOU S. Ct. at 836.
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tion of residential privacy—an aspect of community self-determination—were
considered substantial local government interests. they were only peripherally
promoted by the 75-percent requirement and could be sufficiently served by
measures less destructive of First Amendment interests." 117
justice White's Village of Schaumburg opinion actually involved slightly
closer judicial scrutiny than was employed by the Chief justice in an earlier
analogous case, Hynes v. Mervor and Council of the Borough rf Oradell,'" In the
latter case, the Court invalidated a town ordinance regulating door-to-door
canvassing and solicitation for charitable and political purposes on vagueness
grounds. Hynes, even more starkly than Village of Schaumburg, appeared to
pose the conflict between community self-determination and citizen participa-
tion. The plaintiffs were a state assemblyman, Hynes. who was campaigning
for re-election in the town, and registered voters residing there, who sought
to participate in political campaign canvassing. The preamble of the chal-
lenged ordinance, in turn, clearly stated a community self-determination pur-
pose:
WHEREAS, the Borough of" Oradell is primarily a one family resi-
dential town whose citizens are employed elsewhere, resulting in the
wives [sic] of the wage earner being left alone during the clay: and
WHEREAS, because of the geographical location of most of the
homes it is impossible to police all areas at the same time, resuhing
in a number of breaking] and entries and larcen[ies] in the home;
The Court struck down the ordinance on vagueness grounds, but suggested
that a more narrowly drawn identification ordinance might succeed.'" Chief'
1 " 7 Id. The Court observed that more precisely drawn regulations could be
employed to prevent fraud, that "householders ate equally disturbed by solicita tion on
behalf of organizations satisfying the 75-percent requirement as they are by solicitation
on behalf of other organizations, - id., and that the ordinance was not restricted In
residential solicitation but applied to on-street solicitation 'as well, Id.
"8
 425 U.S. bit) 176). Chief . Justice, Burger's opinion for the Court was
joined by Justices Stewart., White, Blackmun, and Powell. justice Brennan concurred in
part, in an opinion joined by Ittstice Marshall. Id. at 623. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Id. at 630. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision,
1 "" Oradell Ordinance No. 598A. quoted rn 125 U.S. at 613 11.2.
''" See 125 U.S. at 617. According to Burger. the defects of the ordinance
which rendered it unconstitutionally vague were:
First, the coverage of the ordinance is unclear: it does not explain, for
example, whether a "recognized charitable cause" means one recognized by
the Internal Revenue Service as tax exempt, one recognized by some com-
munity agency, or one approved by sonic municipal official. While it is
fairly clear what the phrase "political campaign-
 comprehends. it is not
clear what is meant by a "Federal, State, (.:ounty or :Municipal ... cause."
Finally, it is not clear what groups fall into the class of "Borough Civic
Groups and Organizations -
 that the ordinance also covers.
Second, the ordinance does not sufficiently specify what those within
its reach must do in order to comply. The citizen is informed that before
soliciting he must notify the Police Department. in writing, "for identifica-
tion only.-
 But he is not told what must be set forth in the notice, nr what
the police will consider sufficient as 
- identification." ... N4Ir does the urdi-
nance "provide explicit standards for those who apply
-
 it.
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Justice Burger's opinion for the majority thereby avoided the explicit articula-
tion of the conflict between self-determination and citizen participation, which
was confronted more directly in Justice Brennan's Hynes concurrence 171 and
in Justice White's later opinion for the Court in Village of Schaumburg." 2
Yet, neither Hynes nor Village of Schaumburg should be read as signaling a
substantial exception to the Burger Court's broad deference to local ordi-
nances regulating community affairs.'" These two decisions merely protect
the door-to-door residential dissemination of explicitly political speech from
Id. at 621-22 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court further ruled that
the limiting construction given the ordinance by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 66
N.J. at 380, 331 A.2d at 279, did not rentedy these flaws. See 425 U.S. at 622.
''' Justice Brennan. while recognizing the important interests of municipalities
in "keeping neighborhoods safe and peaceful," contended that "door-to-door solicita-
tion and canvassing [was] a method of communication essential to the preservation of
our free society. - 425 U.S. 610, 624 (Brennan, J.. concurring). The identification re-
quests of the Oradell Ordinance, by destroying anonymity, '... might deter perfectly
peaceful discussion of public matters of importance' ... particularly of sensitive
and controversial issues,- id. at 625, as well as discourage citizen participation in politi-
cal campaigning, so significant "to the preservation and strength of the democratic
ideal." Id. at 628.
) 72 Village If Schaumburg. in striking a more specific statute challenged by a less
traditional political group. seemed to represent slightly more judicial intervention by
the Court than did the majority opinion in Hynes.
l'" In general. the Burger Court has upheld first amendment attacks upon
community self-determination ordinances and laws. See, e.g., First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 705 (1978) (Powell. J.) (5-4 ruling) (state criminal statute
forbidding banks and business corporations to make eAnurihutions for purposes of in-
fluencing vote on referendum proposals concerning questions not materially' affecting
the bank or corporation held to violate first amendment); National Socialist Party of
America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (state supreme court's
denial of stay of lower court's order enjoining National Socialist Party of America from
parading in uniform or displaying swastika, or from distributing or displaying mate-
rials promoting hatred against Jews or others of any faith. ancestry or race, held to
violate first amendment in absence of procedural safeguards); Linmark Associates. Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 83 (1977) (8-0 ruling) (invalidating 'municipal
ordinance banning posting of real estate "for sale" signs, in order to promote stable,
integrated neighborhoods); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (5-3 ruling) (practice
of patronage dismissals of non-civil service. mm-policymaking employees of county
sheriff's office held to violate first amendment): Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 42 2
U.S. 205 (1973) (Powell, J.) (6-3) (municipal ordinance making it a public nuisance for
drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity, when screen visible from a
public street. held impermissible prior resit-aim); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130
(1974) (Brennan, J.) (5-3) (municipal ordinance making ii unlawful 10 use "obscene or
opprobrious language'' toward police officer held to violate first amendment); Police
Department. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (unanimous in result)
(city ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 130 feet of school, except peaceful pick-
eting of school involved in labor dispute. held to violate first and fourteenth amend-
ments); Coates v. Cincinnati. 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (Stewart, J.) (5-3) (municipal ordi-
nance making it unlawful for three or inore persons to assemble on sidewalks and
conduct themselves in "manner annoying to persons passing by,'' held to violate first
and fourteenth amendments); rf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972) (7-0 ruling) (city vagrancy ordinance held unduly vague because it failed to give
fair notice of forbidden conduct, encouraged arbitrary police action and made nor-
mally innocent behavior criminal). nu, see Elrod v. Burns. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (self-rule principles support patronage).
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some forms of regulation. The Court's earlier opinion in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc.'" makes it clear that localities may prevent other forms of
protected speech from "settling" in residential areas in the form of "adult"
businesses. Thus, the Court has continued to defer broadly to local zoning
regulations, while showing a willingness to scrutinize other regulations that
have an adverse impact on first amendment public participation interests.
3. Community Self-Determination and Municipal Creditworthiness
The broadest reading of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez' 75 —that. local financing arrangements are to be regulated exclu-
sively by state and local legislation without federal judicial intereference—has
been narrowed somewhat by the Court.. In U.S. Trust v. Nev lersev,L 7 " a holder
and trustee of revenue bonds issued by the Port. Authority of New York and
New jersey challenged a 1974 New jersey statute that sought to repeal ret-
roactively a 1962 statutory covenant. that had limited the power of the Port
Authority to subsidize mass transit operations from its reserves and revenues,
which were derived from bridge fees, tunnel tolls, and building rents.'" _Jus-
One area in which the Burger Court has fairly consistently rejected first amend-
ment claims, however, is obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (5-4)
(state criminal statute designed to regulate obscene material not violative of first
amendment where material covered by statute appeals to prurient interest in sex. por-
trays sexual conduct specifically defined by state law and has no serious literary, artis-
tic, political or scientific value); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)
(5-4) (state law regulating commerce in obscene material and the exhibition of such in
public places. including - adult - theatres, does nor violate first amendment, even
though conclusive proof of nexus between anti-social behavior and obscene material is
lacking). See also Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 ( I 976) (rejecting first
amendment attack on zoning dispersion law applied to businesses dealing in -adult -
materials not yet proven to be obscene). Furthermore, the Court has been willing to
defer broadly. on the basis of community self-determination, to factual conclusions by
the legislature about obscenity which may he incorrect. Sri,
 Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton. 413 U.S. 49, 58 Sc n.8 (1973). SQ. goierai/y Gel rand. Authority and Aulonoutv, supra
note 143, at 146-47.
' 74
 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Powell also joined in
Parts 1 and III. but filed a separate concurring opinion in which he disagreed with the
Court's analysis of the first amendment issue. /d. at 73. Justice Stewart filed a dissent-
ing opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, id. at 84, and Justice
Backmun's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
id. at SS.
The Detroit ordinance upheld by the Young Court required the geographic dis-
persion of" adult bookstores and cinemas. The ordinance was intended to preserve
residential neighborhoods, reduce crime, and prevent decreases in property values. All
three purposes are life-style interests promoted by local government in its self-rule
capacity, see 4'27 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J.. concurring). but the third interest also affects
the service-provider role, since decreased property values will result in lower property
tax revenues.
411 U.S. 1 (1973). See notes 47-112 supra and accompanying text.
431 U.S. I (1977). '	 •
'" id, at 5-7. Revenue bonds are backed solely by the revenues derived from a
particular source, such as bridge and tunnel tolls, rather than by the general taxing
power which stands behind general obligation bonds. Sr-i , Gelfand. Seeking Local Gov-
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Lice Blackmun, joined by three of the seven participating justices,'" con-
cluded that "the 1962 [statutory] covenant constituted a contract between the
two States and the holders of the Consolidated Bonds issued" prior to
1973, 179 this contract had binding effect upon future legislatures,' 8° it had
been impaired by the 1974 statute,'" and the impairment was not "reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose."'" The Court, there-
fore, reversed the ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court and held that the
1962 statute violated the contract clause.'"
The U.S. Trust Court emphasized that it would not defer to the legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity, "because the State's self-interest
[was] at stake."'" The statute before the Court failed to meet the necessity
ernnent Financial Integrity Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits:
The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN, L. REv. 545,
549 n.19, 560-61 (1979). and sources cited therein [hereinafter cited as Financial Integ-
rity].
For a brief history of the early years of the Port Authority, see F. BIRD, A STUDY
of"I'HE PORT or NEW YORK AUTHORITY (1949). Much of the financial difficulties of the
Port Authority were attributable to deficits created by its operation of the mass transit
"tubes" linking New jersey cities with Manhattan, see 431 U.S. at 9. 19. and construc-
tion of the World Trade Center, ,see Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York
Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 379, l90 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S.
78 (I 963).
178 .Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Rehnquist. and Justice Stevens. 431 U.S. at 2. Chief Justice Burger also wrote a sepa-
rate concurring opinion. Id. at 32. Justice Brennan. jotted by justices White and Mar-
shall, dissented. Id. at 33. Justices Stewart and Powell took no part in the decision.
"" Id. at 18. This was based upon a finding by the trial court. See United States
Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 183 n.38, 338 A.2d 833, 866 n.38
(1975).
' 8" The Court ruled that the covenant, despite its binding effect upon future
legislatures. was not invalid tinder the reserved powers doctrine, because it was -purely
financial, and thus not necessarily a compromise of the State's [New Jersey's] reserved
powers." 431 U.S. at 25.
' 8 ' The trial court had concluded there was no impairment, since plaintiff had
failed to prove the market price of the bonds had been permanently affected by the
repeal of the statutory. convenant. United Slates Trust Company v. State, 1:14 N.J.
Super. at 181-82. 196, 338 A.2d at 866, 874 (1975). It had employed the standard set.
by a long line of earlier cases holding that a modification. to constitute an impairment.
must materially or substantially alter the contract. See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanagh,
295 U.S 56 (1935): 1-tonic Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Na-
tional Sur. Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U.S. 276 (1912); Von Hoffman v.
City of Quincy. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867). See generally Hale. The Supreme Court and
the Contract Clause: Ill, 57 HARV. Rev. 852 (1944). Although Justice Blackmun
claimed not to dispute the trial court's findings, he concluded that an impairment had
resulted from the repeal of the 1962 covenant. He ,justified this conclusion by noting
- 1_a[s. a security provision, the covenant was not superfluous; it limited the Port Author-
ity's deficits and thus protected the general reserve fund from depletion." 431 U.S. at
19.
182 'P31 U.S. at 25.
1 "" Id. at 32. The Contract Clause provides: "No state shall ... pass any ... law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CoNsT. ars, I, 10, el. 1.
I" Id. at 26. CI: National League of Cities v. Users, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (also
treating states as if they were natural persons when acting with respect to financial
'natters, see notes 262-73 infra and accompanying text): Gladstone v. Village of
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Id.
requirement because alternatives to the total repeal of the 1962 covenant
existed—exclusion of proposed bridge and tunnel surcharges from the cov-
enant, modifications of the formula For permitted mass transit deficits, and
new procedures for bondholder approval.'"' Moreover, the repeal was un-
reasonable, because the covenanting parties had anticipated in 1962 the very
circumstances which prompted repeal of the covenant in 1974—public de-
mand for mass transit, energy shortages, and environmental problems.'""
In short, under the U.S. Trust standard, "necessity is established only when
the state's objectives could not have been achieved through less drastic modifi-
cations of the contract; reasonableness is assessed by the extent to which alter-
ation of the contract was prompted by circumstances unforeseen at the time
of the contract's formation.'' '" 7 This stringent judicial scrutiny of the repeal
legislation"" drew severe criticism from Justice Brennan, who was joined in
dissent by Justices White and Marshall.'""
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (giving village standing to sue on ground t ha t "racial
steering" would detrimentally affect its tax base and thus its revenue receipts, see notes
214-20 infra and accompanying text). But see Allied Structural Steel v. Spamms, 438
U.S. 234 (1978) (also closely scrutinizing. and invalidating. a state's modification of
private contractual relations over the objections of the three U.S. Trust dissenters).
' 8 " 431 U.S. at 30 n.28. The Court, however, expressed no opinion on the
constitutionality of any of these covenant modifications. It also noted several alterna-
tive means of furthering the state's goals. but provided no cost-benefit analysis. Com-
pare Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. Nloymi I., Rev.
21, 38-39 (1978) (arguing plaintiff attacking legislation should bear burden of produc-
ing social science data needed to show its unconstitutionality).
' 88 431 U.S. at 32. The Court stated:
During the 12-year period between adoption of the covenant and its re-
peal, public perception of the importztnce of mass transit undoubtedly grew
because of increased general concern with environmental protection and
energy conservation. Rut the concerns were not unknown in 1962, and
the subsequent changes were of degree and not of kind. We cannot say
that these changes caused the covenant to have a substantially different
impact in 1974 than when it was adopted in 1962. And we cannot conclude
that the repeal was reasonable in light of changed circumstances.
187
 The Supreme Gaud, 1976 Term, 91 HARY.	 70, 86 (1977) (footnotes
omitted) I hereinafter died as 1976 Term]. Chief justice Burger, in his concurring opin-
ion, zirtictilated an even more stringent standard of review: "(Tilie State must dem-
onstrate that the impairment was es,o.wiia/ to the achievement of an important state
purpose. Furthermore, die State must show that it did not know and mould not have
known the impact of the contract or that state interest at the time the contract was
made." 431 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
'" Indeed. justice Blackmun's treatment of the "necessity .-
 requirement ap-
pears more akin to first amendment analysis, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968), than to the usual level *judicial review employed for legislation regulat-
ing properly rights. See 1976 Term. supra nine 187, al 87-88.
' 8 " 431 U.S. at 53 (Brennan..[., dissenting). He argued: -The Court ... stands
the Cumract Clause completely on its he ad ... and both formulates and strictly applies
a novel standard for reviewing a State's attempt to relieve its citizens front unduly
harsh contracts entered into by earlier legislators." Id. fie also contended that "this
apparently spontaneous formulation ... is wholly out of step with the modern i. tt-
tempts of this Court to define the teach of the Contract Clause when a state's own
contractual obligations are placed in issue." Id. at 54-55. The dissent then analyzed the
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4. The Narrow Parameters of the Fundamental Rights Exception
Arlington Heights, Belle Terre, Rodriquez, and Ambach show the Court.'s will-
ingness to defer to local government decisions that define and control the
"life-style" of local communities. They emphasize what has been referred to
here as "community self-determination, - i.e., the ability of citizens, through
their local governments, to determine the nature and quality of their com-
munal life without interference by the federal courts. Although community
self-determination has no specific textual support in the Constitution,'" the
Court does seem to view it as "an intrinsically valued process" '"' entitled to
substantial deference and respect even when the effects upon non-residents
may be quite unfavorable. Yet Moore, Village t,f Schaumburg, and U.S 7-rust
show that the Court will nevertheless closely scrutinize some local""= self-
determination legislation which severely infringes upon fundamental rights.'"
Due to the Burger Court's sometimes shifting majority, it may appear
difficult to predict precisely which rights will be deemed to outweigh com-
munity self-determination.'" One can, however, isolate some common fac-
tors in the cases discussed above. The statutes and ordinances invalidated in
Moore, Village of Schaumburg, and U.S. Trust all involved governmental action
deferential judicial approach toward legislative contractual modifications in Worthern
Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935). Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316
U.S. 502 (1942), and El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). In particular. the
dissent noted that the Asbury Park Court had unanimously "authorized an impairment
of creditors' financial interests [extending the maturity date of municipal bonds by
more than 30 years and reducing the coupon rate) that was far more substantial than
that involved" in U.S. Trust. 431 U.S. at 57, But see HUrSt, Municipal Bonds and the
Contract Clause: Looking Beyond United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 5 HAsT. 25,
55-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hurst]. The dissent was also very critical of the
majority for failing to take account of facts which, it contended, showed the great
weight of the State's sell-rule interests and the "minimal - damage to bondholders oc-
casioned by the repeal. ld. at 38, 41. See also Ctunment, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39
Outo Sr. I..j. 195, 206 n,112 (1978).
015 But if. Bum: v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N AV:2d 14 I (1976) (rejecting
Rodriguez - type claim for state-wide school financing in part because local control was
state constitutional right),
'"' Nlichclinan, States' Rights and Slates' Roles.- Permutations ff 'Sovereignty' in Na-
tional League of Cities V. User, 86 YA h 165, 1192 11.86 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Micheltnai].
"2 U.S. Trust involved attempted repudiation of a statutory covenant created
for the benefit of holders of bonds issued by a hi-state authority. Although neither this
authority nor the State of New jersey could make as strong a claim for self-
determination as the Village of Arlington Heights or the Alamo Heights Independent
School District, one suspects that an attempt by either of these local governments to
repudiate a covenant would receive similar treatment at the hands of the U.S. Trust
majority. See E F Hauling; Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist.. 613 F.2(1 675 (7th Cir.
1980).
1 "" As one commentator on :Ifoore has put it. "In short, strict scrutiny would be
applied only to ordinances impinging on previously' enumerated fundamental rights,
and these rights would he strictly construed: minimal scrutiny would he the standard
for all other ordinances. - Power to Regulate, supra note 37. at 320.
t"' See generally Ely. The Supreme Court 1977 Term—Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 11 A RV. 1.. REV. 5. 10-16 (1978) (criticizing the Burger Court's
"value imposition methodology - and the legal theorists who advocate it),
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purposefully and overtly directed against the groups represented by the
plaintiff's—extended families, advocacy-oriented solicitors, and bondholders.
Moreover, none of these three cases required the Court to make a detailed
examination of the operation of the local zoning or financing process."'
Therefore, no special competence was required, and no wholesale revision of
systemwide procedures was necessary.'" In addition, plaintiffs' claims in Vil-
lage of Schaumburg and U.S. Trust rested upon more specific constitutional
guarantees, with a longer judicial history, than did the equal protection claims
raised in nearly all of the cases involving deference to local self-determination.
Finally, Moore and U.S. Trust rejected only weak self-determination interests,
and Village of Schaumburg upheld a citizen participation claim which out-
weighed the self-determination interest."'
III. NATIONAL ACTORS ENTER THE STAGE—CONGRESSIONAL AND
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITY
While the Court's fundamental rights exception to deference t.o local
self-rule has been somewhat limited where it has been called upon to act by
defining or creating rights, ihe Burger Court has made it clear that Congress
can alter both the procedural and substantive standards to be applied in cases
challenging local government actions. Thus, the Court has shown a greater
willingness to intervene where local government actions interfere with rights
defined by Congress. The congressional enactments involved have been based
upon the commerce clause,'" the post-Civil War amendments,'" and the
spending clause,"-" The supremacy clause 211 instructs the Court that valid
congressional and presidential acts, premised on these and other powers con-
stitutionally delegated to the national government, 212 are to prevail over con-
trary state and local actions. The Burger Court has, however, found some
federalism-based limitations on national government. actions which interfere
with the structural integrity of slate and local governments.
A. Expansion of Individual Rights: Congress Upstages Local Governments.
1. Proving a Violation of Individual Rights
Both the Burger Court and circuit courts have acknowledged congres-
sional authority to expand the substantive content of individual and group
This contrasts sharply with Arlington Heights, Worth, and liodituez.
t"" This contrasts with the reapportionment cases. see notes 112-15 supra and
accompanying text. and with Rodriguez.
" 7
 The (mutt has not, however. always given this priority to citizen participa-
tion values. See notes 139-44 „cupia and accompanying text.
1 "' See National League of Cities v. Usery, '120 U.S. 833 (1970): City of
Lafayette V. Louisiana Power and light. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
'"" Fitzpatrick v. Bitter, '127 U.S. 445 (1970).
"" North Carolina v. Califano.,435 U.S. 902 (1978).
" "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall he made
in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land: and the judges in
every State shall he bound thereby. _Anything in the Constinitimi or Laws of any State
ho the Contrary notwithstanding. -
 U.S. C'rus't. art. VI, 2.
Other relevant powers might include the bankruptcy clause. the enforce-
ment section of the fifteenth amendment, the taxing power. and the war potter.
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rights asserted against local governments acting in their self-rule capacity.
Thus, even though the Court. could find no equal protection violation in Ar-
lington Heights, 203
 because there was no showing of discriminatory purpose,'"
it remanded the case for a determination whether the Fair Housing Act 205
required the application of a broader standard of local government liability.
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Vil-
lage had an obligation under this Federal statute "to refrain from zoning
policies that effectively foreclose the construction of any low-cost housing
within its corporate boundaries." 2"" It established a four-pronged test to de-
termine whether such a statutory violation had occurred , 217 and remanded to
the district court to apply this new test. 2 "8
"" Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); see notes 21-31 supra and accompanying text.
2 " 429 U.S. at 270. The Court relied on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), which involved a c.hallettge under the fifth amendment's clue process clause to
the District of Columbia's use of an unvalidated personnel test as part of its recruit-
ment of police officers. See note 25 supra. In Davis. the Court held that different
substantive standards are to be applied in such discrimination cases, depending upon
whether the claim is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976), or is brought directly under the Constitution.
As to Title VII claims, the Court in Davis held that proof of discriminatory impact
is sufficient. 426 U.S. at 246-47. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Dotharcl v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). But see New York City Transit Authority V.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (purporting to apply "disparate impact" standard, but
rejecting a Title VII attack upon Transit Authority's employment exclusion of
methadone users because the rather substantial statistical showing upon which trial
court's findings for plaintiffs were based was "weak"). For a general discussion of the
use of' statistical evidence in such cases, see Note, The Rule of Statistical Evidence in Title
VII Cases, 19 B.C. L. Rev. 881 (1978).
2"' 429 U.S. at 271, citing Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1976). By
contrast. the Court in Davis had ruled there was no necessity to remand on the Title
VII claim, because that claim had been adequately ventilated below. The trial court
had found that the challenged personnel test was directly related to performance in
the police training program. 426 U.S. at 248-52.
" 1 i 1
 Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights.
558 F.2(1 i283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977), cot denied. 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
2117
 The factors were:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff 's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is
there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy
the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; (3) what is the defen-
dant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does the plaintiff'
seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for mem-
bers of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfer-
ing with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing,
hi. at 1290.
The Seventh Circuit's application of this test still evidenced substantial respect for
"local prerogatives." Id. at 1292-93. In describing the third prong of the test (interest
of the defendant), the Court said. "MI' the defendant is a governmental body acting
within the ambit of legitimately dervied authority. we will less readily find that its
action violates the Fair Housing Act  Moreover, municipalities are traditionally af-
forded wide discretion in zoning. Village' of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).'' Id.
at 1293. Also, in applying the fourth factor (nature of relief sought), the Court showed
concern for the financial implications of a ruling tinder the Fair Housing Act, an-
nouncing that courts should he less willing to intervene where plaintiffs seek to compel
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Furthertntire, in city of Mobile v. 13olden," 01 the Burger Court rejected
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment attacks on Mobile's use of an at-large
system for electing commissioners, on the ground that plaintiff's had failed to
prove purposeful discrimination by the City or its commissioners. Yet, the
very same day, the Court, in city of Rome v. United Slates,"" upheld the U.S.
Attorney General's authority under the Voting Rights Act of 11165 2 " to reject.
electoral changes that would have given Rome, Georgia an at-large system
comparable to that judicially validated for Mobile. In Rome, as in Mobile, there
had been no showing of discriminatory purpose; the electoral modifications
would, however, have had a discriminatory effect by diluting the votes of
blacks in Rome. The Court, per justice Marshall. reasoned:
The Act's ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect
is an appropriate method of promoting the purpose of the Fifteenth
Amendment even if it is assumed that Section 1 of the Amendment
prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress could
rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdic-
tions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination
in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination. it was proper
to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.'212
The Court thus demonstrated its intent to follow Congress' lead in the expan-
sion of individual rights against state and local governments.'""
affirmative government action, such as the construction of' integrated housing. than
where plaintiffs seek simply to remove governmental obstacles to the construction of
integrated housing on their own land. H. The Seventh Circuit's test has been criticized
both for insensitivity to the legitimate municipal interests in prohibiting low Monne
housing projects. see N.Y.U. Comment. supra note 30, at 175-76, and for giving instil .-
Eicient attention to the substantial national interest in ending racial discrimination in
housing. see inning, sutra note 159, at 1688-90. See also Nhndelker, supra note 31. at
1252 n.108 (test requires policy and financial judgments too complex for court to
make in absence of further statutory guidance).
'20H1
.
1
. .fie principal factual issue was whether or not other properly zoned suit-
able sites were available within the Village for low cost housing- . 558 F.2d at 1291.
1294-95. The court of appeals majority placed the burden of providing this issue on
the defendant Village. Id. at 1295. After months of negotiation, the Village agreed to
annex and rezone a neighboring area in which the subsidized rental housing will he
built, The agreement was effectuated by a consent decree issued by the district court.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, Civil Action
No. 72C 1453 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1979), described in URII. AFT. REP. (CCH), Apr. l2,
1979, at I. The challenge to this decree by an adjoining village, various property own-
ers, and community associations was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 016
F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1980).
" 100 S. Ct. 149(1 (1980), See notes 127-38 supra and accompanying text.
21 " 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980). Sec notes 288-97 iaf3n ;mil accompanying text,
2"
 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
" 2 	S. Ct. at 1562.
21:1 Even before Rome, the circuit courts had shown a willingness to give a
broad reading to federal civil rights statutes. So, e.g., Resident Advisory Board v.
Rizzo, 504 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1 0 )8 (1978). Pre-Arlington
Heights cases include Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8111 Cir. 19711):
United States v. City of Black lack. 508 F.2d 1 17!) (8th Car. 1971), cert. dilled. 422 U.S.
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2. Standing to Sue and Immunity from Sun
In addition to this power to enlarge the substantive content of individual
rights. Congress can also expand the class of plaintif fs who can pursue suits
against local governments and can alter the types of defenses available. For
example, the Burger Court has acquiesced in substantial statutory expansion
of standing In bring housing discrimination suits. In Gladstone v. Village of
B ellwood ,214 real estate brokerage firms and their employees were accused of
"racial steering." Plaintiffs included both residents and non-residents of the
"target area," as well as the Village in which the target area was located:II'
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court 21 " ruled that Congress, in the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 2 ' 7
 had expanded standing to the full extent of the fed-
11)42 (1975): and Kennedy Park Homes ANS ' 17 v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Ch. . 11170), cert. denied, 101 U.S. 1010 (1971).
Some ditit • 01.1111S had, however. extended the Washington v. Davis discrimina-
tory purpose standard to employment discrimination actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
See Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp.. 439 F. Supp. 55 (F.D. Pa. 1977): Croker v. Boeing
Co., 437 F. Stipp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977): :Johnson v. Hoffman. 124 F. Supp. 410 ) (E.D.
Mo. 1977). A final resolution of this issue was postponed when the Supreme Court
vacated as moot a Ninth Circuit ruling that a public employer's hiring practice, which
was exclusionary in operation but not purposefully discriminatory. violated both Title
VII and Section 1981. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority. found the controversy moot because the only
employment practice the plaintiff class had standing to challenge had not been and
would not be used and because the County had hired a substantial number of minority
recruits during the pendency of the litigation. Two Justices were, however, anxious to
reach the substantive issue. Iel. at 1380 (Powell, dissenting. joined by Burger.
Even if' a discriminatory intent standard were deemed necessary for Section 1081
ac tio ns , thi s
 would not necessarily prevent the application of the discriminatory effect
standard in actions under Titles VII and VIII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Section
1981 is a broad remedial statute with language closely paralleling the fourteenth
amendment itself'. The twentieth-century civil rights statutes. like the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 interpreted in ROM', are fOcused upon particular discrimination problems.
and their legislative histories support broad judijal interpretation within their spheres
of coverage. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S, 503. 567-68 (1074) (Title VI); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 402 U.S. 124. 420-36 (1971) (Title VII); Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp. v. Village of' Arlington Heights, 558 F.2(1 1283, 1281) (7th Cir. 1077) (Title
VII I); Comment, Applying the Tide VII Prima Each , Case to Title VIII Litigation, I I H ARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. RE,v, 128 (1076): Zoning, supra, note 150. at 1081-84, and sources cited
therein.
2" 141 U.S. 91 ( 1970).
2 " Id
. 
at 93, 91, 95. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had steered black pro-
spective buyers toward an integrated neighborhood in the Village of Bellwood and had
steered white prospective buyers away Inn]] this area. Id. at 95.
2" Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Chief justice Burger and
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun. and Stevens. justice Rehnquist dissented
in an opinion joined by justice Stewart. 14. at 1 16.
2 ' 7
 Specifically, the Court ruled that section 812 of this Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3612
(1976), which authorizes immediate federal court action by plaintiffs. provided a rem-
edy for the same class of plaintiffs as section 810, 42 U.S.C. § 3010 (1970), which
establishes procedures for administrative conciliation of housing discrimination claims
before the bringing of individual suits. The Court had previously held that section 810
extended standing "as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." Traf-
ficame v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205. 201) (I1)72). Traffirante involved an
action under section] 810 brought by one white and one black tenant against their
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oral courts' article III powers, 218 thus permitting suits by those who Would
have been barred by the "prudential standing rules" he had articulated in
Warth . 2 " The (Curt, therefore, concluded that the trial court had erred in
granting summary jt.idginent. against the target area residents and the Village,
since they both had alleged economic injury due to loss of the integrated
character of the target area. 220
 It is likely that this expansive interpretation
of standing under the Fair Housing Act and other civil rights acts will obtain
where the defendant is a public institution rather than a private realtor or
landlord. 22 '
In a related development, for example, the Burger Court reinterpreted
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Sherman Antitrust. Act to remove the
total immunity for local governments which prior decisions had engrafted
onto these statutes. In Airmen v. Department rf Social Seroices, 222 seven members
of the current Court. 223 after a careful reexamination of the legislative his-
tory,224 voted to overrule 225 the Warren Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape 2
that local governments could not be sued under the Civil Rights Act of
1871 227 fO• constitutional violations. 22 ' Yet, they continued to show defer-
private landlord for discriminating against non - white potential tenants in various ways.
Justice Douglas wrote t'or it unanimous Court, with . justices White, Blackmun and
Powell joining in a separate concurring opinion. He ruled that plaintiffs had standing
as ''aggrieved persons'' to bring the action under section 810. because of the alleged
loss of economic, social, and professional benefits they would have derived from living
in an integrated apartment complex. Id. at 209.
21 " "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States.... [and] to Controversies
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
21" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). See id. at 500-01 (inviting Om-
gress to overcome these judicial prudential harriers to standing by making appropriate
legislative findings of fact).
22" 441 U.S. at 115.
221 See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 1.2d 126. 139 n.17 (1977), ceri,
denied. •35 U.S. 908 (1978); Zoning, supra note 1511. at 1664-66, 1683-86.
•	 222
 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
223
 Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices
White. Stewart. Marshall. and Blackmun joined. Justice Powell cnticurred, id. at 704,
and justice Stevens concurred in part, id. at 714. Justice Rehnquist dissented in an
opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 714.
221 Id. at 665-89. The interpretive problem involved what effect should be
given to the congressional rejection of the Sherman amendment.
225 Id. at 701.
22" 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (Douglas, _J.). See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I
(197(1) (municipal corporations cannot he sued under Section 1983 and cannot be
added as pendent parties); City of Kenosha v. Bruno. 412 U.S. 509 (1973) (exemption
from Scctinn 1983 liability applies to injunctive as well as monetary relief); Monr v.
County of Alameda, 4 i I U.S. 693 (1973) (county cannot be sued under Section 1983).
Following this line of cases. lower federal courts had protected other governmental
entities from suit under Section 1983. See, e.g., Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd..
545 F.2d 527, 531 it.7 (5th (:ir. 1977): Trott v. Condello, 427 F, Stipp. 1175. 1184
(S.D.N.V. 1976) (city teachers' retirement fund and state authorities).
227 42 U.S.C.	 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance. regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State ... or "Territory, subjects, or causes to he sub-
jected. any citizen of the United Sates or other person within the
tint] thereof to the deprivation of any rights. privileges, or immunities se-
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ence to local governments, by rejecting vicarious liability suits under that stat-
ute.""" While Monell gave a broad reading to Congress' power to authorize
suits against local authorities,'"" it left crucial questions concerning the -con-
tours of municipal liability" 231 and the scope of potential defenses"' to be
resolved.'"
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall he liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
This provision became law as part of the Civil Rights Act. of 1871, Act of Apr. 20,
1871. ch. 22. section 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The narrow question of statutory interpreta-
tion in both Monroe and Monett was whether or not local governments are "persons"
within the meaning of Section 1983. If not, there could be no federal court jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976), Section 1983's jurisdictional counterpart.
"28 Specifically, the Court ruled:
Local governing bodies rand officers sued in their official capacities], there-
fore, can he sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, Or
injunctive relief where. as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitu-
tional implements or executes a policy statement, ... ordinance. regulation,
Or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers ...
or is taken] pursuant to governmental "custom - even though such a cus-
tom has not received formal approval through the bodys official decision-
making channels.
436 U.S. at 690-91.
22" The Court determined that both the language of Section 1983 ("subjects ()r -
ealises to he subjected, - see note 227 supra) and its legislative history (which implicitly
rejected the usual justifications for vicarious liability) compelled the conclusion
that a municipality cannot he held liable solely- because it employs a
tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
Instead, it is when execution ()la government's policy or custom. whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly he said
to represent official policy, inflicts the ittjury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.
436 U.S. at (191. 694. For a criticism of the reasoning behind this conclusion, sec Blum,
From NIonroe Mona-. Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51
TEAWLE L.Q. 409, 412-14 (1978) thereinafter cited as Blum'.
2 "" See especially 436 U.S. at (191) n.54.	 •
231
 Id. at 695.
232 The principal question left unresolved. see 436 U.S. at 695-701 & 713-14
(Powell, _I., concurring), was whether the broad immunities created by the Burger
Court for various public officials, .tee, e.g.. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S, 349 (1978)
(absolute immunity for judges): Procunier v. Navareue. 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (''good
faith - defense for prison officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)
("good faith'' defense for school hoard members). would be extended to the
municipalities themselves. Initially some lower courts said "yes. - See, e.g. Paxtuan
Campbell. 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 198(1) (en franc): Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467
F. Stipp. 324, 344 (1). Vt. 1979) ("If the governmental decision-makers responsible bu -
rin unconstitutional policy or custom satisfy this good faith test, then the government,
as an entity, has not acted wrongfully even if' the constitutional rights of the plaintiff
have been abridged."): Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F, Stipp. 585 (1).R,I, 1978)
(extending "good faith - defense to municipality "where the official acts with a pur-
poseful intention - and setting gross negligence as the culpability standard in other
Monell-type cases). See generally Blum, slimy) note 229, at 412 n.14, 441-43. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court rejected this approach, ruling "that (al municipality !nay
not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983. -
Owen v. City of Independence, 114(1 S. Ct. 1398. 14119 (1980) (Brennan. l.). The major-
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iiv opinion noted that the concerns justifying qualified immunities for governmental
officials were "less compelling, if not wholly inapplicable, when the liability of the
municipal entity is at issue." Id. at 1416.
2 " Initially, the Monett decision was regarded as a mixed blessing by ciYil tights
litigators. This was because other devices were already available for obtaining jurisdic-
tion over and stating claims against municipalities, despite Monroe's blockade of the
Section 1983 route.
The principal device was to premise a claim directly upon the fourteenth
amendment and to obtain federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction). This approach was developed by analogy to the
implication of a damage remedy hir fourth amendment violations committed by fed-
eral officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). It derived tacit support from the remand instruc-
tions in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507. 5[4 ( 1973), and from Justice Breit-
11:111S concurring opinion in that case, id. at 516. Most lower federal courts that con-
sidered the issue prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Morrell had accepted this
implied damage remedy. See. e.g., Turpin v. Mailet. 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en bane),
vacated and remanded (for reconsideration iii light of ,iluerell), 439 U.S. 974 (1978);
Owen v. (.:U) Independence, Stilt F.2d 925, 933-34 (8th Cir. 1977), remanded (for re-
consideration in light of Alone/I), 438 U.S. 902 (1978); Stapp V. Avoyelles Parish School
Rd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 n,7 (5111 Cir. [977): Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2(1 551,
559 (6th Cir. 1976): McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2(1 5116 (7111 Cir.), cert. denied.
434 U.S. 966 (1977): Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Stipp. 812, 8[8 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Patterson v. Ramsey. 418 F. Stipp, 523, 528 (I). Md, 1976): Panzarella v. Boyle.
406 F. Stipp. 787, 792 (D.R.I. [975); Sanabria v. Village of Nlornicello, 424 F. Stipp.
402, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41-45 (1st Cir. [977)
(refusing to imply cause of action against municipality under fourteenth amendment
in vicarious liability case but suggesting different result if municipality had directly
ordered the constitutional violation): Perzanowski v. Salvia, 369 F. Stipp. 223, 229-31
(D. Court. 1974) (accepting jurisdiction under Section 1331 Inn refusing to imply a
cause of action for damages): Sandoval v. Brown. 432 F. Sapp. 1028. 1032 (D.N.N1.
1977). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword. 85
HARv. 1.. RE N. 1532 (1972): Hundt.StUng Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 71) Nw. U.I.. Rev. 770 (1975); Nowak, The Scope ," Cougressiunal Power to
Create Causes of Action Against State Govern MOILS and the History of the Eleventh and Four-
teenth Amendments. 75 CoLtim. I.. REY. 1413, 1459-611. 1476-68 (1975): Note. Damage
Remedies Against :11unicipalities f o r Constitutional Violations, 89 HARy, 1,, Rev. 922, 952
(1976).
Eighteen months before the ;Howl/ opinion was delivered, the Burger Court had
expressly reserved decision on the implication of such a claim fOr damages under the
fourteenth amendment. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. lid. of Educ. v. Doyle. 429
U.S. 274. 278-79 (14177). Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Monell suggests that the
majority's opinion now obviates the necessity of making such a decision. 436 U.S. at
712-13. See also [lupin v. Mailer, 591 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. [979) (en bane): Lune v.
City of Providence, 463 F. Stipp. 585. 587-88 (D.R.1. 1978), But see Citrlson v. Green,
100 S. Ct. 1468, 1477, 1478 (Burger', C.J.. dissenting) (arguing the test adopted by the
plurality for implying Biveets-type remedy under eighth amendment against federal
prison officials "would seem to permit a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated by a state officer to bring suit under Bivens even though Congress in 42
U.S.C. 1983 has already fashioned An equally effective remedy:).
Another pre-/110M/ avenue forohmining- federal court jurisdiction, at least indi-
rectly, over suits against municipalities was to sue the offending officials as individuals
under Section 1983. See Edelman v. Jordan. 413 U.S. 651 (1974); lion v. Condello,
427 F. Stipp. 1175. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. [976). In j unctive relief could nearly always be ob-
tained this way, but monetary relief soniethnes posed a problem. See, e.g., Muzquii. v.
City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d. 499 (5th Cir. [97(i). See generally Freilich. Groiscoek,
Ungar, /977-78 Annual Review a]' Local Government Law: Judicial and Cmistioaional Inter-
vention in Municipal Fiscal Affairs, Ill URn. LAW. 573, 600 (1978).
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Another long-standing barrier to federal court actions against local gov-
ernments was lowered when the Court, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
and Light,'" ruled that cities which owned and operated electric utility systems
could be sued by a privately-owned utility under the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 233 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion 2 "" co ncluded that local govern-
inentscould invoke the "stale action" defense 2"7 to Congress' broad antitrust
scheme only when they had acted ''pursuant to 1 -ai state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service.'' "" Thus. "when the
Stale itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the
State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must obey the antitrust
laws. -23" Chief justice Burger concurred in the judgment on the ground
Moreover. the Supreme Court had often ruled on the merits in suits against
school hoards, even in some that involved monetary relief, without ever mentioning
the jurisdictiotial issue, see, Nlilliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S, 717 (1974); San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4I I U.S. (1973): Tinker v. Des Moines Inc. Commun-
ity School Disc, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See generally M.onell v. Dept of Soc. Serv.. 436
U.S. 658, 663 (1978); id. at 704, 710-M (Powell, j., concurring).
Still other approaches included suits against municipalities under 42 U.S.C.
1981 and under pendent state claims in a suit with jurisdiction premised upon 28
U.S.C. § 133I(a),	 Blum, supra note 229, at 4 14-16, 4 19-20, and sources cited
t herein.
In short, .Morrell provided a new jurisdictional basis for federal suits against local
governments in a limited number of circuits, but it may have cut short the gradual
development or other . jurisdictional bases and opened the door to an expanded arsenal
of municipal defenses. tier , e.g., Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Stipp, 585, 587-88
(D,R.1. 1978) (refusing to imply a claim for relief upon the fourteenth amendment
and rejecting a Section 1981 claim, even though responcleat superior and negligent
supervision claims were unavailing in a Section 1983 claim for verbal and physical
abuse by policement). See generally Blum, supra note 299. 'Hie point is seen most clearly
by noting that if the claim in Mo4ime—early morning warrantless police raiding and
ransacking of plaintiff's home—were presented to a federal court after Monett. it
could survive a jurisdictional challenge but not a motion to dismiss, because respondeat
superior claims cannot be maintained under Section 1983 after Morrell. But we Maine v.
Thilboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980) (ruling that	 1983 encompasses federal statutory as
well as constitutional claims. that 	 1983 claims can be brought in state courts, and that
the latter can award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs).
234 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2 ' 15 IS U.S.C. § 1 (1978). The specific violations claimed are listed in 435 U.S.
at 392 11.6.
" justice Brennan was joined by justices Marshall, Powell. and Stevens. jus-
tice Marshall wrote a separate concurring opinion, 435 U.S. at 417, and Chief Justice
Burger concurred only in Part I of .justice Brennan's opinion and in the judgment, it/.
at 418. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which justices White and Rehn-
quist joined, id. at 426. Justice Blackmun joined in most of justice Stewart's dissent and
wrote a separate dissenting opinion, id. at 141.
2 " '[he "state action - defense was first articulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1043), in which the Court held that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to
apply to anti-competitive restraints imposed by state-administered programs. For re-
cent applications, refinements, and limitations of the doctrine. sec Rates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350. 359-63 (1977). Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1957). So, generally Verkuil, Stale
Action, Due Process, and Antitrust, 75 COLUM, L. REv. 328 (1975); 1 1 CoNN. L. Rey.
126, 130-36 (1978).
23" 135 U.S. at 113.
" 3 '' Id. at 416. See id. at 4 I 5.
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that the "state action" defense did not apply to the "proprietary enterprises of
municipalities," such as electric utilities, but only to "a sovereign's decision ...
to replace competition with regulation... 24" While the Cite ff Lafayette Court
declined to "decide any question of remedy," 241
 its decision clearly rejected
the prior standard of complete immunity for municipalities based solely upon
their governmental status.
3. Remedies Under Federal Statutes
The Court has also sanctioned a partial expansion of remedies against.
local government defendants. Milliken n, Bradley,24 ' an equal protection case,
set the standard for cases in which there has been no prior congressional or
administrative intervention. As noted above, the Court there ruled that a fed-
eral districi court could not consolidate white suburban and black central-city
school districts to create a metropolitan-wide desegregation plan where only
the Detroit central-city school system had been found guilty of direct racial
discrimination.? -1 :t
Hills a. Gaulreaux 244
 demonstrates how the situation can be altered when
congressional legislation and federal administrative activity arc involved. In
Hills, black tenants and applicants For public housing sued the Chicago Hous-
ing Authority and the United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) on constitutional and statutory grounds. 245
 The issue pre-
sented to the Supreme Court was whether - a federal court. order to remedy
statutory and constitutional violations by HUI) could extend beyond the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the city in which the violations had occurred.24 " At an
earlier stage of the litigation, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
had determined that HUD violated both the fifth amendment and Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act 217
 by knowingly funding Chicago's racially
"4"
 Id. at 418. 422 (Burger, C.J„ concurring). Chief . fustice Burger further con-
tended, id. at 423, that his focus upon the activity rather than the entity providing it
was closer to the spirit of the ruling in National League ()I' Cities v. Usery, 420 U.S.
833 (1976). see notes 2(12-80 infra and accompanying text. Both the plurality ()pillion,
435 U.S. 412-13, and the principal dissent. id. at 427-28, 432-34. disagreed.
241
 435 U.S. at 402. The dissenters contended that the Clayton Act's treble
damages provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15, was mandatory and could not be disregarded by
the courts. If granted. treble damages would i. itninun 1(1 $540 million on just one of
the claims in City ff Lafayette, to he collected from cities with a combined population of
only 75,000. See 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart..].. dissenting): id. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J„
dissenting). The courts may. however. find a means of engrafting a "good faith -
 de-
fense for municipalities in antitrust suits analogous to that attempted by some lower-
courts in civil rights cases after ill(mell, see tote 190 ,supra, or may require exhaustion
of state remedies prior to filing in federal district court. ,See 11 CoNN. L. Rcv. 12(1.
142-45.
112 4 18 U.S. 717 (11174).
1 " See notes 1i3-72 supra and accompanying text.
211
 425 U.S. 284 (1976). The tornrotts ten-year litigation history of the case is
described in McGee, Illusion and Contradiction in the Quest for a Desegregated Metrapolis,
11170 ILL. L.P. 1H8, 953-57. i012-15 [hereinafter cited as McGee].
24"
 425 U.S. at 28fi.
1 " /d. at 292.
2.17
 42 U.S.C. § 20004 (i970) (Forbidding racial discrimination by recipients of
federal	 assistance).
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discriminatory public housing program. 248 It subsequently ordered the trial
court to adopt "a comprehensive 'metropolitan area plan that will not only
disestablish the segregated public housing system in the city of Chicago ...
but will increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible." 24"
In reviewing this order of inter-district relief in the absence of a finding
of inter-district. violations, 2 " the Supreme Court"' emphasized that Milliken
"was actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the
federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental
entities." 252 The Court. then distinguished Gautreaux from Milliken on several
grounds: HUD, unlike Detroit's suburban school districts, had actually vio-
lated constitutional and statutory provisions; 253 the housing market area ex-
tended well beyond Chicago's city limits; 254 HUD and the Chicago Housing
Authority had power to operate throughout this metropolitan area; HUD had
both the statutory power and duty to promote low-income housing oppor-
tunities and racial &concentration."'" After reviewing the numerous applic-
able federal statutes, the Court concluded that a metropolitan relief order di-
rected against HUD "need not abrogate the role of local government units in
the federal housing assistance programs." 2 "
248 The district court, on the basis of I WerWheillling uncontradicted evidence,
had granted summary judgment against the Chicago Housing Authority on the
ground that it had unconstitutionally selected housing sites and assigned tenants on
the basis of race. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969). See also 425 U.S. at 288-01.
24" GinareaUX v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 903, 939 (7th Cir.
1974).
25" Although the court of appeals had surmised that an inter-district visitation
or segregative effect may have been present in the case, the Supreme Court criticized
this as "contrary both to expert testimony in the record and the conclusions of the
District. Court." 425 U.S. at 294-95 n.11.
251 Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the Court, in which all participating
justices joined. The three remaining- Milliken and Rodriguez dissenters filed a concur-
ring opinion, written by Justice Marshall, which strongly favored "paqing] the way for
a remedial decree directing the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
utilize its full statutory power to foster housing projects in white areas of the greater
Chicago metropolitan area." 425 U.S. at 307. justice Stevens (who replaced Justice
Douglas, the fourth Rodriguez and Milliken dissenter) took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
252 Id. at 293.
253 Id. at 297, 299, 302.
254 Id. at 299.
255 Id. at 302.
25 " Id. at 303. This was because lain order directed solely to HUD would not
force unwilling localities to apply for" federal housing assistance programs. Id. at 303.
Thus, the Court felt that merely inducing local governments to comply with housing
dispersion plans by providing financial assistance was different from a federal court or
agency order to comply. Cf. notes 298-308 infra and accompanying text (discussion of
spending clause cases). Even as to the program in which HUD could contract directly
with private builders to construct integrated and scatter-site housing, the Court noted
that "local governmental units retain the right to comment on specific assistance pro-
posals, to reject certain proposals that are inconsistent. with their approved housing-
assistance plans, and to require that zoning and other land-use restrictions be adhered
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4. Dormant Commerce Clause Barriers to State and Local Action
In addition to its rulings in these cases involving federal civil rights and
antitrust statutes, the Burger Court has fairly consistently acknowledged and
protected the broad scope of Congress' private sector regulatory power, by
invalidating state statutes and regulations that burden interstate commerce,
even in the absence of an affirmative exercise of Congress' commerce clause
power'" Indeed, the Court has rejected dormant commerce clause attacks
on state and local actions only where the burden on interstate commerce is
considered minimal ''' or where the state itself' has entered the economic
marketplace.''"
to by builders, - 425 U.S. at 305. See McGee. supra note 244, at 960-61, 1005-10. The
Court thus allowed suburban governments to continue, even in cases under the 1964
Civil Rights Act, to exercise many of the self-determination powers recognized in Ar-
lington Heights and Belle Terre, see notes 21-37 supra and accompanying text, ;Ind later
expanded in Las-tlake, see notes 92-101 copra and accompanying text.
See Lewis v. B	 Investment Managers, Inc.. 100 S. Ct. 2009 (1980) (in-
validating state statute hirbidding mu-of-sum: banks to own investment advisory ser-
vices in the state); Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (striking down statute forbid-
ding transport of minnows out of state); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978) (striking down statute fOrbidding importation of garbage for disposal in the
state); Raymond Motor 'I'ransp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (striking clown statute
barring trucks longer than 55 feet or pulling more than one other vehicle from operat-
ing on highways within state without permit): Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating statute which. in effect. prohibited display
of Washington State apple grades on closed containers shipped in North Carolina);
Great Atlantic Pacific 'lea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (striking down state
regulation forbidding importation of milk unless exporting state signed reciprocal
trade agreement); Allenberg Cotton v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974) (reversing state
court's refusal to entertain suit on cotton delivery contract brought by unregistered,
out-of-state corporation); Pike v. Bruce Church. 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating
order made pursuant to stale statute forbidding export of cantaloupes by grower to
nearby out-4if-state packers).
All of the statutes and regulations invalidated in these dormant commerce clause
cases involved various forms of state business regulation. The ruling will lie the same,
however, even Svhere the commerce clause interests in national uniformity and free
trade are pitted directly against a community self-determination interest, such as crime
control. See Service Nlae,h. Shipbuilding v. Edwards, 617 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 198(1)
(dormant commerce clause violated by local ordinance requiring everyone who seeks
new employment within the parish to obtain an identity card, ;niter paying a $1(1.00
lee, being fingerprinted and photographed, and responding to extensive governmental
questionnaire), affd, 3288 (October 21, 1980). The author was lead coun-
sel for the employers and employees challenging the ordinance in the Service Machine
case.
'5" See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (rejecting dormant com-
merce clause attack on tug escort requirements, while finding other portions of state
environmental act preempted); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Audi Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, 405 -707 (1972) (upholding one -dollar use and service charge levied by state
and local authority for each airline passenger enplaning commercial aircraft). See also
Exxon Corp. V. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding that state statute
14bidding petroleum producing or refining companies to operate retail service sta-
tions did not violate clorinam commerce clause, because it affected only particular in-
terstate firms and left out-of-state independent retailers free to compete with in-state
retailers).
"" See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake. KM S. Ct. 2271 (1980) (rejecting commerce clause
attack on state-owned cement plant's refusal to sell to an out-of-state buyer); Hughes v.
NIay 19801
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Thus, a general pattern of Court acquiescence in congressional expan-
sion of rights and remedies against local governments has emerged. Statutes
expanding substantive individual rights against local governments (Arlington
Heights, City qf Rome), extending the class of plaintiffs who can assert. these
rights (Gladstone, Trafficante), and terminating the absolute immunity for local
government defendants (Monell, City of Lafayette) have been upheld. in addi-
tion, the Court has enforced remedial orders under federal housing and
anti-discrimination acts that impose new duties on federal agencies. Nioreover,
the Court has protected the broad congressional sphere of action through its
dormant commerce clause rulings. While some of these cases still show so-
licitude for local government self-rule,""' they do contrast sharply with the
broad judicial deference of community self-determination cases, such as Ar-
lington Heights and Rodriguez. Although the rationale for these differing results
has not always been clear, it appears to rest upon the fact that the plaintiffs in
Arlington Heights, Rodriguez, and Salyer were trying to persuade the Court, act-
ing on its own, to interfere with the political decisionmaking of local. elected
bodies, while their counterparts in Gautreaux, City of Rome, and Moridl asked
the Court merely to effectuate political decisions made by a national, elected
body. In short, the latter cases involved what might be viewed as national
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (Powell, j.) (upholding slate statutory
scheme imposing more burdensome documentary requirements on out-of-state junk-
car processors than cm in-state processors, because state was "participating in the mar-
ket and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others").
justice Brennan, joined by justices White and Marshall, accused the majority in
Alexandria Scrap of resting its decision on an extension of the "state sovereignty - doc-
trine espoused in National League of Cities v. User'', 426 U.S. 833 (1976). see notes
262-77 infra and accompanying text. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap. 426 U.S. 794, 823
11.4 (1976) (Brennan, j., dissenting). In Reeves, both Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
five-man majority and Justice Powell's opinion l'or the dissenters agreed that National
League qf Giles principles could be applied in dormant commerce clause cases. The
dispute was over the appropriate situation for their application. The majority con-
tended that South Dakota's residents-first policy on cement sales was justified, because
State proprietary activities are subject to congressional (affirmative commerce clause)
regulation just like private business activities. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light. 435 U.S. 389 ( 1978), see notes 234-41 supra and accompanying text:
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1946) (subjecting state-owned railroad to
commerce clause-based regulations). Therefore, - lAdvenhandedness suggests that, when
acting as proprietors. state[s] should similarly share existing freedoms from federal
constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.'' 100 S. (It. at
2278-79. By contrast, justice Powell (joined by justices Brennan, White. and Stevens)
concluded that state proprietary activities were subject both to dormant commerce
clause attacks and to active commerce clause regulations. For these dissenters. "state
sovereignty- could be a harrier only to dormant commerce clause attacks upon South
Dakota's integral government operations, such as "withhold[ing] from interstate com-
merce the cement needed for public: projects." Id. at 2285. - If, however, the State
enters the private market and operates a commercial enterprise for the advantage of
its private citizens. it 'nay not evade the constitutional policy against economic balkani-
zation. - Id. at 2284.
fro Sc e ne commentators believe these cases continue to show too much solic-
itude for local government self-rule. See, e.g.. Zoning, supra note 159, at 1693 (criticiz-
ing Gautreaux for this). See also note 233 supra and accompanying text.
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self-rule in conflict with local self-rule, with the supremacy clause' requiring
such a conflict to be resolved in favor of the national government.
B. Restraints on Congressional Interference with Local
Government: The. Constitutional Director Intervenes
In cases where individuals seek federal judicial intervention against. local
governments, the Burger Court's general pattern has been deference toward
the local governments, coupled with deference to congressional decisionmak-
ing that conflicts with local decisionmaking. On the other hand, where stale
and local governments assert that congressional action intrudes too far upon
their structural integrity. the Court has created a limited "slate sovereignty"
exception 10 the general rule of deference to Congress as a means of protect-
ing state and local governments in their service-provider role.
1. National League of Cities and "State Sovereignty''
Arty analysis of the limits the Burger Court has placed on congressional
interference with local governments must begin with the 1973 decision in Na-
tional League if Cities v. User v.'" 2 There, the Court, with justice Rehnquist
writing for a four-man plurality, 't 3 invalidated amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act which extended minimum-wage and maximum-hour protec-
tions t o state and 1111IlliCipal ellIplOVCCS. 26 ' 1 The plurality reasoned that al-
though Congress had the authority to reach the matter of wage and hour
regulations under the commerce clause," the Constitution prohibited it from
exercising this authority in a manner which interfered with traditional aspects
'" See note 201 supra.
426 U.S. 833 (1975). The wide variety of approaches taken by the commen-
tators is shown by the following selection Id illustrative titles: supra note
191 (focusing itt particular on the implications for local government): Percy, National
League of Cities v. Users: The Tenth Amendment is Alive and Doing Well, 5 i 'FIJIAN!: L.
REV. 95 (170) [hereinafter cited as Percy]: Stewart, Pyramids 4 Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in mandating state implementation njt.. Nat iona l Envinimimmtal Policy,8fi y ALE I „ J .
1196 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Steward: Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services. (1) MARV. L.
REV. [Mir) (1077) I hereinafter Hied its Tribe': Comment, ApplYing the Equal Pay Ad To
Slate and Local Governments: The Eff•ci of Ntnional 1...eague of Cities V. User•. 125 PA.
L. Rev. 065 (1077): Note. Federal Securities- Fraud Liability and Municipal Issues: Implica-
tions of National League of v. liSery, 77 CoLum. L. Rev. 11014 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Federal Securities Fraud); Note. Title VII and Public Employees: • Did Congress Ex-
owl Its Powers?, 78 COLUM. I.. REV. 372 ( 1979). See also MANDELKER NETscir, supra
note 13, at 3-22: Continent. The Rise 4 Municipal Sovereignty in Supreme Court Jurispru-
dence. 2 GRII. I.. REV. n 1 6 . 48 (I 1177) (describing National League ,?!. Cities as one
 of the
11175 Ternt's great surprises- ).
"" Justice Rehnquist's (pinion was joined by Chief . justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Powell, Justice Blackmun filed a separate tsulcurring opinion. 420 U.S. at
850. Justice Brennan dissented in an opinion joined by Justices \Vhile and Marshall. id.
at 856. and Justice Stevens dissented separately. id. at 880,
52 Slat. 1000, 211 U.S.C, § 2(11 (1970).
U.S. Corsi. art I, § 8, el 3 See generally NIcl.;tiii v. Real Estate Bd. of New
Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (describing the broad scope of congressional action
under the commerce clause).
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of "state sovereignty."'" justice Rehnquist noted that, unlike a private
employer who is "merely a factor in the shifting economic: arrangements of
the private sector of the economy," 267 a State "is itself a coordinate element in
the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Linion." 2 " 8
"State sovereignty" thus prevents Congress from interfering with states in
structuring their internal governmental affairs, including employer-employee
relationships in "typical" or "traditional" activities. 2 "" The Court noted
further that its protection of "state sovereignty -
 would extend to all political
subdivisions that derive their power and authority from their respective states.
Since congressional displacement of "state decisions may substantially restruc-
ture traditional ways in which local governments have arranged their
affairs," 7 " the Court ruled that "Wnterference with integral governmental
services provided by such subordinate arms of a state is therefore beyond the
reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, just as if' such
services were provided by the State itself." 2n
Other than the broad phrase "functions essential to separate and inde-
pendent existence," " 7 " however, the opinion failed to pronounce adequate
guidelines for determining which state and local government activities warrant
such protection,'" Moreover, the National League of Cities Court did not
"" 426 U.S. at 851-52.
167 Id. at 819.
2 ""
'''" Id. at 851.
2 'n 426 U.S. at 849. See also id. at 850.
271 N. at 855-56 n.20. See generativ City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
1571. 1574-75 tin.11-12 (1980) (Powell, _I., dissenting) (linking integrity of local gov-
ernment structures to community self-determination). For an analysis of developments
in the political process supporting a renewed judicial rule in protecting slate
sovereignty. as Well as a discussion of the difficulties in developing a standard for
judicial review of federal action impacts upon the states, see Kaden, supra note
15.
172 Id. at 845.
2 " Sonic guidance was provided by the Court's extended discussion of the ef-
fects of applying the federal minimum wage and overtime pay provisions to local gov-
ernment police and fire services. S ee 426 U.S, at 946-51, The Court specifically listed
''Inci prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health and parks and recreation."
as activities that are "typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services," 426 U.S. at 851. but it noted that these "examples" were "obviously not an
exhaustive catalogue ... if traditional operations." Id. ;IA 85l n.16. At the other ex-
retne was a state-operated, interstate railroad, which could be controlled by Congress
in the post-Natirma/ League of Cities world, because it was not one of the activities which
"states have regarded as integral parts of their govirtitnemal activities.
- National
League of Cities - v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833. 854 n.18 (1975), citing United States v.
California. 297 U.S. 175 (103(i). as consistent with its ruling.
On remand, the district court did not specify further. Instead. it approved new
Department of Labor regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 7752, 7753 (1978), which left the ques-
tion of "traditional function" to be resolved in the future on a case-hr-case basis. See
National League of Cities v. Marshall. 420 I', Stipp. 703 (1).1).C. 1077). See also Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake. 100 S. Ct. 2271, 2282-83 11.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (calling busi-
ness subsidy programs traditional functions); Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Stipp. 13, 18
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specify the source of its newly discovered federalism limitation upon congres-
sional power. Some lower courts and commentators have :tempted to anchor
it in the tenth amendment. 274
 while others contend that "state sovereignty" is
based more generally upon the "constitutional plan.' 2 75
 Justice Rehnquist
himself has opted for the latter interpretation, as shown by a subsequent
statement in Nevada v. Hal1. 27" Whatever position the majority of the Court.
Nlich. 1979) ("prison administration may well be one of the few unambiguous exam-
ples of a traditional governmental function ... that is not expressly enumerated in the
Useyy opinion.").
2 " See City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Stipp. 221, 240-41 (D.D.C. 1979)
(McGowan, C.J.), affd without mention if tenth amendment, 100 S. CA. 1548 (1980); Jor-
dan v. Mills, 473 F. Stipp. 13, 17-18 (ED. Mich. 1979): Kaden, supra note 15, at 883-
976; Percy, supra note 262. The only explicit mention of the tenth amendment in
justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in National League if Cities was his quotation
of the knowing passage from Fry v. United States, 42! U.S. 542 (1975):
"While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,' stating
merely that all is retained which has not been surrendered,' United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 129 (1941), it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system."
426 U.S. at 842-43.
27 ' See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 191. Ott this reading, state sovereignty
would be a sort of a "penumbral" constitutional right, like the right of privacy, as
articulated by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
276
 In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Court ruled the Constitution
imposes no limitation on the assertion of jurisdiction over the state of Nevada by the
California state courts. justice Rehnquisrs dissent, jt nined by Chief Justice Burger, in-
chided the following interpretation of his National League of Cities opinion:
Any document—particularly a constitution—is built on certain postulates
or assumptions; it draws on shared experience and common understand-
ing. Ott a certain level, that observation is obvious. Concepts such as "State"
and "Bill of Attainder" are not defined in the Constitution and demand
external referents. But on a more subtle plane, when the Constitution is
ambiguous or silent on a particular issue, this Court has often relied on
notions of a constitutional plan — the implicit ordering of relationships
within the federal system necessary to make the Constitution a workable
governing charter and to give each provision within that document the full
effect intended by the Framers. The tacit postulates yielded by that order-
ing are as much engrained in the fabric of the document as its express
provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied force and
often meaning. Thus, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), Chief
justice Marshall, writing for the Court, invalidated a state tax on a federal
instrumentality even though no express provision for intergovernmental
tax immunity can be found in the Constitution.... More recently this
Court invalidated a federal minimum wage for state employees on the
ground that it threatened the States "'ability to function effectively in 'a
federal system.' "National League of Cities v. User y, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976),
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). The Court's
literalism, therefore, cannot be dispositive, and we must examine further
the understanding of the Framers and the consequent doctrinal evolution
of concepts of state sovereignty.
Id. at 433-34 (footnote omitted). See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9
(1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
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eventually accepts as to the constitutional source of "state sovereignty," the
outcome, in the case of a conflict, will turn primarily on the specific constitu-
tional basis for the congressional action alleged to interfere with that.
sovereignty. 277 Indeed, a close look at National League of Cities and its prog-
eny reveals that "state sovereignty" poses a harrier primarily, if not exclu-
sively, to congressional action pursued under the commerce clause.
2. The Limited Scope of National League of Cities
In a footnote, the National League of Cities Court sought to limit the
breadth of its ruling by noting that the regulations it invalidated were based
solely on Congress' power under the commerce clause. 278
 The Court specifi-
cally refrained front expressing a view as to the validity of regulations affect-
ing state or local governments involving exercises of Congress' spending au-
thority" 7 " or enforcement powers under the post-Civil War Amendments.'"
a. The Post-Civil War Amendment Enforcement Powers
Four days after National League of Cities was announced, the Supreme
Court released an opinion, also authored by Justice Rehnquist, suggesting an
answer to part of the question left unresolved in that. National League of Cities
footnote. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 2 " the Court unanimously upheld the applica-
tion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 282 to state and local
governments. It ruled that Congress could require these authorities to provide
back pay to victims of their employment discrimination. Rejecting an eleventh
amendment defense, the Court reasoned:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment],
not only is it exercising legislative authority that. is plenary within the
terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that. authority under
one section of a constitutional amendment whose other sections by
their terms embody limitations on state authority. 283
27 This methodological approach would seem to be dictated by the language
of the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. Coxsr. amend. X. Thus, the Court must, as it has in the cases dis-
cussed below, determine first how much authority has been delegated to the federal
government under the particular constitutional provision (commerce clause, spending
clause, or fourteenth amendment) relied upon to support federal actions. Since the
tenth amendment and the "constitutional plan" appear to have a differential pull (like
the moon creating waves and penumbras?) with respect to each of these delegated
powers, the focus of judicial inquiry must be primarily on the particular federal power
involved.
27H
 Id. at 852 n.17.
275 U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, cl. 1.
2 " U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
2" 427 U.S. 445 (1976),
' H.' Pub. L. No, 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1974).
283 427 U.S. at 456.
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The Fitzpatrick Court thus Found the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.
(passed pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. to expand the
equal protection guarantee) distinguishable from the Fair Labor Standards
Act challenged in National League rrf Cities, which was an exercise of Congress"
commerce clause power.="a The majority in Hutto v. Finnev 285 later extended
the Fitzpatrick rationale to include the granting of attorney's fees against a
state to assist the enforcement of other constitutional rights incorporated into
the clue process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 28 "
24 id.	 453 n.9. Initially, there was sonic question whether stale and local at
governments would also he exempted from other labor acts, passed as amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act considered in National League of Cities. Nearly all courts
that have considered the issue, however. have determined that the Equal Pay Act. 29
U.S.C. 206(d). is civil rights legislation. and therefore governed by Fitzpatrick rather
than National League of Cities, despite the fact that Congress had employed the "com-
merce clause'' label in enacting it. See, e.g., Lisery v. Allegheny County Institution Dist.,
544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1076), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); Usery v, Charleston
County School Dist_ 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. [07 .7); Marshall y. Owensboro-Daviess
County Hospital, 581 F.20 116 (6th Cir. 1978). But see Howard v. Ward County, 418 F.
Stipp. 404 (D.N.D. 1076). Several lower courts have also held that the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-636 (1976), can validly be applied to state
and local governments. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1077); Rem-
mick v. Barnes County. 435 F. Stipp. 014 (D.N.D. 1977); Aaron v, Davis. 424 F. Stipp.
1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976): Users v. Board of Ethic. of Salt Lake City, 421 F. Stipp. 718
(D. Utah 1076).
" 5
 437 U.S. 678 (1978). In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court rejected an
eleventh amendment attack on an award under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of'
[976..12 U.S.C. § 1088 (1976). Even though the underlying substantive case had in-
volved a cruel and unusual punishment claim premised on the eighth amendment. as
applied to the defendant stale though the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court relied heavily upon Fitzpatrick in concluding that Congress has
plenary power to set aside the State's immunity from retroactive relief-in order to
enforce the fourteenth amendment. 437 U.S. at 603. The Court noted further that the
Attorney's Fees Act merely authorized die imposition of attorney's lees as an element
of costs, which "traditionally [have] been awarded without regard fur the state's
eleventh amendment immunity. - Id. at 695. Sec Maher v. Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2571)
981)) (eleventh :intendment dues not bar attorney's fee award for plaintiff who pre-
vails against state on statutory. non-civil-rights claim).
81'
 Justice Rehnquist's dissent in 1/utto criticized the majority's reliance on
Fitzpatrick:
Wit Fitzpatrick, .	 there was conceded to he it violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause which is contained in hues verha it) the language of the Fou•-
teenth Amendment itself. In this case the claimed constitutional violation is
the infliction of' cruel and unusual punishment, it is not at all clear to me
that it follows that Congress has the same enforcement power under § 5
with respect to a constitutional provision which has merely been judicially
"i n corporated" into the Fourteenth Arnendineni that it has with respect to
it provision which was placed in that Amendment by the drafters.
437 U.S, 678, 717 (1978) (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting). See also City or Rome N . . United
States, 100 S. Ct. 154$. 1577 (108(1) (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting) (interpreting Congress'
enforcement power under the fifteenth ttntendiuent inure narrowly than the majority
hat!).
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Any doubt created by the fact that Hutto and Fitzpatrick rejected only
eleventh amendment objections to congressional action"' was removed by City
of Rome v. United States. 2H8 The City there argued that the state sovereignty
limitation articulated in National League of Cities prevented Congress from re-
quiring, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, prior federal approval for
proposed changes in the municipal election code.289
In 1966, the Georgia General Assembly passed several laws which exten-
sively amended the electoral provisions of the City's charter. 29° Contrary to
the directive of the Voting Rights Act,'" the City failed to seek preclearance
2M7 That doubt was initially created by the fact that the sovereign immunity
defense (premised on the eleventh amendment), which was rejected in Fitzpatrick, is
quite fragile when standing on its own. It has long been subject to restrictive congres-
sional interpretation and even abrogation. provided Congress states its intent explicitly.
See Quern v. .lordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Hutto v. Finney. 437 U.S. 678 (1978);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);
Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see gen-
erally Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation
of Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 H,sRv. L. REv. 682, 697-98 (1976)
(arguing. even before National League of Cities and Fitzpatrick were decided. that the
tenth amendment imposes greater limits upon congressional action than does the
eleventh amendment). Furthermore. the eleventh amendment defense does not apply
to local governments. Compare Molten v. Dept of Soc. Scrv., 436 U.S. 658, 600 (1978)
with Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979).
2" 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980).
2" 42 U.S.C.	 1973 (1076). The approval requirement is found in § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). This requirement of pre-
clearance by the Attorney General of any change in a "standard, practice, or proce-
dure with respect to voting," id., applies to those jurisdictions which come within the
purview of the coverage formula set forth in § 4(b), 42 § l973h(b) (1076). In
1965, Georgia was designated as a covered jurisdiction. thus subjecting all
municipalities in the State to the preclearance requirement as well. See 100 S. Ct. at
1554.
'"" 100 S. Ct. at 1553. The Rome electoral scheme was modified as follows:
(1) the number of wards was reduced from nine to three;
(2) each of the nine commissioners would henceforth be elected at-large to
one of three numbered posts established within each ward;
(3) each commissioner would be elected by majority rather than plurality
vote, and if no candidate for a particular position received a maj(wity, a
runoff election would he held between the two candidates who had re-
ceived the largest number of votes:
(4) the terms of the three commissioners from each ward would be
staggered:
(5) the board td education was expanded from five to six members;
(6) each board member would be elected at-large by majority vote, for one
of two numbered posts created in each of the three wards, with runoff
procedure's identical to those applicable to city commission elections:
(7) board members would he required to reside in the wards from which
they were elected;
(8) the terms of the two members from each ward would be staggered.
Id.
29 ' See note 289 supra.
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for these electoral changes tic for sixty annexations made during a ten-year
period. When apprised of these changes and annexations in It-M74, the U.S.
Attorney General declined to give the required "preclearance.""'' The City
and two of its officials then sought declaratory relief' from the' requirements
of the Act. and the Attorney General's adverse determinations, based on a
variety of procedural and substantive grounds. 2 "
In response to plaintifIV argument that the preclearance provisions of
the Voting Rights Act violated National League tf Cities federalism camtraints
by infringing upon integral state and local government operations, justice
2"2 As the Court described the facts. the Attorney General
concluded that in a city such as R01/1C, in which the population is predomi-
nately white and racial bloc voting has been common, these electoral
changes would deprive Negro voters of the opportunity 10 elect a candi-
date of their choice. The Attorney General also refused to preclear 13 of
the 60 Annexations in question. He found that the disapproved annexa-
tions either contained predominately. white populations of significant size
or were near predominately white areas were zoned for resiticuti;tl
subdivision development. Considering these factors in light of Route's at-
large electoral scheme and history of racial bloc voting, he determined that
the city had not carried its burden of proving that the annexations would
not dilute the Negro vote.
100 S. Ct. at 1554.
293 Plaintiffs first raised two arguments asserting that the Court need not reach
the merits of the case. The first was that the City may exempt itself from the coverage
of the Act through the bailout procedure in § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (197(1). The
Court rejected this contention on the ground that Rome failed to satisfy the "separate
unit - status required for application of § 4(a). Plaintiffs' second contention was that the
Attorney General's tardiness in reviewing the changes resulted in the changes being
precleared according to the liming provisions of § 5 of the Act and the implementing
regulations. The court interpreted these provisions to mean !hal the 60-day period, sec
§ 51.3(d) (1978), commenced anew each time the Attorney General seeks or
receives additional information front the submitting jurisdiction.
In addition to the federalism claim under :Vat/anal League of Cities. see notes 294-
97 i?ifin and accompanying text, plaintiffs raised four other claims on the merits, all of
which were rejected by the Court. The first claim was that the Voting Rights Act only
prohibited voting practices that were purposefully discriminatory. Justice :Marshall, re-
lying on prior jurisprudence interpreting § 5. stated ''Congress plainly intended that a
voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory put-pose and effect are
absent, - 101) S. Ct. at 1559. A second claim was that the Act exceeded Congress' power
to enforce the fifteenth amendment by prohibiting voting practices which lacked dis-
criminatory intent, even if they were discriminatory in effect. The court also rejected
this claim: "It is clear, then. that under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may
prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment. so
long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting arc 'appropriate,' id.
at 1562. which they were in the case at bar. Id. See note 212 supra and accompanying
text. Plaintiffs argued further that the 1965 Act had outlived its usefulness and that
the congressional extension of the Act in 1975 was improper. The Court refused to
invalidate this extension, finding it to have been a "plainly constitutional method of
enforcing the fifteenth amendment. - M. at I 51)5. As a final effort, plaintiffs claimed
that first, fifth, ninth, and tenth amendment rights had been abridged as no election
had been held in the City since 1974. The Courl dealt with this argument summarily,
contending that if there was any abridgement. the culprit was not the Voting Rights
Act but the City officials. Id. at 1565.
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MarshaIP" referred to the fOottiote limiting the scope of that decision. 2 " 5 He
then read Fitzpatrick as ruling that the federal statute there considered was an
appropriate exercise of the enforcement. power under the fourteenth
amendment,'" which was barred neither by the eleventh amendment nor by
any other federalism constraints. He added that similar broad, unlettered
powers were also available under the enforcement section of the fifteenth
amendment. He then concluded:
We agree with the court below that Fitzpatrick stands for the proposi-
tion that principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle
to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to
enforce the Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislation. -
Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of
federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this
principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate state
and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights Act.'""
The Court thus embraced the view that Congress' enforcement powers under
the post-Civil War Amendments are virtually unfettered by federalism con-
straints.
b. The Taxing and Spending Powers
The Court has also given a broad reacting to Congress' spending and
taxing powers, even where those powers come into conflict with state and
local government. autonomy. For example, a claim that. National League of
Cities' state sovereignty constrains congressional spending was unceremoni-
ously rejected in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow it. Califano. 2 " 8 In that case, the
Court summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court. 2 " that
Congress could validly condition a state's receipt of federal health care aid
upon the recipient state requiring a certificate of need""" prior to new hospi
tal construction, even though such a requirement would have violated the
North Carolina Constitution.'"
2:1.1 justice Marshall was joined by Chief justice.Burger and justices Brennan.
White, Blackmun and Stevens. justices Blackmun and Stevens filed separate concur-
ring opinions. Id. at 1507, 1509. justice Powell dissented. id. at 1571, and Justice
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Stewart. Id. at 1577.
2"5 See note 278 supra and accompanying text.
100 S. Cr. at 1503.
297 Id ,
' 2" 435 U.S. 902 ( 1978).
2 "" 445 F. Stipp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
3 " Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §
300m-2(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1976), For an in-depth discussion of federal grants vis-a-vis state
sovereignty. see Kaden. supra note 15, it 871-83.
"'" The North Carolina Supreme Court had previously ruled that the state
statute authorizing a medical care commission to refuse issuance of a certificate of
need for hospital construction on die basis of pre-existing bed capacity in the area,
rather than on an evaluation of equipment and staff quality of private hospitals to be
constructed on private land, violated N.C. CoNsT. art. 1. § 19 (clue process clause). See
Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 721) (1973).
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In rejecting North Carolina's claim that. the "condition [was] coercive
tinder the unique circumstances applicable to it," "" 2 the district court had
emphasized that "[t]he validity of the power of the federal government under
the Constitution to impose a condition on federal grants made under a
proper Constitutional power does not. exist at the mercy of the State Constitu-
tions or decisions of State Courts,"" The district court noted that the con-
gressional program before it was not compulsory or coercive, but. merely gave
to the states an option 10 enact such [certificate of need] legislation and, in
order to induce that. enactment, of fer[edil financial assistance."'" Moreover,
if North Carolina chose not 10 exercise this option, by refusing 10 amend its
constitution, the financial "impact of such loss [approximately S5() million dol-
lars] could hardly be described as 'catastrophic' or 'coercive.'" 3"4 Thus, the
district court was able to distinguish National League If Cities on the ground
that the statute before it involved only the spending power and was not a
coercive federal regulation of the State.' By summarily affirming the dis-
trict court's ruling, the Supreme Court "seems to have accepted the principle
that when Congress pays the piper as well as calls the tune, there is no real
threat to the autonomy either of' states or of individuals." "" 7
Siinilarly, in Massachusetts v. United States' the Court upheld a federal
aircraft registration tax"" against a claim that its application to a state police
") 12
 445 F. Supp. at 535.
30:1 Id.
304 Id. at 535-36 (footnote omitted).
""" Id. at 535. In light of emerging state and local financial difficulties, see
notes 345-41) infra and accompanying text, this conclusion may he open to serious
question. See generally Continent, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implica-
tions of National League of Cities, 26 Ayr, REV. 726, 744-46 (1977). However. the
plurality opinion in National League of Cities stated that the determination of whether a
congressional act impinges On "state sovereignly- does not rest (on a "particularized
assessment of the actual impact - upon the state. 426 U.S. at 851, Instead, .justice
Rchnquist's test involved the risk of serious impact on traditional government services.
See Tribe„thpra note 262, at 1076. See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S.
444, 461 (1978) (Brennan. J., for a plurality), But see National League of Cities v.
Users, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1975) (Blackmun..].. concurring) (interpreting the Court's
opinion as involving a balance between sovereign state interest and the necessity of
federal regulation): L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUT/ONAL Law 20 (Stipp. 1979) (''it is
certainly ... possible that some of the five majority votes in (National League of Cities]
may have turned on the evidence in the record predicting substantial adverse effects
upon state and local governments - ) [hereinafter cited as L. TxtRE],
" 11 " 445 F. Supp.' at 536 n.10. See User' v. Charleston County School District,
558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977). This ruling is consistent with earlier n ts recogniz-
ing the breadth of Congress' spending power. See Rosado v. Wyman. 397 U.S. 31)7
(1971)): King v. Smith. 31)2 U.S. 309 (1968); Vermont v. 'Brinegar. 379 F. Supp. (166
(I). Vt. 1974).
"" 7 L. TRIRE„swpra note 31)5. at 18. It is surprising that the Court should so
readily accept this view of spending- with - strings -attached as non-coercive, when so
much of the majority's opinion in Rodriguez rested upon the Fact that state Financing of
education necessarily resulted in state control. See note 54 ,cupni and accompanying
text,
""" 435 U.S. 444 (11178).
""" 'l i e Court explained that the act under consideration. 211 U.S.). § 4491.
"imposed an annual 'flat fee' tax on all civil aircraft [including those owned by state
and national governinciusl that Hy in in: n(IV(RINe an'SpaCe of (he United States." 435
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helicopter unconstitutionally interfered with an essential and traditional state
function. Justice lirennan's opinion, joined by the other three National League
of Cities dissenters,'" reviewed the doctrinal development of the implied state
immunity from federal taxation and concluded:
A requirement. that Status, like all other users, pay a portion of the
costs of the benefits they enjoy from federal programs is surely per-
missible since it is closely related to the federal interest in recovering
costs from those who benefit and since it effects no greater interfer-
ence with state sovereignly than do the restrictions which this Court
has approved.sr'
Then, in a portion of the opinion also joined by justices Stewart and Powell,
the Court found that. the aircraft registration tax before it was such a non-
discriminatory user charge, and therefore was constitutional."'
U.S. at 446. The actual amount of the fee was determined by the weight and type of
aircraft involved. The disputed charge considered in the case was $131.43 plus
penalities and interest. .
:"" Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices White, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, justices Stewart and Powell filed an opinion concurring in the con-
clusion that the registration tax was a valid user fee, but they (lid not join in the
plurality's discussion of the general contours of slate immunity from federal taxation,
435 U.S, at 470. justice Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined by Chief justice
Burger. hi. at 470.
:I" 435 U.S. at 461-b2. The plurality opinion reasoned that ''[a] nondis-
criminatory taxing measure that operates to defray the cost of a federal program by
recovering a fair approximation of each beneficary's share of' the cost" does not "Un-
duly- burden "essential state activities. - Id. at 160. While "forcing a stale to pay its own
way when performing an essential function- does increase the cost of that service,
an economic burden on traditional state functions without more is not a
sufficient basis for sustaining- a claim of immunity. indeed, since the Con-
stitution explicitly requires states to hear similar economic burdens when
engaged in essential operations, see U.S. Const., Anults. 5. 14; Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 303 (1922) (State must pay just compensation
when it ''takes'' private property for a public purpose); U.S. Const., AD. I
sec. 10. cl. United States Trust v. New Jersey. 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (even when
burdensome, a slate often must comply with the obligations of its con-
tracts), it cannot be seriously Contended that federal exactions from the
States of" their fair share of the cost of specific benefits they receive front
federal programs of fend the constitutional scheme.
Id. at 461. For a discussion of U.S. Trust (and Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion), see
notes 175-89 supra arid accompanying text. For a discussion of the Burger Coin•'s
analysis of "takings" questions, see notes 3811-94 infra and accompanying text.
"r- 435 U.S. at 40(1-70. The Court relied upon Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Authority v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972). which had rejected commerce clause
and right to travel attacks upon a $1.00 per head tax on commercial airline passen-
gers. because it did not discriminate against commerce. was based upon "a fair approx-
imation of use,'' and was not excessive in relation to the cost (to the taxing govern-
ment) of the benclits conferred, Irl. at 716-20. By substituting "slate function - For
"interstate commerce" in the Evansville-Vanderhurgh test, the Massachusetts V. United
States majority arrived at the following test for Ole constitutionality of federal govern-
ment user charges imposed on state governments:
So long as the charges do not discriminate against state functions, are
based on a fair approximation of use Or the SySICIII, and are structured to
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Thus, a clear majority ,
 of the Burger Court has adopted a broad reading
of congressional power pursued under the taxing and spending clause of' arti-
cle I of the Constitution.'" So long as the tax imposed is a real user charge
or the conditions attached to federal funding are in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the spending program, the congressional action will survive a chal-
lenge premised on National League if Cities. ' slate sovereignty.
C. Rationalizations: The Critics Speak
The National League of Cities principle thus emerges as an important., but
limited, restraint on the exercise of' congressional powers. Its essential theme
is judicial protection of slate and local governments in their "role of providing
for the interests of [their] citizens in receiving important social services.'"
produce revenues that will not exceed the total cost to tile Federal Gov-
ernment of the benefits to be supplied. there can be no suhstantial basis for
a claim that the National Government will be using its taxing powers to
control. unduly interfere with, or destroy a State's ability to periOrm essen-
tial services.
435 U.S. at 466-67.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Massa•husetts v. United Slates, calling-
 the three-pronged
test "vague and convoluted." Though he had authored Evansville-Vanderburgh • from
which the test seas drawn, he argued:
IC:lases regarding intergovernmental relations raise significantly different
considerations. Commerce clause cases. while no doubt 1150'111 analogies,
are not required to deal with the fact that the payer of the user fee is a
State in our constitutional structure. and that its essential sovereign in-
terests are entitled to greater deference than is due to ordinary business
enterprises which may be regulated by both State and Federal Govern-
ments.
43F) U.S. at 473..fustice Rehnquist (whose opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger)
also felt the majority had erred in making a finding, as a matter of iaw. that the tax in
question was a permissible user charge. "1 cannot, under my view of the law, accept as
a substitute for such factual findings House and Senate Reports which merely state
that a tax of this kind is 'generally viewed as a user charge: ht. at 474.
:113 Six members of the Court joined in upholding the flat-fee registration
charge in Massachusetts v. United States under the three-pronged lest, see notes 3111-12
supra and accompanying text. Though Justice Rehnquist dissented in an opinion :ruined
by Chieflustice Burger, the dissenters agreed "with the Court that respondent would
have a valid defense to this action if it had established, or could establish, that the
charge imposed was reasonably related to services rendered to the petitioner [the State
of Massachusetts] by agencies of the Federal government. - 435 U.S. at 474. Thus. if
the test could have been tightened somewhat and more factual development pre-
sented, even the two dissenters might have joined in upholding this federal govern-
ment tax On an essential state function. There were no dissents from the summary
affirmance in North Carolina v. Califuno. see notes 298-307 supra and accompanying
text.
'ra Ntichelman, supra note 191. at 1172. See Tribe. supra note 262. at 1076.
While approaching National League of Cities from slightly different starting points, Pro-
fessors Michelman and Tribe arrive at similar conclusiims. Michelman regards "state
sovereignty - as "but a metaphor for its citizens' interests in the adequacy of a state's
performance of its service function. - Michelman. supra note 11/ I. at 1184. Tribe ar-
gues. "The notion of claims of rights against states, therefore. should continue Ill play a
crucial role in supporting claims of rights (?/' states against the federal government. -
Tribe, supra note 2112, at 11177 n.42 (emphasis in original). Though the Burger Court
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Indeed, a link between protection of "state sovereignty" and "citizens' legiti-
mate expectations of basic government services"' provides a useful tool l'or
reconciling National League of Cities with Fitzpatrick, City of Rome, and North
Carolina v. Califano. These cases hold that a congressional program which se-
verely and unnecessarily"'r jeopardizes the ability of a state or local govern-
ment to provide basic services 217
 will be judicially invalidated, unless Congress
has acted to further individual rights against the subnational government in-
volved. 3 " Similarly, when Congress pays for the additional cost of providing
may never adopt such a full-scale theory of affirmative constitutional obligation, the
analysis of National League of Cities as a "service-provider- case appears to rest nn firm
ground.
3 '" "bribe, supra note 262, at 1076. But see Stewart, supra note 262, at 1210-1[
(showing admiration for the approach described in note 314 supra, but pointing to
some of the practical difficulties in the enforcement of such claims for basic services
against state and local governments),
'"" A congressional enactment may deal with an overriding national concern,
such as pollution of the environment. provided the regulations involved are Mont the
perspective of the state and local governments as service-providers) the least restrictive
means to that end. "Closer scrutiny of congressional legislation may he more appro-
priate with respect to alleged national concerns than with respect to rights in conflict,
so as to ensure not only that the general subject is one of pressing national interest,
but also that the specific area affected by the measure is itself one ()I' substantial
urgency." Tribe, supra note 262, at 1099 n.125. Compare National League of Cities v.
Users. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun. j.. concurring) (advocating a balancing
apprOach and citing environmental protection as an area of justified national power).
For further discussion of the National League of Cities implications on environmental
legislation, see notes 424-45 infra and accompanying text.
317 Just which services are m be deemed "basic- or "essential" under National
League cf Cities as written, or as reinterpreted by Tribe and Michelman. remains a
difficult question. See note 273 supra and accompanying text. Some light is shed on
this question by a series of recent cases that seem to he reviving the proprietary-
governmental distinction, See, e.g.. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake. 100 S. CL 2271, 2278-79
(1980) (see note 250 supra and accompanying text): City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power and Light, 435 U.S. 389, 403. 405 11.31 (municipally owned public utility not
exempt from antitrust laws for its anticompetitive activities): id, at 418-19, 422 (Burger,
C.j., concurring) (explicitly focusing on the proprietary and profit-making nature of
the municipal utility there involved): Jackson v. Metropolitan Edistin Co., 419 U.S.
345, 352-53 (1974) (limiting "state action - doctrine to public functions that have been
"traditionally reserved exclusively to the State''). See also Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978) (emphasizing that City was not
acting in its "enterprise capacity" in limiting development for purpose of historic pres-
ervation): Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 11.6 (1970) (quoted in note 108 supra); see
generally TRIBE, supra note 262, at 1076-77 11.12 ("a line is being drawn between ser-
vices that a governmental unit delivers in fulfillment of claims of right of its citizens
and those it delivers for a price simply to meet their desires. just as a private party
might attempt to earn a profit by meeting those desires.''): 1l CoNN, L. REY. 126
(1078).
3 " See notes 281-97 supra and accompanying text. "While the legislature's
choice of terminology in characterizing the source of its power—whether article I or
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment—should not itself be dispositive, a judicial
determination that Congress was in fact acting to further individual rights seems criti-
cal to the acceptance of such a defense- of congressional legislation against claims of
state sovereignty. Tribe. supra note 262, at 1097.
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a service, albeit with restrictions attached, the availability of that service will
not be financially jeopardized by the congressional restraints. Massachusetts v.
United States adds the further proposition that states, and presumably local
governments, can he required to "pay their way" through non-discriminatory
user charges. It is only where the taxing or spending power is disproportion-
ately used that the Court is likely to limit congressional intervention."'"
This analysis sheds additional light on the Burger Courts differential
treatment of constitutional claims and statutory claims against local govern-
ment. In the first. situation—represented by Rodriguez, Arlington Heights, City (f
Mobile, and Salyer—local governments were resisting federal judicial interfer-
ence on the basis of the self-rule aspect of local government—either commun-
ity self-determination or citizen participation. In the second situation—
represented by National League of Cities—they were instead resisting congres-
sional interference on the basis of their role as service-providers. 2 " This
"service-provider -
 defense is somewhat weaker, since it will rarely prevail
against congressional statutes that further individual rights, such as those up-
held in Fitzpatrick and city if Rome, or that induce compliance financially, such
as the statute upheld in Califo). The service-provider defense can, however,
be invoked more easily by state governments than can the "community self-
determination - delense." 2 '
Since none of this constitutional analysis operates in a vacuum, it is
necessary to consider next the local government financial situation, which
both creates (he factual background for the legal doctrines developed above
"'" Sri' L.	 supra note 3(15, at 18-111; TRIRE„supm note 26, at 315-16.
" 2 " As noted above, sec text at notes 198-21I3 8.2 2fil supra and accompanying
text, this situation involves action by one elected political body. Congress. which is
conflict with the action of another political body, a state or local government, and the
supremacy clause which renders a self-rule defense by the latter inappropriate. Tints,
a defense based on federalism must focus on the service-provider role. In fact. ''what is
'Sovereign' about municipalities for National League nf purposes1 is not their
legislative position or signilicance. but the states' customary reliance on them to pro-
vide Int' the interest of citizens in receiving certain important social services. - Michel-
man. supra note 19 I. at 1171 (footnote omitted). Sri' M. at t 181-82.
"'' -Though Tribe does not employ the self-rule/service-provider terminology
used here, he does draw a similar distinction between the two types of cases considered
in this article:
•	 It would he wrong. however. to treat the Court's reference in National
League of Cities ID the value of local autonomy as 21 renewal ()I •
 the theme
seemingly implicit in decisions such as Village of Belle Terre v. Roraas, (116
U.S. I (1970, which allowed individual rights to be subordinated to com-
munity rights of self-delinition analogous to individual first amendment
rights. First of all, in National League y' Cities. the Court did not distinguish
between the intrusion of the challenged amendments on stale autonomy
and their intrusion on local deeisionniaking. This failure to distinguish be-
tween the state and local levels, coupled with the Court's emphasis on
federalism and state sovereignty, indicates that it had no greater objection
to the legislation as applied to the local than to the state level. And. what-
ever values of expression or of privacy may be possessed by decisionmak-
ing at the level of communities like Belle Terre, it cannot plausibly be ar-
gued that decisionmaking at the state level possesses such values.
Tribe, supra note 262, at 1069 n.20.
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and generates new problems calling for accommodation through the applica-
tion of these legal doctrines.
IV. PUTTING THE SHOW ON THE ROAD—FISCAL REALITIES
Ironically, the Burger Court's approach to federal-state and federal-local
relations contains within it the seeds for destroying the local self-rule so often
lauded by the Court. Although the Court has upheld local policy and pro-
grammatic choices unless confronted by quite substantial countervailing indi-
vidual interests, the approval o f virtually unfettered federal control over
programs passed pursuant to the spending clause poses a serious threat to the
state and local autonomy the Court seeks to protect. Current fiscal conditions
require local governments to turn to the federal government to finance, or to
help in financing, many ()I' their most essential services. The power of Con-
gress and federal agencies to condition receipt of these funds upon com-
pliance with federal programmatic choices is likely to undercut self-rule by
redirecting patterns of local service provision.
The current restrictive fiscal climate in major American cities is a reflec-
tion of two developments: the taxpayer's revolt, exemplified by California's
Proposition 13. and the emerging fiscal crises in many older cities, highlighted
by New York City's near default in 1975-76 and Cleveland's actual default in
1979. Both the taxpayer's revolt and the fiscal crises in the cities have set
the stage for greater local government. dependency on federal aid and, there-
fore, greater subordination to national control. In addition, respect for the
interests of landowners and creditors in these troubled cities has already led
the Court to articulate still further limitations on local autonomy.
A. The Taxpaver's Revolt: Trouble at the Box Office
Partly as a result of demographic and inflationary pressures,"'" and
partly to pay the cost of state and local government expansion.:` -" stale and
local taxes have grown in the last decade to what some voters consider epic
None of this is to suggest that the two arguments cannot overlap in some cases,
see, e.g,, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (discussed at
notes 47-72 supra and accompanying text); Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (dis-
cussed at notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text): Michelman, supra note 191, at
1173-74 (political accountability argument). It is simply to note that in legal doctrine,
as in political analysis, see notes 11-18 .supra and accompanying text, different aspects
of local government will be emphasized in differing contexts.
"' See notes 315-46 iufra. For example, as the number of professional and
middle-income taxpayers declines while welfare-sector dependency increases, central
cities are forced to increase the burden upon the remaining taxpayers in order to meet
expenses.
s' 2 " State and local government expenditures have been rising at a faster rate
than the economy as a whole. See MANMELKER L NETSCH„Mpia Dote 13. at 259 (state-
local expenditures as percentage of GNI' for 1954-1976); Economic Rpt, of the Pres.,
Jan. 1975, at table B-72 (1978 figures); Shannon S.: Weissert. After jan ,is: Tough QM'S-
lions for I'Vical Policvmakerc. 4 1NTERGovERNmENTAL PE.u.srEcrivt-.  8. 9 (1978) (state-local
taxes and expenditures as percentage of stale personal income for 1948-1977).
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proportions.'" - I -hey have responded to this increase with substantial pres-
sure for new and stricter tax and spending limits. This recent move by tax-
payers is not without. precedent; states have long employed constitutional and
statutory restrictions upon the power of their local governments to impose
real estate taxes."' '[he earliest such restrictions were developed in the
1870's and the 1880's." 2 " Further limitations emerged during the depression
of the 193(4's in response to the alarming level of tax delinquency resulting
from the decline in personal incomes."" Though there were some adjust-
ments in limitation formulas during the early 1970's, 328
 there was no general
call for tax relief until later in that decade, when voters began to react to the
rapid rise in property assessments. The initial taxpayer stirrings rose to a
crescendo with the severe limitations embodied in Proposition 13, adopted by
California voters in ante l978," 2 " and in comparable proposals considered by
seven states.in November of" that year."" This movement to limit the level of
324 sentiments of some voters might he summed up
 by the
Noah must have taken into the Ark two taxes, one male and one female,
and did they multiply bountifully! Next to the guinea pig, taxes must have
been the most prolific: animals.
W. ROGERS. The Autobiography of Will Rogers. 19 (1949).
Genii& Financial Integrity„upra note 177, at 551-54.
32 ' See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
CONST/TUTIONA I. AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAN ING POWERS 27-29,
34-35 (19(12) [hereinafter cited as ACIR].
327 See id. at 30. 36-37; Bird, The Trend (If Municipal Tax Delinquency, XIX
NIUNICIPAL FINANCE (1947): Nlacchiarola, Loral littohPreS Under the 1\`P70 Y ork State Con-
stitution with Emphasis on Nrw York City, 35 FORDIIAM L. REV. 263, 263-69 (19135).
121 Fora discussion of levy hmits, developed by some states as a replacement
for the tax rate limit. see U.S. ADVISORY COMM ISSION ON I NTERGOVERNM ENTAL RELA-
TIONS. STATE LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL TAXES AND FIX l'ENDITURES 12 (11177); Celfand.
Financial Integrity, supra note 177. at 552-53,
" 2 " CAL. CoxsT. art. XIII A. For discussions of subsequent legislative develop-
ments, see Doerr, The California Legislature's Response to Proposition 13, 53 So. Cm.. I..
REV. 77 (1979); Commeni, Taxation; implementation of Proposition 13, 10 PM:. L. 573
(1979),
' 1 ' 1
 In November' 1978. provisions similar to California's Proposition 13 were
approved in Idaho. InAuo Comm; § (13-923 (1978), and Nevada, Question No. 6,,Gen.
Election Ballot [copy on file with author]. The Nevada proposal required passage
again in Nov. 1980 before it could he effective as a constitutional amendment. In the
same election. voters in non-binding referenda throughout Illinois and in parts of .
Nlassachusetts favored limits on slate and local taxes. Perry. Voters in 16 States Give
Approval to 81) of Tax-cutting Initiatives, \V;. II Si. j„ Nov. 9, 1978, at 4. col. 1 [hercinaf-
ler cited as Perry]. However, proposed constitutional amendments similar to Proposi-
tion 13 failed in Nlichigan (Tisch Amendment) and Oregon. hi. See also Etushwiller.
Tax-Cut Advocates Fight One Another Instead of City Hall. %Vali St. J., Aug. 31, 1978, at 1.
col. 2 thereinafter cited as EinsInvilled. For a good analysis of the salient features of all
the above proposals and the final vote count, see Shannon, Slowing Down Public Sec-
tor Growth—Hard Questions For Pnlicvmakers. Address to Utah Chapter American
Society for Public Administration. Dec. 12, 1978. at A-7 [hereinafter cited as Shannon]
[on file with the author].
In September 1979, voters rt.: jeCI ed ;I proposal Io cull DEopelly taxes in Dade
County, Florida by 99 percent. Apparently the proponents had intended a much
smaller cut but had misstated the proposal when collecting signatures. Hence the nega-
tive vote cannot be tak'en as reflecting a positive attitude toward property taxes, In-
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real estate taxes has been paralleled by a drive in various states"' to adopt
state and local government expenditure limits.;" Although the emphasis is
slightly different, both types of limits attempt to restrict the rapid growth of
state and local taxes"" and the expansion of local government operations," 4
These new tax and expenditure limits are likely to have significant effects
upon local government financial arrangements and consequently, upon the
role of local government in our federal system. Initially, the new property tax
limits will reinforce the trend away from reliance on real estate taxes as the
principal source of local revenue.'' The substituted forms of local taxation,
deed, nearly 35 percent of the voters favored the draconian lax reduction that was
proposed. See Miami Herald, Sept. 1, 1171, at 1-A, col. 3; id.. Sept. 10, 1979, at I-A.
col. 3; id., Sept. 19, 1171, at 1-A, col. 2.
Few of the tax cut proposals in the November 1980 balloting succeeded. For
example, the Nevada proposal failed to obtain the second passage required to make it
a constitutional amendment. Michigan and Oregon voters also rejected tax cut Incas-
ores submitted to them, as they had in 1178 M.,..... assachusetts voters. however. approved
a substantial cut in real and personal property taxes. Sre Stale Is.sues Confrwtting
Tuesday Include Sweeping Tax Cuts and Secession, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1980, at 8, col, I;
illassaihusals Passes Tax Cul Package, But Many Slates Snub Similar Proposals, Wall St. J.,
Nov. ti, 1980, at 6, col. I.
3" 1 See, e.g., ARtz. CoNsT. art. 9, § 17 (West Stipp. Pam ph. 1179-1980) (State
spending limit); CAL, (.:oast'. art. XIII B (state and local expenditure limit); N.J. STAT.
ANN, § 40A:4-45.2 (West Stipp, Pamph. 1978) (five-percent municipal spending limit);
id. at § 52:9H -6 to 52:1H-13 (State spending increases calculated by elaborate for-
mula); MICH, CoNsT. art. IN, §§ 25-34 (Nov. 1978) (State spending limit); TENN.
CoxsT. art. 2. 24 (Nov. 1977) (same); TEx. CoNsT. art VIII, § 22 (Nov. 1978) (same).
Voter reaction has not. however, been uniform. In the November 11178 elections. vot-
ers in Colorado and Oregon rejected constitutional state expenditure limits, and Ne-
braska voters defeated a proposal to impose a constitutional municipal spending limit.
See ferry, supra note 330; Shannon, supra note 330. See generally Perry & Hyatt, While
California Votes on Taxes, Other Slates Mull Spending Limits, Wall St. ,J.. ,June (1, 1978, at I.
col. I; Shannon, A Jr:1Na/, Note, INTERGOVERNMENTAL Pr.rtsPEctivr.. 24 (Fall 1978).
.9 " 2 Rather than restricting the amount of revenue a government can derive
from a particular source, as real estate tax rate limits and levy limits do. an expendi-
ture limit restricts the amount of money a government can spend (or budget for
spending) in a particular year. It is usually framed in terms of a percentage increase
over the prior year's expense budget. The first expenditure limit was adopted by stat-
ute in Arizona in 1121. Subject to certain exclusions, it prohibits the budgets of
Arizona counties and cities from rising more than ten percent over that of the prior
year. See ARIz. REY, STAT. § 12:42-303(C)-(D) (1976). For a discussion of the actual op-
eration of this expenditure lid, see Gelfand. Financial Integrity, supra note 177, at 554,
576-78, and sources cited therein.
333 Proposition 13 and similar provisions focus exclusively on lowering the
property tax. Advocates of expenditure limits contend that their approach. by contrast,
will result in a general lowering of all taxes. See, e.g., Enishwiller, supra note 330.
334 The expenditure limits are more directly focused upon controlling public
sector growth than either levy limits or tax rate limits.
Less than half of the revenue of large local governments is derived from
real estate taxes. ,AovisoRY CommissioN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES (IF FISCAL FEDERALISM: TRENDS
3, 36-38 (1976); Blaydon & Gifford, Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1976 DUKE
L. J. 1057, 1102-05 [hereinafter cited as Blaydon • Gifford]. New York City, in fact,
derives less than 25 percent of its Revenue Budget from real estate taxes. See City of
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however, will probably have serious exclusionary effects. For example, one
form of taxation, already employed by California municipalities to replace rev-
enues lost due to the limits of Proposition 13, is the development impact tax.
It requires a developer to pay substantial fees for the privilege of developing
land within an incorporated area.""" Since this type of tax will inevitably be
passed on to homebuyers in the form of increased initial costs, it will contrib-
ute to the substantial disparity between current homeowners and new pur-
chasers already created by Proposition 13 and its progeny."' The taxation
and expenditure limits may also farce local governments to adopt even more
restrictive zoning devices to maintain their tax bases and to keep service costs
low. Under the standard announced by the Burger Court. in Arlington Heights,
few constitutional barriers %multi preclude such action by local govern-
ments,'
In addition to employing newer taxes and solidifying their tax and ser-
vice bases, local governments will probably seek increased state and Federal
aid to supplement their limited local revenues. If the majority in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez " 39 was correct in assuming that
increased stale aid inevitably leads to increased state control, this trend will
severely weaken the self-rule role of local governments."'" In fact., the Su-
preme Court's acquiescence, in North Carolina v. Califano," 4 ' to congressional
policy conditions attached to gram-in-aid programs creates a substantial likeli-
hood of increased control over local government programmatic choices by
federal government administrators. Although local governments also receive,
relatively unrestricted general revenue sharing funds,"' it is unlikely that the
New York, Adopted Budget-Fiscal Year 1979, at	 City of New York, Adopted
Budget-Fiscal Year 1981, at 	 see also 2 MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, MUNICIPAL &
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2502-03 (1980) (budget. figures for fiscal years 1972-79).
33" Hoes, & DEA% REP. 398 (BNA) (1978); see Contractors & Builders Ass)] v.
City id' Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fia. 1970), See also The Post-13 Barrage al New Loral
Taxes, T Ax REvol:r DicEsT I. 7 (November 1978).
:S:17 p i .op„s ib rm 13 ro ll s back ,betaxablevalue o f cill.i.c.„,b,_owned properly to
its 1975-76 "full cash value, - but property purchased after that fiscal year is 10 be
taxed at its appraised value at the time of sale. CAL. (.:oNsT. art. NIII A, § 2(a). Thus.
in an inflationary spiral. a more recently purchased house will always have a higher
- full cash value'' for tax purposes than a comparable house that has been held by the
state owner for a longer period of time. This disparate treatment has been held not to
viol a te equal protection. See ,Antador Valley joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 1).2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1978).
338 See notes 21-30 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, even if' local offi-
cials do not adopt restrictive land use ordinances. the residents may decide to impose
restrictions through zoning referenda, also held to he constitutional by the Burger
Court. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 4213 U.S. (308 (197(3); James
V. Valtierra, 4)42 U.S. 137 (1971). Sec mites. 84-101 supra and accompanying text.
:I:'" 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See notes 47-62 supra and accompanying text.
3." See Ma rlin. Coping With Proposition 13, in Copisc. Wmt CUTRACKS IN MUNIC-
IPAL REVENUES, 1. I15 ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Corixcl; Nathan, Is
Local Control the Lour ire JarTans Vote?, Wall St. J., June 8, 1978, at 2(1, col. 3. Sec also
MeCariliy, Living With ProporitiNn 13, STATE 1..Exasi.ATuREs 16 (Sept. 1978).
3 '" 435 U.S. 962 (1978). gli'g 445 F. Stipp. 532 (E.D.N.(:. 1977). Sec miles
298 - 3117 supra and accompanying text.
34" SP(' rOW , Beyond the New Federalism —Bcmiell Re Shoring in Perspective. 15
HARv. J. 1..riGts, 40-55 (1977) (arguing that while the 1976 amendments to Slate and
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level of this support will be sufficient to substitute for the revenue losses sus-
tained as a result of Proposition 13 and similar fiscal limitations. 343 Increased
federal aid, therefore, is likely to be required in the form of restrictive
categorical grants-in-aid.
B. The Fiscal Crisis: Finding an Angel
Though local and regional conditions vary somewhat," 4 the principal
factors contributing to local government financial difficulties prior to the tax-
payer's revolt were demographic trends, 345 nationwide economic recessions
coupled with inflation,34 " employee pension plans, 347 state and federal imposi-
tion of financial burdens," 4 " and local mismanagement. 34 " More recently,
energy cost increases have exacerbated the problems. Like the taxpayer's re-
volt, the urban fiscal crisis will probably lead to increased reliance on state and
federal financing. Furthermore, local, state, and federal responses to the crisis
will place increased pressure on the Burger Court to limit both the self-rule
and the service-provider autonomy it has accorded to local governments. The
principal areas affected. are statutory regulation of municipal securities, judi-
cially protected creditors' rights, and municipal bankruptcy legislation.
Local Fiscal Assistance Act eliminated the latter's priority expenditure scheme, they
also increased federal oversight of state and local activities by expanding the antidis-
crimination provisions, strengthening enforcement thereof' by expanding citizen stand-
ing and auorney's fees. and by mandating public hearings on use of revenue sharing
funds).
343 See sources cited in 340 supra.
Indeed. for 1978. general revenue sharing constituted only $6.8 billion, while the
various grant-in-aid programs totaled $67.8 billion. See U.S. Otrica: of MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFT/CE OF THE PRESIDENT. SPECIAL. ANALYSES BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES. GOVERNMENT FISCAL. YEAR 1980. at (30 (1979).
3" See lilaydon & Gifford. supra note 335.
at 1058-59. In general. central cities—particularly in the Northeast and
Midwest—have experienced substantial losses of industrial employment, decreases in
professional and middle-class taxpayers. and increases in the welfare-section depen-
dent population. h/. at 1058-59. See TENIPORARY CONIMESSION ON CITY F- INANCES, THE
CITY IN TRANSITION: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR NEW YORK (1978).
34" Recessions increase presssurcs on local government social services. while re-
ducing revenues from local sales and income taxes. The impact of inflation is particu-
larly severe, because local government services arc labor-intensive. See U.S. Anvtsokv
CosisussioN ox INTERGoVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 32-42
(1973). Though inflation may increase revenues from sales and income taxes. the gap
between assessments prevents real estate tax receipts from keeping pace with inflation.
3" See Blavdon S.: Gifford, supra note 335. at 10(37; New York City–What Lies
Ahead?, 12 (..:ot.tim. IL. Sot:. PRoB. 587, 613-15 (1976); Leavens el. a/., City Personnel:
The Civil Semite and Municipal Unions, in ACENDA FOR A CITY (3(15 Fitch & A. Walsh
eds. 1970).
3" See Geffand. Financial Integrity, supra note 177, at 556-57; Univ. of Calif. at
Riverside. Federal and State Mandating on Local Governments: All Exploration of Is-
sttcs and IIIIpaCtS..IDDC 20. 1979.
34" See id.	 557-58, and sources cited therein.
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I. Debt Financing and Disclosure
Local governments finance their capital programs by issuing various
types of securities, principally general obligation"' and revenue bonds."'" In
addition, several forms of short-term notes "52 are employed primarily to meet
cash flow problems.":' 3
One response to the New York City financial crisis was pressure to man-
date increased public disclosure by municipal securities issuers."'" Congress
has considered several bills 355
 which would substantially increase federal in-
These bonds are backed by the hill faith-and credit of the issuing Munici-
pality. See Flushing Nail Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corporation, 41) N.Y.2d 731,
358 N.E.2d 848. 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). Thus, the issuing government obliges itself
to raise whatever funds are necessary through its taxing power. primarily the real
property tax, to pay the principal and interest as they become due. See G. CALVERT,
FUNDAMENTALS OF M UNICI PA BoNns 3 (9th ed. 1973); Guandolo, nix . Limitations: Im-
pact Upon General Obligation Bonds, Rental Bonds, .Special Assessment Bonds and Payment of
Debt Service, at li, printed as supplement to Com:G. supra note 310.
:"' See note 177 supra and accompanying text. Because of the more
source of revenue standing behind then], revenue bonds nearly always pay a greater
rate of interest than general obligation b o nds. See generally Gclfand, Financial Integrity,
supra note 177, at 560-61. and sources cited therein. For a discussion of attempts to
increase the security of revenue bonds by placing a state's or city's ''moral commit-
ment" behind them. see Griffith, -Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security?, 8 URB.
LAW. 54 (197(1), Quirk 8; Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known
as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. RES. 521 (1971); MA NDELKER N FISCH , supra note 13, at
390-95.
en The principal short-term obligations arc tax anticipation notes (issued in
anticipation of the collection of. and secured by, some specific tax such as the teal
estate ad valorem), revenue anticipation notes (issued in anticipation of the collection of,
and secured by, USer charges, non-real estate taxes, or intergovernmental transfers),
and bond anticipation notes (issued in anticipation of, and secured by, the sale of
bonds). See Greenberg, Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URn.
LAW. 338, 347-19 (1977), See, e.g.. GA. CONST. art. IN. § 7. par. 1, N.Y. LocAt. FIN. L.
§§ 20.00, 23.00-25.00, 39.00 (McKinney Supp. 1977-78); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-169.
159-170 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-202 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79) ;
0)
 For discussions of the abuse or shut-tern] debt. see U.S. ADVISORY Commis-
sioN (IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET FOR STATE AND
Loc;AT DEBT 10-11 (1976): Gelland, Financial Integrity, supra note 177, at 567-69. 589.
' 44
 For more onnprehensive discussions. see Currier. Mandating Disclosure in
Municipal Securities, 8 FORDHAM URB. LI 67. 72-79 (1979): Neugebauer, Municipal Se-
curities: Disclosure Requirements, 9 URB. LAW. 305 (1977); Peterson, Doty, Forbes 8.:
Bourque, Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the Municipal Securities . Market, 1976 DuKE
I...]. 1177; Onnment, State Sovereignty .,s.
 Impact on Federal ReA.,rulation of Municipal Se-
curities, 7 GOLDEN GATE C. REV. 577 (1977) [hereinafter cited as State Sovereignty]; Note,
The Constitutionality uf Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities Issuers: /Applying the Test of
National League of' Cities v. User'. 51 N.Y.U. 1.. REV. 982 (11)7)1); Comment. Federal
Regulation if Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory A nahsi,c, 1976 ])u KE I..[.
2111 [hereinafter cited as Federal Regulation]; Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Se-
curities: Disclosure Requirements and Dual Sovereignty, 811 YALE t..1. 919 (1977); Federal
Securities Fraud, supra note 262.
3.'.'
	 e.g„ H .R. 2724. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2339, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Scss. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1 -1.k. 2724, S. 2339, S. 2574, and S. 2969, respectively].
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volvement in municipal debt financing. The Eagleton Bill. 35" in particular,
raises serious questions under Notional League of Cities, because it would per-
mit the Securities Exchange Commission to issue a "stop order" 3:-' 7 effectively
preventing the floating of municipal bonds which it determined not to comply
with the securities registration requirements. 35 " This direct federal veto over
financing needed for essential local services. coupled with the enormous cost
of complying with the registration provisions, is arguably an undue interfer-
ence with local government's traditional autonomy.""" Yet, the substantial na-
tional interest in maintaining integrity in the nationwide municipal credit
market"' would weigh heavily in favor of the constitutional validity of a more
restrained form of municipal securities regulation."'
2. Creditor's Rights
A related area, recently re-emerging as a subject of federal constitutional
dimension, is creditors' rights against. state and local authorities. The New
York City fiscal crisis generated numerous state .3 'i 2 and lower federal' court
3 ' S. 2574, supra note 355. Essentially, this bill would amend section 3(a)(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976), to remove the current exemp-
tion afforded municipal securities. Municipal issuers would then be required to file a
registration statement with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) before offering
a new issue to the public, and they would be subject to the Act's civil liabilities. See
sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k(a), 771 (1970).
357 See section 8(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77H(b) (1976).
35 ' Since bond counsel, underwriters, and dealers are extremely unlikely to
handle any obligations subject to a stop order. the municipality would, as a practical
matter, be unable to float the bond.
35" See Stale SovereigntN, supra note 354, at 614-16; Federal Regulation, supra note
354, at 1311)-19. But cf. U.S. Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) ("purely
financial" matters covered by bond covenant not essential attribute of sovereignty for
purposes of reserved power doctrine).
3 " New York City Financial Crisis, Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. 94th Cong., 1st Sess.. Oct. 9, 10, 18, and 23, 1975; Se-
curities and Exchange Commission Staff Report on Transactions in Securities of the
City of New York, to the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Com-
mittee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Aug., 1977.
"' See Gelfand, Financial Integrity, supra note 177, at 580 n.193.
362 Perhaps the most significant state case was Flushing National Bank v.
Municipal Assistance Corp., 4(} N.Y.2d 731. 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976),
in which the New York Court of Appeals invalidated an act that required holders of
New York City short-term debt to choose between a payment moratorium and au
exchange of their notes for Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) bonds. Id. at 733,
358 N.E.2d at 850, 390 N.Y.S.2d. at 24. See 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 868-70 (McKinney
1975); N.Y. PUB. Aunt. L. § 3030-40 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1970-1975). The court
ruled that the state constitution required City notes, like general obligation bonds, to
be backed by the City's "faith and credit." See N.Y. Corsi. art. VII, § 2. Compare Ropico
v. City of New York, 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N,Y. 1976) (upholding the same
Moratorium Act under federal contract clause, on basis of analysis similar to that of
trial court and dissent in U.S. Trust).
Although the note payments required by Flushing Bank posed some difficulties for
the City's fiscal recovery plan, default and bankruptcy were averted by a coordinated
state-federal loan scheme, see SEC, Final Report in the Matter of Transactions in the
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cases dealing with this subject. Moreover, the climate of imminent fiscal doom
and the existence of severe investor uncertainty may have contributed to the
Burger Court's articulation of a very stringent contract. clause standard for
public authority bonds in U.S. Trust v. New fersey. 3 " 4 The limitations framed
by that case may, however, pose serious difficulties for city officials forced to
make delicate financial decisions in times of fiscal crisis." 3
3. Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation
Should the financial situation in older American cities deteriorate
further, officials may be forced to seek relief under the new federal municipal
bankruptcy provisions. Some creditors, in turn, would likely challenge the
constitutional validity of this federal enactment under National League of Cities
principles.
In response to the New York City fiscal crisis, Congress. acting under its
bankruptcy power.""" adopted special provisions for municipal debt. composi-
tion. Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act was reenacted and amended"' to
specify elaborate procedures whereby local governments, with state permis-
sion, 31 ' 8 can petition for federal court approval of a debt adjustment plan that
will be binding on dissenting creditors. 31'" These provisions were intended to
Securities of the City of New York, 16 SEC Docket 951, 953 (Feb. 20, 1979), financial
restructuring, see Supplemental Staff Report, in ht. at appendix, and court rulings
inure favorable to the City. See, e.g.. cases cited in note 363 infra.
Other important stale cases dealt with investment by pension funds in Slate. City,
and MAC securities. See Westchester Chapter. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., v.
Levitt, 50 A.D.2d 11(15. 373 N.Y.S.2d 659 (3d Dep't), nip on certified question. 37
N.Y.2d 591. 375 N.V.S.2d 294. 337 N.E.2d 748 (1975); New York City Civil Serv.
Retired Employees Ass'ti Roche, Index No. 18043/75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Oct. 17,
1975). See also Comment, New York A City in Crisis: Fiscal Emergency Legislation and the
Constitutional Attacks, ti FORDHAM CHIC, 1„. 1. 65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fordham
Comment]; Note. Creditors' Remedie.s . in Municipal DrfauIt. 1976 DuKr. L.J. 1363.
See. e.g.. Tron v. CondeHo, 427 F. Stipp, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rejecting
contract clause attack on investment by pension funds in City and MAC securities):
Ropico v. City of New York. 425 F. Stipp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (described in note 362
,cup/o). See also In re Nets' York City Securities Litigation, [Transfer Binder . ' CCH
FEn. Sec. L. REP, It 97,528 (1976). See generally Fordharn Continent, supra note 362.
"" 4 131 U.S. I (1977). Sec notes 176-89 supra and accompanying text.
3 "' See TRIEW, supra note 26. at 471-72: Hurst, supra note 189, at 26.
"Congress shall have posse' ... to establish ... uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States. - U.S. CoxsT, art. I. § 8(1).
' 3t7
 These pnivisions are currently codified in I I U.S.C. §§ 103, 901-946
(Sapp. III 1979).
3" The new act protects stale sovereignty by requiring both state and local
government acquiescence before its provisions can he invoked. Thus, unlike a private
party. a local government may not be subjected to an involuntary composition but
must initiate the proceedings by.filing a court petition. Moreover, the state must i141--
/H ffiAC such a filing. II § 109(c) (Satrap. 111 1979). It should be further noted
that slates themselves may not seek this judicial debt adjustment—only their political
subdivisions, Id. at §§ 101(29), 109(c).
""" For a more detailed discussion of Ihe new municipal bankruptcy provisions.
see Greenberg, Municipal Ne(7111itil'S: .Some Basic Principles awl Practices, 4 URit. LAW. 338
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assist insolvent. political subdivisions, to further the national interest in uni-
form treatment of creditors, and to ensure uniformity in the national bond
market. 370
 Although the restrictions contained in these procedures might
create expense, delay and uncertainty for local governments, 37 t the protec-
tions for state and local autonomy built into the bankruptcy pt'ovisions, 372
coupled with the significance of the national interests involved, weigh heavily
in favor of a ruling that the new provisions do not violate the state
sovereignty principles represented by National League of Cities. Therefore, the
Court would be likely to uphold these new statutory provisions:37 "
In short, the taxpayer's revolt and the urban fiscal crises threaten to
weaken the local government. autonomy favored by the Burger Court in a
variety of ways. First, local governments will be forced to adopt national and
state administrative priorities in order to obtain needed grants-in-aid. Fur-
thermore, city officials may feel the need to undercut broad home rule au-
thorizations, previously given by their states. by seeking direct state authoriza-
tion for activities affecting the local economy. This direct authorization should
protect them against the substantial damage remedies foreshadowed by the
ruling in City of Lafaye1te.'" 4 They may also need to restructure operating
procedures in order to avoid damage recoveries under Monel1. 37 '' Finally,
congressional and judicial attempts to inform and protect municipal creditors
in times of fiscal crisis may further erode local government financial indepen-
dence.
(1(177); Patchan & Collins, The 1976 Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV.
287 (1977): Nine, Munitipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A/101/6prd Bankruptcy!: Note, The Recent
Revision of the Federal Municipal Bankinptcy Statute: A Potential Reprieve for Insolvent
Cities?, 13 HARV. J. LEG, 549 (1976).
" 7 ' ) The first congressional attempt to provide a system for municipal debt ad-
justment. Act of 3.1ay 24. 1934. ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798. was ruled unconstitutional, be-
cause it impinged upon the "separate and independent existence- of the states and
their subdivisions. Ashton V. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298
U.S. 513 (1936). A subsequent modified statute. Act of Aug. 10, 1937, 50 Slat. 653.
was upheld in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
37 ' There is also a danger of interference with local government policy deci-
sinus, Le.. interference with the self rule aspect of local government, by the bankruptcy
court. Sec Municipal Bankruptcy, sepia note 369, at 1894-95.
372 See note 368 supra. See also Bankruptcy Act § 82(c), 1 i	 § 904 (Supp.
III 1979) (limiting Bankruptcy Court's power once it has jurisdiction); Municipal B a nk-
ruptcy, supra note 369, at 1804. ,
373 The other possible attack, which some creditors might pursue, is that the
new provisions place too much judicial authority in the hands of an article 1 court—
the bankruptcy court „ee, e.g„ 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. Iii 1979).
371 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See notes 234-41 .supra and accompanying text.
' 77' Municipalities that do HO ild n Ipi to developing constitutional interpretations,
Owen v. City of Independence, KM S. Ct. 1398 (1080). or federal statutory develop-
ments, Maher v. Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2570 (1980): Maine v. Thiboutot. 1)6) S. Ct. 2502
(1980), [oar he subjected to substantial damage remedies and attorney's fee awards.
See notes 232-33 supra and accompanying text. Maher and Hutto make it cleat' that
even state agencies will not be able to assert an eleventh amendment defense to anor-
nev's fee awards in such statutory or constitutional cases. See notes 285-86 supra and
accompanying text.
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V. A PLAY WITHIN A PLAY "7" —
LOCAL GOVERNMENT. A7s:0 ENvIRoNmENTA t. REGULATION
The best way to illustrate the impact of these constitutional doctrines and
financial developments is to c(insider a representative area of the law—
control over the physical and aesthetic environment—from a local govern-
ment perspective. The decisions in this field do fit within the predicted
patterns—judicial deference to local self-determination and judicial protection
against national interference with local service-provision, tempered by recog-
nition of economic realities. Thus the Supreme Court has upheld local aes-
thetic regulations that. interfere to a significant extent with the interests of
individual property owners. It also appears that the Court will not. require
local (or state) authorities to enforce national pollution control standards, un-
less the pollution control program is financed by federal funds.
A. The Aesthetic Environment: The Preservation of Sets from Great Plays of the Past
Increasingly, local governments are seeking to preserve historically sig-
nificant and architecturally aesthetic structures in their communities. 3 " Sonie
of the reasons behind this development are instrumental—the need for good
urban housing despite skyrocketing costs for new construction 375 Aid the
economic advantages of maintaining "tourist-oriented charin."" 79 Others are
non-instrumental—to "enhance the quality of life for all.'" Relying on
'76 “Theater takes place all die time wherever one is and art simply Facilitates
persuading one that this is the case." . 1. CAGE, SI LENGE 174 ( 1 961).
' 77 As the Supreme Court has noted: "Over the past 50 years, all 51) states and
over 500 municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of
buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic: importance." Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v, New York City, 438 U.S. IOC 107-08 (1978) (citing publications by the
National Trust for Histork Preservation). See abit., Citstimis. The Chicago Plan: Incentive
Zoning awl the Preservation of Urban Landmarks. . 85 HARV.	 Rev. 574 (1972) Ihercinar-
ter cited as Chicago Plan]: Wilson & Winkler.	 Response if Stale Lei,rislation to Historic
Preservation, 3t3 1.. & CONTE:NW. PROI4. 329 (1971). The federal government has also
encouraged this process through the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Pub.
I... No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 916. 16 U.S.C. § ,-170(b) (1974). See generally Gray. the Response
of Federal Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 1.. (.be  PROis. 314 (1971), A 1976.
amendment to the Act created the National Historic Preservation Fund, Pub. I. No.
94-422. tit. [I, 90 Stat. 1313, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (Stipp. 1979). and the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. I._ No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), contains provisions designed to
encourage historic preservation efforts by the private sector. See Comment, Historic
Preservation awl the Tax Rtform Act (y . 1976 11 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. Rev. 453 (1977).
"8 See Boasherg, ishwie Pr'esertvrlian. Suggested Directions far Federal
12 kVAKE FortesT L. Rev. 7:), 75-76 (Spring 1976): Marcus, The Grand Slam Grano' (..en-
trill Termination Decision: A Luclid f o r Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDI? awl A B esobthon
of the RegulatorylTaki»g Impasse, 7 l'icwArGr L.Q. 731, 75)) (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Marcus].
37 '' City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiain) (up-
holding ban of push-cart food sales in New Orleans' French Quarter in face or equal
protection attack on its -- grandfather provision" exempting two such vendors). See also
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 51ti F.20 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting claim that
strict architectural control ordinance applicable to the Quarter constituted a - taking ).
rent. denied. 426 U.S. 9t)5 (197(3).
"" Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New lurk City. 438 U.S. 104, 108
(1978).
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both types of justification,:'H° New York City (the City) adopted a Landmarks
Preservation Law in 1965 which created a Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion (the Commission) with power to designate historic, scenic or cultural
landmarks, landmark sites, and historic districts located in the City. 38" The
owners of a building designated as an historic landmark under this law.'"
were subject to substantial development and use restrictions and were re-
quired to assume certain repair and maintenance duties.""
Pursuant to this New York scheme. Grand Central Terminal was deSig-
nated as an historic landmark in 1967. The next year, the Terminal's owner,
Penn Central Transportation Gonpany, and the lessees of its development
rights applied to the Commission for permission to construct a multi-story
office building above the Terminal. Despite compliance with other applicable
zoning ordinances, the Commission rejected both their plan for a 53-story
building, as involving too much destruction to the Tert»inal's facade, and
their plan to cantilever a 55-story tower above the existing facade as "nothing
more than an aesthetic joke. - " 8:' Penn Central and its lessees then sued the
City in the New York State courts. contending that the Commission's actions
under the Landmarks Preservation Law constituted a "taking" of their prop-
erty without "just compensation -
 in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendinents" 86
 and a deprivation of property in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth aniendmein."s 7
Although the trial court granted the injunction sought., its ruling was
reversed by the Appellate Division."'" The New York Court of Appeals, in
turn, unanimously affirmed the Appellate Division in an opinion authored by
Chief judge tireitel."'" He rejected out of hand Penn Central's "taking
-
3 " See N.Y.C. AnNuN. Com.: ch. 8A, § 205-1.0(a), (b) (1970).
"2 Irl. at § 207 et seq.
"3
 Tile process involves CominiSSion investigation, notice to the owner, a hear-
ing, Commission designation. New York City Board ii Estimate approval, and the
right to judicial review. Id. 207.
3 " For more detailed consideration of these restrictions imposed by the Land-
mark Preservation Law. see Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. at 110-15: Rankin, Operation twirl nlerprelal ion of the New York Gilt' Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law, 30 L. S.,.• CoNTEN11'. PRoli. 360 (1971); Confluent, Cultural Ecolagy: The
Urban Landmark as an Environmental Resource, 11 U. SAN FRANCISCO I,. RE.v. 720, 722-25
(1177) (hereinafter cited as S.F. Commend.
3 ' 3
 438 U.S. at 118(quotin), the Commission's report). The Commission
explained, "[QhMe simply, the mower would overwhelm the Terminal by its slicer mass.
The 'addition' would be four times its high as the existing structure and would reduce
the Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity."
' 84 ' INlor shall private property he taken for public use, without just compen-
sation. - U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. This prohibition is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. No' Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 220 (1897).
387
 See now 1511 supra.
Peon Central Transpnrialiim Co. v. City of Ness' Yolk, 51) A.D.2d 265, 377
N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dept 1975).
3" Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 300
N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). For valuable commentary on judge Breitel's
innovative approach to the case, see Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand
Central Terminal Decision, ¶11 HAHV. L. REV. 402 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CostonisL
and S.F. Comment. supra note 384.
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claim on the ground that there had been no transfer of control over the
Terminal to the City, but only a restriction on its use. 3" He further con-
cluded that this restriction did not constitute a due process violation, because
Penn Central could obtain a "reasonable return" on the "privately created and
privately managed ingredient" of the Terminal."' The Supreme Court af-
firmed the New York court's decision by a 6 to 3 margin in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Brennan. 3 "2 The majority opinion focused upon the "tak-
ing" question, but analyzed it in terms of "reasonable return." 3• As Justice
Brennan viewed it:
The question presented is whether a city may, as part of a com-
prehensive program to preserve historic landmarks and historic dis-
tricts, place restrictions on the development of individual historic
landmarks—in addition to those imposed by applicable zoning
ordinances—without effecting a "taking" requiring the payment of
"just compensation
This statement, as well as Judge Breitel's more dramatic framing of the
issue,"5 indicates that the two courts not only accepted, but also built upon the
broad deference to community self-determination represented by such cases
as Belle Terre and Arlington Heights. First, they placed beyond peradventure the
judicial acceptance of particular exercises of local self-rule premised solely
upon non-instrumental aesthetic considerations. 31 " This position was a
3"" 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1274. 307 N.Y.S.2d at 916. In an earlier
unanimous opinion authored by Chief Judge Breitel, the New York Court of Appeals
had ruled that unreasonable regulations not resulting in actual government control of
the property would be invalidated but would not give rise to claims for just compensa-
tion under an inverse condemnation "taking" theory. Fred F. French Investing Co.,
Inc. v. City of New York (Tudor Parks), 39 N.Y.2(1 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). Accord, H FH, Ltd. v. Superior Court. of Los
Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rpt.r. 365 (1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 904 (1976); see also Fa:ilia, Growcock, & Ungar, 1977-78 Annual Review of
Local Government. judicial and Constitutional Intervention in Municipal Fiscal Affairs, 10
URB. Law. 573, 581 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freilich el al.1 (characterizing this as
the "majority view'').
3 " 1 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2cl at 916.
3"2 438 U.S. 104 (1978). He seas joined by justices Stewart. White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist dissented, in an opinion joined by Chief jus-
tice Burger and Justice Stevens, on the ground that a compensable taking had taken
place. 438 U.S. at 138, 144.
3o
 justice Brennan specifically reserved judgment on the "inverse condemna-
tion" issue, which Judge Breitel had treated as foreclosed. Compare note 390 supra
and accompanying text with note 407 infra and accompanying text.
:19-' 438 U.S. at 107.
333 "In broadest terms, the problem in this case is determining the scope of
governmental power, within the Constitution, to preserve, without resorting to emi-
nent domain, irreplaceable landmarks deemed to be of inestimable social or cultural
significance." 42 N.Y.2(.1 at 327, 311)1 N.E.2d al 1272, 397 N.Y.S.2c1 at 915.
39" The Commission's refusal of building permission, which the majority up-
held, was based solely on the detrimental effect the proposed construction would have
upon "the majestic approach from the south." Sri! 438 U.S. at 117 (returning to the
Commission's report). While disagreeing with the particular means employed to pre-
serve Grand Central Terminal, the dissenters did accept aesthetic considerations as a
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natural outgrowth of language in Belle Terre, which upheld single-family zon-
ing,""' and in the later Young v. American Mini Theaters, inc.,"" which upheld
the dispersal and control of "adult businesses" to preserve residential
neighborhoods.'" Yet, it went beyond these cases by upholding a land use
regulation whose direct economic benefits were much less immediate.'" Sec-
ond, while earlier zoning cases had upheld land use regulations covering a
relatively broad geographic area, the regulations upheld in Penn Central
placed development restrictions on particular plots and buildings."' Finally,
the just compensation claim rejected in Penn Central was premised on much
more specific constitutional language 402 than the claims of the plaintiffs in
Arlington Heights, Belle Terre, Rodriguez, or Ambach. 903 Yet, the quasi-
legitimate objective of local government land use regulation. See 438 U.S. at 147 n.10.
152 n.14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
u' See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
427 U.S. 50 (1976). See notes 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
' 1 " 427 U.S. at 71-73. The Court gave very little attention to alternative, less
restrictive means of furthering this goal, e.g., through concentration rather than dis-
persion of Detroit's adult businesses.
4"" Indeed, historic preservation restrictions actually prevent a landowner from
making the "best economic use" of his or her property, even though the proposed use
is not a "noxious" one in the same sense as the prohibited brickyard in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), or the sand and gravel pit in Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), or the adult bookstores and theaters in Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (see notes 398-99 supra and accom-
panying text). This is shown by the fact that historic preservation restrictions forbid
even development that is in compliance with existing zoning laws or building codes.
Thus, the Penn Central Court. had to reject the so-called "noxious use" takings test. See
438 U.S. at n.30. See generally Marcus. supra note 378. at 742.
1 "' Judge Breitel's opinion acknowledged this directly, by noting, "This is not a
zoning case" in which "Le]ach property owner in the zone is both benefited and re-
stricted front exploitation," nor one involving "landmark regulation of a historic dis-
trict ... designed to maintain the character, both economic and esthetic or cultural, of
an area.- Though he found some common characteristics. ''landmark regulation is dif-
ferent because the burden of limitation is borne by a single owner. He may or may not
benefit from that limitation but his neighbors most likely To this extent, such
restrictions resemble 'discriminatory' zoning restrictions, - 42 N.Y.2d at 329-30, 366
N.E.2d at 1274. 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18. Justice Rehnquist's dissent made a great deal
of this concession, 438 U.S. at 139 n.2. However, his quotation from Judge Breiters
opinion left out the crucial three sentences which followed: "There is, however, a sig-
nificant difference. Discriminatory zoning is condemned because there is no acceptable
reason for singling out one particular parcel for different and less favorable treatment.
When landmark regulation is involved, there is such a reason: the cultural, architec-
tural, historical, or social significance attached to the affected parcel. - 42 N.Y.2d at
330, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion went even further in concluding that "the New
York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or
aesthetic interest wherever they may be found in the city." 438 U.S. at 132. See id. at
im.28 & 32. The counsel for the New York City Planning Commission argued that this
"language would seem to encourage communities In think big—in terms of' large com-
prehensive landmark designation programs—not only for their own sake, but also as a
fortification against charges of arbitrariness." ,Marcus, supra note 378, at 744-45.
'1112 See note 386 supra.
4 ` 1 " Arlington Heights, Rodriguez, and Ambach involved equal protection attacks
upon local ordinances or state statutes, while Belle Terre was based upon the penumbral
rights of privacy and travel.
838	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:763
constitutional doctrine of community self-determination developed in these
earlier cases nevertheless provided a basis for both the New York Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court to reject the challenge to the operation of
the City's historic preservation scheme, thereby expanding local government
discretion over land use regulation. •
Two cross-cutting factors appear to have contributed to the broad judi-
cial deference of Penn Central. First, New York's historic preservation scheme
did not involve direct local government self-interest to the same extent as the
repeal of the covenant considered in U.S. Trust.'" Yet, at the same time,
there was judicial recognition, not far from the surface, that. New York City
would have been unable, in the midst of its fiscal crisis, to purchase the Ter-
minal's development rights through its eminent. domain powers. 905
justice Brennan's Penn Central opinion did, however, explicitly acknow-
ledge that there are limits to the extent of community self-determination.
These limits simply had not been exceeded by the particular development
restrictions reviewed."'" Indeed, the Court quite clearly left open the possi-
404
 See note 184 supra and accompanying text. This may well have been an
important factor persuading Justice Blackmun (author of U.S. Trust) and Justices
Stewart and Powell (non-participants in that decision) to join Justice Brennan and the
other two U.S. Trust dissenters to form a six-man majority in Penn Central. Compare
note 178 supra with note 392 supra.
4 " Chief Judge Breitel observed:
In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks through use
of the eminent domain power might be desirable, or even required. But
when a less expensive alternative is available, especially when a city is in
financial distress, it should not he forced to choose between witnessing the
demolition of its glorious past and mortgaging its hopes for the future.
42 N.Y.2d at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 9'22. Breitel, having written the
majority opinion in Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d
731, 358 N.E.2d 848. 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976), was well aware both of the City's finan-
cial crisis and of the need for judicial protection of property rights during that crisis.
See note 362 supra.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent also saw the financial question as crucial to the resolu-
tion of the Penn Central case:
The question in this case is whether the cost associated with the city of New
York's desire to preserve a limited number of "landmarks - within its bor-
ders Must be borne by all of its taxpayers of whether it can instead be
imposed entirely on the owners of individual properties.
438 U.S. at 138, 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), See also id. at 152-53. It is interesting
to contrast Justice Rehnquist 's view, that the burden here should be borne by the
taxpayer; (through the City's payment. of "just compensation") rather than by the indi-
vidual property owner, with an earlier case involving a conflict between a citizen whose
civil (rather than property) rights had been violated by local government officials. In
that case, he (again joined by the Chief Justice) concluded that local government fi-
nancial considerations dictated, in effect, that. the wronged individual rather than the
taxpayers (through the City's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) should bear the burden.
See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv, of the City of New York. 436 U.S. 658, 714
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4 "" In concluding that Penn Central could still obtain a reasonable return on the
Terminal, both the Supreme Court, 438 U.S. at 137, and the New York Court of
Appeals, 42 N.Y.2c1 at 334-35, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2t1 at 920-21, treated as
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bility that local governments may be required to compensate landowners for a
more extreme form of regulation, even for one that did not result in an ac-
tual transfer of ownership or contra"' More recently, in Agins v. City of
Tiburon,408 the Court again raised the specter of such an "inverse condemna-
tion" remedy.
Thus, although it was born within a different constitutional context, Penn
Central can be recognized as the progeny of the judicial deference cases dis-
cussed in Section II–A above. Like them, it upholds a very broad expansion
of local government self-rule, while warning that certain overall limits still
remain. It is likely to fortify those local governments which choose to be ag-
gressive with respect to energy and neighborhood conservation, 469
 as well as
historic preservation. These governments should, however, avoid extreme
regulations which totally destroy the value of a landowner's property, and
therefore constitute a taking.
B. Regulation of Environmental Pollution: Who Controls the Ambiance?
Recent attempts to curtail air and water pollution—to prevent harm to
the urban environment, rather than to preserve its attractive aspects — have
raised serious questions regarding congressional intereference with state and
significant the fact that the unused development rights could be transferred to several
other Penn Central-owned parcels in the vicinity. New York's scheme permits owners
of landmarks who are prevented by historic preservation regulations from developing
their property to the full extent allowed by zoning controls to transfer their unused
development rights to nearby parcels. See N.Y.C. Zoning Resolution. §§ 74-79 to -793.
Interestingly, transferability was substantially expanded as a result of a 1969 amend-
ment initiated by Penn Central. Marcus, supra note 378, at 737, 747. The legitimacy
conferred upon transferable development rights by these Penn Central decisions should
encourage local governments to employ this device as a component in their programs
for historic preservation and other forms of environmental and energy-related land
use control. See id. at 750-51. An impressive, dispute-filled . literature on transferable
development rights has already developed. See, e.g., Berger, The Accommodation Power in
Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 Cot.unt. L. RE v. 799 ( 1976);
Chicago Plan, supra note 377, at 584-89; Costonis, supra mite 329; Cosionis, "Fair Com-
pensation" and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Con-
troversies, 75 CoLust. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City,
36 L. & CONTEMP. PRoB. 372 (1971); Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and
the Tithing Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BurrAt.o L. REv. 77
(1974).
407 The Court felt it necessary, even before beginning the main body of its
analysis, to make the "implicit - explicit: "[Me do not embrace the proposition that a
taking can never occur unless Government has transferred physical control over a por-
tion of a parcel. - 438 U.S. at 123 n.24. See Freilich et at, supra note 390. at 58-84.
4" I00 S. C:t. 2138 (1980). Justice Powell. for a unanimous Court, concluded
that it was unnecessary to consider whether a state may limit "taking - remedies 10
mandamus and declaratory judgment. because no taking had occurred in the case be-
fore him. A case on this term's Supreme Court docket may result in a final determina-
tion of the issue. See San Diego Gas L Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 48 U.S.L.W.
3820 (June 17. 1980) (postponing ruling on jurisdiction in appeal from California
courts raising quesnon of proper remedy for inverse condemnation).
"9 This would include innovative zoning schemes to encourage both active and
passive solar housing, wind energy systems, and energy conservation.
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local governments as service-providers. Though most of these environmental
policies are formulated at the national level,"" the federal government must,
as a practical matter, rely upon state and local authorities to implement many
of its policies."" The requisite federal-state partnership has, however, largely
failed to produce timely implementation of congressional pollution control
standards. 412
 Part. of this failure can be attributed to the insufficient adminis-
trative resources available to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which has primary responsibility for these programs at the federal level. 413
Moreover, state and local officials have been "exposed to intensive pressure
from politicians, industry, unions, and citizens reacting to the costs (economic
and otherwise) of controlling pollution and the possibility of unemployment
and curtailment of economic development. " 414 These pressures upon state
and local officials tend to prevail, because there are few strong incentives for
them to assume the political, economic, and administrative burdens required
to further national environmental goals. 9 "Ci As a result, stale and local en-
vin.mmental agencies are generally underfunded and understaffed.
The principal inquiry, therefore, is: can Congress compel slate and local
governments to act, or must it induce their cooperation by providing financial
incentives? 411; To derive an answer to this politico-legal question, one must
consider, first, the extent of congressional power to regulate land use plan-
ning and environmental enforcement directly, without state and local in-
volvement.; second, the constitutional limits upon national authority to impose
ettf'o•cement. duties, on local authorities; and, third, 'the practical limits on
federal funding of pollution control schemes.
4111 The "dormant" commerce clause. see notes 257-59 supra and accompanying
text, places limits on the power of state and local governments to formulate policies
that involve screening out environmental waste. See, e.g.. Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating New Jersey law that forbade importation of solid
waste from other slates for disposal in its landfills).
"' This dependence is due to "the nation's size and geographic diversity, the
close interrelation between environmental controls and local land use decisions, and
federal officals' limited implementation and enforcement resources. Stewart, supra
note 262, at 1196. Sel! also 116 CoNc. RF.c. 19,204 (1970) (statement nl Rep. Staggers).
' 2 See, e.g., Downing & Brady, Implementing the Clear Air Act: A Case Study of'
Oxident Control in Los Angeles, 18 NAT. RES. J. 237 (1978) [hereina•ter cited as Downing
& Brady]; Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits
of Aspirational Commands, 78 CoLum. L. Rev. 1429 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hender-
son & Pearson].
'"" Stewart, supra note 262, at 1200-01. There were also a variety of
background difficulties—the unrealistic "aspirational" goals, the complexity of pollu-
tion and of the technology needed to reduce it, the expense of uniform regulatory
measures, and the increased costs occasioned by the 1973 energy crisis and recession.
Id. at 1199-1200. Henderson & Pearson, supra note 412:. La Pierre, Technology-Forcing
and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 1i2 IOWA L. REY. , 771 (1977).
4L4	 CWall „tupra now 262, at 1201.
41 ' Apparently the federal government faced similar problems in obtaining
cooperation by state and local officials in the enforcement of fugitive slave and prohi-
bition laws. See Henderson & Pearson, supra note 412, at 1431-32 11,10, 1464 11.183.
4 "'• See Zoning, supra note 159, at 1610-18.
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1. Direct Federal Enforcement
The commerce clause grants Congress substantial authority to control
private uses of land, air. and water that have significant spillover effects in
tither political jurisdictions. Thus. federal regulatory authority is particularly
inappropriate with respect to developments along state borders and within
especially critical ecosystems: 41 ' Federal control can be extended, under a
variety of theories, to more localized pollution sources owned by private indi-
viduals or corporations. 418
 The application of federal land use regulations to
the detailed locational decisions made by state and local governments may be
somewhat more debatable,'" but even this potential impairment of the
service-provider role can be justified where state and local actions have spill-
over effects. 42" In short, the congressional enactment 411 a nationwide pollu-
tion control program, to be enforced by federal officials against both public
and private sources, should pose no insuperable 421 constitutional
 ohst l-
117 Id. at 1578-70, 1588. 1614-15, The physical movement of pollutants across
slate borders has been held to constitute interstate connucrce ihal can he regulated by
Congress. S re South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646. 677 (Ist Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Stipp. 624, 629-32 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 423
F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 308 U.S. 904 (1970).
4IJ4 congress
 would he able to impose controls " n anY flint (however local)using goods produced in interstate commerce, upon all potential polluters in order to
minimize competition between those located in slates with lax environmental controls
and those subject to strict state controls, or upon firms affecting- inland or coastal
waters. See Stewart. supra note 262. at 1222-23. and sources cited therein. See ge nem ill'
cLairt v. New Orleans Bd. of Realtors. 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (describing Congress'
broad power to regulate activities -affecting commerce"). The commerce clause also
places limits on the power of state and local governments to act within the same
sphere. See note 410 supra.
''" One commentator gives the following illustration: "kvIhere federal regula-
tions would erect significant impediments to the location and construction of stale
medical. sanitation. or recreational facilities. it might he concluded that the regulations
'displace state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of
those governmental services: - /otoiig, sit pra note 159. at 1614-15, gum ing National
League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S. 888. 847 (1076).
12 " So,
 National League of Cities v. User}', 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring): Illinois s'. City of Milwaukee. 406 U.S. 01 (1972): District
if Columbia v. Train. 521 F.2d 971, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated na other grou nds sub
nom . EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Stewart, supra note 262, at 1229-30.
42 ' Federal regulation of private property' would, of course, still he suhject to
"taking" and due process challenges comparable to those discussed in Section V—A
supra, See Sierra Club v. EPA. 540 F.2d 11)4. 1139-40 (D.C. (;ir. 1976) (restrictions
imposed under Clean Air Act of 1970 to prevent - significant deterioration" of air
already cleaner than national ambient standards did not constitute a taking), vacated
and re ow ruled (for c o nsideration or moonless). 434 U.S. 809 (1977); In re Surface Min-
ing Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Stipp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978); same, 456 F. Stipp. 1301
(D.D.C. 1978) (ruling upon various statutory, due process. and takings challenges to
Department of Interior mining regulations); ,sir gew eml y Zrming, supra note 159, at
1620-24: Stewart, The netted repine), of Administrative a net Quasi-Constitutional Late in j tat
601 ne•ie te of Environ mental Derision ma king: Lessons from Mr Cleat Air Art, 62 IolVA
REv. 713 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stewart, Developments].
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cles.422
 It is only where national legislators or officials attempt to force state
and local governments to finance and enforce such a federal program that
National League of Cities constraints are likely to arise.""
2. Attempted Federal Control of State and Local Actors
The Supreme Court has not vet outlined the precise contours of constitu-
tional constraints on federal interference with state and local decisions in the
environmental field. In Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown 424
 the Court
vacated and remanded, on the issue of mootness, 421' rulings by the Fourth,
Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits that the Clean Air Act of 1970 426
could not, without raising tenth amendment objections. be interpreted to au-
thorize the EPA to order states to adopt and enforce federal transportation
control programs. 427
The history of these cases began with the Clean Air Act's elaborate
"cooperative federalism" scheme for attaining and maintaining national am-
bient. air quality standards. 428
 That Act gave the EPA 120 days to propose
and promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality stan-
dards. 42 " No more than nine months later, each slate was to produce a State
Implementation Plan .
 (SIP), showing compliance with primary standards
422
 Even such a comprehensive federal pollution control act need not preempt
all state and local activity in the field. For example, in both the Noise Control Act of
1972, 42 U.S.C, §§ 4901-4918 (1977). and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 691)1-6987 (1977), Congress recognized the importance of retaining
a limited statellocal sphere of influence. See generally British Airways Bd. v. Port Au-
thority, 564 F.2d 1002. 1010-11 (2c1 Or. 1977); Andersen, Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Cap, 1978 Wis. L. REV, 633 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Anderson'.
423
 The same National League of Cities constraints would not apply to congres-
sional attempts to end local exclusionary zoning. see McDougal, supra note 31. at
342-43 (making such a proposal). because that legislation mittkl be based on Congress'
power under § 5 ()I' the fourteenth amendment. as a means of increasing individual
civil rights. See notes 280-97 supra and accompanying text. National environmental
legislation, on the other hand, does not so easily fit into this rights-expansion analysis.
See Stewart. supra note 262. at 1245-46. This is because a citizen 's assertion of" a "right"
to clean air and water is more akin to claiming a "right" to minimum wages and
maximum hours (as would municipal worker's covered by the legislation invalidated in
national League of Cities itself). See Trthe. supra note 262. at 1103. See generally R. DWOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS Staxtoust.) -
 82-84 (1978) (distinguishing between "principles" and
"policies").
" 4
 431 U.S. 99 (1977),
42 '' Id. at 104. EPA had modified its regulations somewhat and agreed to [nod-
them further. Id. at 103.
425
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1975), now recodilied as 42 U.S.C.A. § 74 10 (19179),
"7 SP(' Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-28 (4th Cir. 1975): Arizona v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 825. 820 (9th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827. 837-42 (9th Cir.
1975); District olColumbia v. Train, 521 F.2(l 971, 990-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Although
nol appealed, the contrary ruling of the Third Circuit, Pennsylvania v. EPA. 500 F.2d
240, 259
- 62 (3(1 Car. 1974), is open to serious question, since it relied upon :Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1908), which was overruled in National League if Cities. See also
Brown v. EPA. 521 F.2d 827. 838 n.45 (9th Car. 11)75) (concluding Third Circuit had
read Maryland v. 1Virtz too broadly), vacated on other grounds, 43l U.S. 99 (1977).
42 ' See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 76(17-7410. 7413 (1979).
470
 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-1 (1976). now recodified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 74091 ( 1979).
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within three years and secondary standards within a specified reasonable
time. 430 SIPs were then to be submitted to the EPA for review."'
The Act also grants the EPA Administrator authority to approve or dis-
approve a proposed SIP in whole or in part, 432 and promulgate a federally
developed implementation plan to serve in place of the disapproved por-
tions. 433 Once a final SIP is developed, the state has primary responsibility
for its enforcement, but the EPA has broad authority to bring federal en-
forcement actions when the state fails to act. 434
Following this scheme, the EPA promulgated several ambient air quality
standards in 1971 435 and requested the states to submit SIPs with automobile
emission controls adequate to meet these standards."' In response to the
local opposition of downtown merchants, commuters, and real estate develop-
ers to restrictions on automobile use and "indirect sources" of pollution, 437
many states refused to include these controls in their SIPs. 438 The EPA
reacted by promulgating provisions for inclusion in the SIPs of recalcitrant
43" The SIPs were to include, inter alio., "emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be
necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary stan-
dard, including, but nit limited to, land-use and transportation controls." 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-5(a)(2)(B), now recodified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2)(B) (1979).
431 See Brady & Downing, Amending the Clean Air Act: The Past is Prologue, 3
ENV, Poucv & L, 158 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brady & Downing]. The EPA review
process is governed by 42 U.S.C.A. § . 7410(a)(2) (1979).
432 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2) (1979).
4 " 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1979). The Supreme Court has unanimously ruled
that the EPA Administrator may not take into account, in making his review, the
economic and technological feasibility of a proposed SIP, because the Clean Air Act is
designed to force regulated sources to develop new technological solutions to pollution
problems. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-58 (1976). See Comment, In-
feasibility Claims Following Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 62 IOWA L. REV. 923 (1977).
1 " 4 See Brady & Downing, supra note 431, at 158. For a detailed discussion of
the enforcement options open to EPA, see Mintz, Air Pollution Control '2-14 to 2-16, in
IECLE, ENVIRONMENTAL. LAW HANDBOOK (1978).
43' Sulfur oxides, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, photo-chemical oxi-
dants, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen dioxide were covered. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.11
(1971).
43" Initially, the EPA granted extensions to many states for the submission of
transportation control plans and for the attainment of primary standards for the
auto-related pollutants—carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxi-
dants. These extensions were held to be impermissible tinder the Act. See National
Resources Defense Council, inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also City of
Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The EPA then issued a
notice, 38 Fed. Reg. 7323 (Mar. 20, 1973), requiring states that had not already done
so to submit transportation control plans by April 15, 1973, showing achievement of
primary standards for auto-related pollutants by May 31. 1975. See generally 38 Fed.
Reg. 30,626 (Nov. 6, 1973); Stewart, Developments, supra note 421, at 725-27.
437 'Indirect sources" include such developments as shopping centers, large
parking facilities, sports complexes. and highways. See 39 Fed. Reg. 7270-85 (Feb. 25,
1974). Regulations on this subject were subsequently suspended. See Brown v. EPA,
521 F.2cl 827 (1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 99 (1977): Stewart, supra note 421,
at 726 n.66. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5)(A) (1978), added by Pub. L. 95-93 (forbid-
ding EPA Administrator to require inclusion of indirect source review program as
condition of approval of an SIP).
438 Henderson & Pearson, supra note 412, at 1463; Stewart, Developments, supra
note 421, at 725-26: Stewart, supra note 262. at 1203-04.
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states which required the latter to adopt "retrofit, - inspection, and mainte-
nance programs and indirect source control programs.'" Several states then
challenged the regulations, contending that the EPA lacked authority to sub-
ject them to criminal and civil penalties for Failure to adopt. legislation, pro-
vide funds. and administer federal programs to control privately produced
emissions. In 1975, three courts of appeals agreed, ruling that the 1970 Act.
did not "make the states departments of the'' EPA"" or authorize its adrninis-
trawl' to "commandeer the[irl 44 1regulatory powers.'' Even without benefit.
of the Supreme Court's subsequent exegesis of its federalism doctrine in Na-
tional League of Cities, these courts stressed that any alternative reading of the
Act. would result in its invalidity under the t.ent.h amendment:142
Given the need for state and local enforcement. of federal environmental,
welfare, and energy programs, it is likely that the Supreme Court soon will
have to confront the difficult constitutional issue it avoided by remanding
Brown 4 4
 " and Congress postponed by amending the Clean Air Act. in
1977.444 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit. on remand, reinforced by the National
l'" See 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.257(e), .258(1), .259(f) (1976) (transportation controls);
vi. §§ 52.242(1), .243(1'), .244(f) (air pollution controls).
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827. 835 (9(11 Cir. 1975), and Maryland v. EPA,
530 F.2d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 1975).
44 ' District of Columbia v. Train. 521 F.2d 971. 992 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'° Ninth Circuit also pointed to limits imposed by guaranty clause, U.S.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. Brown v. EPA. 52l F.2d 827, 84(1-42 (9th Cir. 1975). The Dis-
trict of CO] ulnbia Circuit appeared to rule that the Administrator's actions exceeded
both the commerce clause and the Clean Air Act. District of Columbia v, Train, 521
F.2d 971. 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit spoke more generally of "state
sovereignty." Maryland v, EPA, 521 F.2d 215, 225-26 (4th Cir. 1975).
" 3 Justice Stevens criticized the Court for trying to avoid it initially:
The action the Court takes today is just as puzzling as the federal parties'
position. Unless and until. the Environmental Protection Agency rescinds
the regulations in dispute, it is perfectly clear that the litigation is not
moot. Moreover, an apparent admission that those regulations are invalid
unless modified is not a proper, reason for vacating the Court of Appeals
judgments which invalidated the regulations.
... By vacating the judgments below, the Court hands the federal
panics a partial victory as a reward for an apparent concession that their
position is not supported by the statute.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
444
 The decision in Brown can he viewed as "a legislative remand for Congress
to correct deficiencies in the 1970 Act." Brady & Downing, supra note 431, at 160-62.
Yet, the 1977 Amendments made no relevant changes in the provisions regarding the
categories of actors subject to EPA sanctions. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) to
8(a)(2) (1970) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(a)(1) to (a)(2) (1979) (identical: "any person" in
violation of SIP); compare 42 U.S.C. § J857c-8(b) (1975) with 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1978)
(slight modification on other grounds); compare 42 U.S.C. 1857(e) (1970) with 42
U.S.C.A. 7602(e) (1979) (both defining "person" to include "State, municipality [and]
political subdivision -). See generally Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). The 1977 Amendments did, however,
make two important. changes which may well affect the actual operation of the
federal-state partnership. See notes 466 & 470 infra and accompanying text.
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League of Cities ruling, has reinstated its earlier decision, despite amendments
to the SIP and the presentation of more subtle arguments by the EPA. 445
3. Federal Financing of State and Local Environmental Activities
The court. of appeals decisions denying EPA authority to impose en-
forcement, duties on state and local governments suggested that national en-
vironmental policies might instead be achieved through conditional federal
funding. 44ii Congress adopted a limited form of this approach in section 129
of the Clean Air Act of 1977, 4 " which prohibits the EPA to make any grants
under the Act to a state which has no implementation plan for attainment of
national primary ambient standards 448 or which has failed to implement any
requirement of its SIP. 44 " It also forbids any federal government authority to
fund, license, approve or "support in any way" activities that do not conform
to the applicable SIP. 45 " Two questions are presented by this financial
carrot-and-stick approach: (1) does it face any of the constitutional barriers
considered above, and (2) can it successfully achieve national air quality goals?
As explained at greater length above, 45 ' the state sovereignty constraints
upon legislation based on the commerce clause do not apply when Congress
exercises its power under the spending clause, Since Congress is providing (or
is threatening to remove) funds for the very program to which federal re-
quirements are attached, there is no interference with the service-provider
role of the state and local governments which accept the grant. They can
simply refuse to initiate the program and thus avoid being forced to decide
between loss of essential funds and compliance with federal government dic-
tates. Similarly, the potential infringement upon self-rule created by having to
comply with federal administrative, rather than local constitutent, demands
can be avoided by simply refusing the funds initially.''" Yet, the spending
power is not unlimited: the very factors which allow it to be so expansive also
suggest its linnts. Since a state or local government must he able to maintain
it.s autonomy by opting out of a federal grant. program that has unacceptable
41 ' See Brown v. EPA, 566 E.24.1 665 (9th (:ir. 1977) (rejecting EPA's claim that
states could be required to adopt such programs because they had contributed to air
pollution by building- highways and other indirect sources). The District of Columbia
Circuit also reinstated portions of its earlier ruling and allowed the parties to prepare
a more complete administrative record. which could also form the basis of a new ap-
peal to the Supreme Court. See District of Columbia V. Costle. 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d at 228 (speaking of the "alternative whip of
economic pressure and seductive favor''); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d at
9113 11.26: Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at 840.
42 U.S.C.A,	 7406(a), JO (111711).
aas H. at § 7506(a)(3):
' 1 " hi. al	 7506(h).
.17,11
Sec notes 2118 -307 supra and accompanying text.
See North Carolina v. Califano. ,-15 U.S. 962 (11178). aff 445 F. Supp. 532
(E.D.N.C. 11177): Stewart. mtpra note 262, at 1254-55 (''conditions reasonably related to
the purpose of federal spending programs will not he invalidated unless they impose
quite extreme or unusual constraints ou the structure of state governments-).
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conditions attached, the federal government may not tie disbursement of its
funds for one activity to compliance with federal regulations in a totally unre-
lated Field.'"
Thus, the Clean Air Act funding requirements discussed above 44."1 should
pass constitutional muster so long as they are enforced by the EPA and other
federal authorities in connection with programs that have a reasonable rela-
tionship to air quality control. 45 " Indeed, more far-ranging penalties for
states that fail to meet federal environmental protection goals 45" could be
added to federal airport, highway, and conservation grant programs.'"
Although the constitutional hurdles can be cleared, the overall effective-
ness of this carrot-and-stick spending approach is problematic at best. The
cost. of direct federal enforcement, or of payment for a substanfital portion of
state enforcement efforts,''" may be prohibitive. 459 Moreover, one prominent.
commentator predicts "serious political and bureaucratic obstacles to actually
terminating federal grants or making the threat of termination credible. If
actually put to the choice, state [arid local] officals may often prefer to sac-
rifice the money rather than adopt unpopular environmental measures.'"
In fact, the EPA would be cutting off the lifeblood of its own programs were
it to terminate aid under the Clean Air Act,'" While attempts to penalize
"3
 Indeed, it is generally agreed that to allow the federal government to use its
grants in such a circuitous fashion to induce compliance in a second, unrelated field
would be us afford Congress a way of exercising its spending power where it is not
spending at all. See L TRIBE, supra note 305, at 18-19: Stewart. supra note 262, at
1257-59: Zoning, supra note 159. at 1(116. Such indirect conditions would, however, be
acceptable if Congress could regulate the second field directly. under one of its powers.
Thus, there may be lit -nits to such use of" the spending power in the environmental
area precisely because of the barriers to use of the commerce clause power to compel
stales to regulate pollution sources with Iiinned spillover effects. See notes 440-45 supra
and accompanying text.
4 " Sec notes 447-50 supra and accomixitiying text.
"' For example, to refuse funding for a sports area, parking facility, or other
indirect pollution source that did not comply with an adopted or promulgated SIP
would probably not vic.slate any National League Cities . principle. However, refusal of a
grant for police rookie weapons training because some police cars were not its com-
pliance with the SIP emission standards would be more questionable.
4'"
 The model could be provisions used in the Billboard Control Program. See
23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976): MANDELRER Nrrscii, supra note 1 3, at 555-88: Cunningham,
Billboard Control Under the Highway Beautification Act ,of 1965. 72 NIren. L. Rev. 1295
(1973).
417 See Zoning, supra note 159. at 1617.
458
 Professor Tribe argues that Congress exceeds it spending power when it
imposes regulatory burdens that are not substantially covered by the federal subsidy
involved. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 315-16: L. TRIBE, supra note 305. at 19.
45"
 While it is extremely difficult to estimate the cost of a full-scale federally
administered pollution-control program, it is worth noting that, for fiscal 1979, $25
million was appropriated to pay states for implementation and $12.6 million for fed-
eral administratiotrof the relatively stied], federally directed hazardous waste program.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6916, 6931 (1977). See generallv Andersen, supra note 422. at 658-59.
Limited federal demonstration projects are also extremely expensive.
Stewart, .supra note 262, al 1262.
45 See geni,ra irt,s Henderson ti Pearson. supra note 412, at 1440, and sources
cited therein.
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states by reducing grants in related areas involve less of an internal contradic-
tion, they will face even more extreme bureaucratic barriers." 2
EPILOGUE
The emerging pattern of Burger Court decisions here described—
deference to local government self-rule, recognition of congressional modifi-
cations of the individual rights/self-rule balance, and opposition to direct fed-
eral conscription of the state and local service-provider role—suggests the
broad outlines of the script for various political dramas of the 1980's. The
Court's development of the quasi-constitutional principle of self-rule,has pro-
vided local government officials with substantial discretion in many aspects of
land-use, finance, organizational and electoral structure, and employment.
Given the setting in which they must perform—local financial crises exacer-
bated by national inflation, recession, and energy shortages—local officials
will exercise this discretion in a way intended to maximize tax revenues and
minimize expenditures. Persons and groups disadvantaged by these self-rule
programmatic chOices—those excluded from residential communities or local
government workforces—will be forced to turn to state legislatures, state
courts,"''' or Congress for redress.
Congress, the Burger Court has acknowledged, has broad authority to
expand substantive individual rights, increase access to federal courts, and en-
large the remedies available. It also has substantial power to adopt social
programs which promote societal goals that differ substantially from those of
many state and local governments.""' Insofar as these federal programs re-
quire monitoring of individual citizens, distribution of personal benefits, or
imposition of penalties on a decentralized basis, however, their administrators
face severe practical difficulties created by size, distance, and cost.
1. Intergovernmental Relations
Because of the Burger Court's artictilatitin of constitutional barriers to
federal interference with "state sovereignty,'' federal agencies will he forced
into an elaborate bargaining relationship with state and local governments
over use of the latter's police power, tax revenues, and manpower resources
to administer and enforce the federal health care. pollution control, and
energy programs of the 1980's. This article and others which focus upon the
legal restraints on this multi-faceted negotiation process rarely capture the full
richness of the resulting political dramas.
4112 In particular, other federal agencies may fight attempts to prevent them
from furthering their own programmatic goals through intergovernmental aid. See
Downing S.: Brady, supra note 4 12, at 280-8 1.
4"3
 At least with respect In 1;111(1 use policies, those heing excluded can appa-
rently expect only the most limited response from state legislatures and courts. See
McDougal, .supra note 31, at 3 19-4 1.
4" The activities of the agencies administering these programs may also in-
volve expansion of individual and group rights. See notes 250-5(i supra and accom-
panying text.
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Both state and federal officials can employ a variety of bargaining
strategies within the broad legal parameters established by the Burger Court..
Federal officials can, for example. threaten to preempt a field, by handling all
enforcement themselves. Because of the prohibitive cost, however, this par-
ticular threat. generally lacks credibility. Alternatively, Congress could give
federal officials authority to intervene in crucial aspects of a regulatory pro-
gram while still leaving ordinary administration in the hands of the state." 5
Local officials may, however, demand more specific rewards before giving
their full cooperation in implementing daily administrative details.
Traditionally the federal government has purchased state and local coop-
eration through grants-in-aid, assuring proper performance by manipulating
the strings attached to these grants. This incentive approach can be further
developed by allowing cooperative states to gain financial benefits directly
from the regulatory program itself. The delayed compliance penalty intro-
duced by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 4 " had this feature. Simi-
larly. if motorists (or energy users) were assessed a set fine for violation of
pollution standards (or temperature limitations) the states would have an in-
centive to create inspection programs allowing them and their local govern-
ments. rather than the federal government, to collect the fines.
In the current era of declining local revenues, the threat of reducing .
federal funds to those localities which do not comply with federal goals is
likely to become increasingly important. Although still somewhat problem-
atic. i " 7 the EPA already has authority to threaten reduction not only of its
own grants but also of grants in related fields. This approach could be de-
veloped into a more comprehensive strategy if' nonpectunary incentives, such
as access to newer energy resources or temporary dispensation from energy
limitations, were made available to federal officials as a bargaining chip. This
would, however, require much greater coordination of national environmen-
tal, energy. and economic planning than has been possible in the past.
Another important strategy for both sides is to bring other actors onto
the stage. For example, the federal government might delegate enforcement.
and other authority to local governments willing to cooperate with federal
policies, thus by-passing apathetic: or even negative state government offi-
cials. 48
 Congress might also persuade sonic citizens to leave their role as
This approach is illustrated by the EPA powers to promulgate provisions of
an air pollution SIP and to prosecute exemplary cases when states fail to act. See notes
433-31 mdpra and accompanying text.
4 "" See Pub. I.. No, 95-95, §§ 112, 118.12 U.S.( .A. §§ 7413(d), 7420 (1979). In
requiring a major stationary source In pas as d penalty an amount equal to the
economic advantage it gains from failure to comply with the SIP by July I, 1979, these
provisions provided an importain financial incentive for slates to enter "final com-
pliance orders" quickly so that the compliance penalty would accrue to their enforce-
ment agencies rather than to the federal government. So, Downing & Brady, .supra
note 4[2, it 282-82.
467 Sec notes 444-50	 160-62 supra zuld accompanying text.
4 " 5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.	 7 , 110(0(3) (1978) (permitting EPA Administrator to
delegate to a general purpose local government iyith -adequate authority under State
or local law ... the authority to implement and enforce" the SIP within its area). If
federal delegation to local officials became a common practice, state legislatures might
attempt to limit the authority of local governments to administer these federally
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audience of the state-federal political dramas and become participating actors.
For example. it could reduce standing and other barriers to court access for
groups with interests parallel to those of the federal programs.;"" Similarly, it
could provide benefits for (or reduce burdens upon) citizens in states with a
federally approved implementation plan. 47 " Citizens seeking to obtain these
benefits (or to remove the burdens) are likely to press their states to adopt the
needed plan. But two can play at. this game of undercutting political support..
Since states and localities arc well represented in Congress, they could make
their interests felt by pressing for amendments to federal agency enabling
acts. 47 '
created programs. Not only would home rule municipalities be able to resist some of
these attempts under state law, but federal delegations could probably he made broad
enough to expand the powers even of non-home rule local governments. See generally
NIANDELKER & NETSCH. supra note 13, at 546-50.
4 " As the names of many of' the most important cases attest, private environ-
mental groups have played an important part in the enforcement of federal environ-
mental protection statues. Also, most civil rights cases are pursued by private litigation.
The statutory authorization of attorney's fee awards has provided substantial encour-
agement for these suits. See note 375 supra.
" 7 " The nonattainment area provisions of the Clean Air Act, added in 1977 by
Pub. L. No, 95-95, § 108(b). !nay operate in this manner. They authorize the EPA
Administrator to approve a SIP if and only if':
It provides that after June 30, 1979, no major stationary source shall he
constructed or modified in any nonattainment area to which such sub
plan applies, if the emissions from such facility will cause or contribute to
concentrations of any pollutant for which a national ambient air quality
standard is exceeded in such area. unless. as of the time of application for
a permit for such construction or modification. such [SIP] meets the re-
quirements of [sections 7501-081.
42	 7410(a)(2)(I) (1979). Thus, in any "nonanaimnent area.'' i.e., one in
which the concentration of a particular pollutant (e.g., a photochemical oxidant) ex-
ceeded the national standard on August 7. 1977. see id. at §§ 7407(d)(1), 7501(2). no
stationary source emitting 100 tons or more per year of that same pollutant, it/. at §
7411(a), may now be constructed or modili61 unless the SIP includes revised, stricter
air pollution controls described in irl. at ,§ 7502. See also id. at §§ 7501, 7503-04. It will
thus he in the developmental and competitive self-interest of an individual or corpora-
tion seeking to construct or modify a factory within a mmattainment area to persuade
the state government to include tile Section 7502 provisions in its SIP.
Initially, one might have anticipated judicial hostility to these provisions, given the
wide sweep of the nonattairtment area definition, see H.R. REP, ND, 291, reprinted in
11977] U.S. Com:, CosIG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1472 (additional views by Reps. Krueger.
Cammage, and Satterfield), and the striking similarity of" the relevant provisions. 42
U.S.C.A. 7502(b)(7). (10), (11) (1979), to the regulatory language disapproved in the
Brown companion cases. See notes 440-42 supra and accompanying text. Yet, the Ninth
Circuit recently affirmed a district court's refusal to grant an injunction against EPA's
ban on all major industrial construction in California's nonattainment areas. Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Costle. 1 i ENVIR, Rry. 667 (BNA) (9th Cir. Aug. 12. 1980) (ruling
appellants, a public interest law firm, had failed to show likelihood of success on merits
of statutory or constitutional attacks on the ban). See N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1979, at A
25, col. 2 (describing the ban): ,set generally 45 Fed Reg. 62,850 (Sept. 22. 1980) (EPA)
proposed rule exempting from construction ban political subdivisions with approved
nommainment plans event though entire nonattainment area in which they are located
lacks such an approved plan).
471 So, Weschlcr. The Political Safrgaarils-
 of Federalism: The Role of the Slates in the
Compo,tilion and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLuNt. 1.. Rev. 543 (1954).
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2. Citizen–Local Government Relations
While the urban fiscal crisis and the taxpayer's revolt will significantly
limit the scope of local government, they need not signal its demise. Local
governments will continue to affect the lives of their citizens in important
ways. In their self-rule capacity, they will become involved in innumerable
conflicts with local property owners—some seeking to reduce their tax bills,
others seeking to prevent regulation that lowers their property values.
Local governments can also continue to provide an important. avenue for
citizen participation and influence with respect to the creation, maintenance,
or termination of certain basic services. But these local citizen demands will
have to compete with substantial state and federal government, pressures,
coupled with financial incentives. In particular conflicts, local officials will side
with the Federal rather than their state government. In others, all three levels
will agree upon particular policies, and the local government will serve simply
as an enforcement body that interacts directly with citizens. The long-term
ability of local governments to maintain an even partially autonomous position
in this bargaining with the state and federal governments will depend not on
the Court's defense of "state sovereignty" or "self-determination," but on the
ability of local governments to obtain discretionary funds—via these higher
level governments, from their own taxpayers, or through fiscal/structural re-
form. 4 "
471
	 more complete phrase would be "structural reform with fiscal implica-
tio n." This may involve internal matters (administrative reorganization), transfer of
functions (airport or sewage plant to separately funded authority), tax-sharing among
contiguous local governments, or far-ranging structural reform of several local gov-
ernments (regionalism. metropolitan federation). See generally M ANDELK ER k Nrrscit,
supra note 13. at 405-528; GeHand. Decentralization, supra note 18.
